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Defining Crime, Delegating Authority—How
Different Are Administrative Crimes?
Daniel Richman†
As the Supreme Court reconsiders whether Congress can so freely provide
for criminal enforcement of agency rules, this Article assesses the critique of
administrative crimes though a federal criminal law lens. It explores the extent
to which this critique carries over to other instances of mostly well-accepted,
delegated federal criminal lawmaking—to courts, states, foreign governments,
and international institutions. By considering these other delegations through
the lens of the administrative crime critique, the Article destabilizes the critique’s
doctrinal foundations. It then suggests that if one really cares about liberty—not
the abstract “liberty” said to be protected by the separation of powers, but rather
the lived liberty gained through careful and accountable criminal lawmaking
that is free from the pathologies that have bedeviled federal criminal law for
more than a century—administrative crimes are normatively quite attractive.
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Introduction
Although—putting aside standard narcotics cases—they comprise a
relatively small fraction of federal criminal prosecutions brought each year,1 a
number of remarkably varied defendants are regularly charged with criminal
offenses that are largely defined by administrative agencies, executive or
independent. The executive who trades on inside information; the drug trafficker
of newer and ever-more-dangerous substances; the business that violates U.S.imposed sanctions on Iran; the immigration policy protestor who obstructs a
Senator’s office;2 and the greedy hoarder of personal protective equipment
during the COVID-19 pandemic3—all have been charged with offenses arising
from Congressional delegations of substantial criminal lawmaking authority to
the bureaucratic administrative process.
While the Supreme Court has occasionally looked askance at these
“administrative crimes” (also known as “regulatory crimes”),4 they remain a
well-accepted feature of federal criminal law,5 albeit one strongly condemned by
those worried about the anti-democratic creep of the administrative state.6 This
acceptance, however, may soon change. In Gundy v. United States, a plurality of
the Court found no violation of longstanding delegation principles in the criminal

1.
Cf. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Attorneys’ Annual Statistical Report, Fiscal 2020, tbl. 3A at 11-12
(2020), https://www.justice.gov/usao/page/file/1390446/download [https://perma.cc/R6QF-MEXJ]
(noting that, of 57,822 cases charged in fiscal year 2020, 24,445 were immigration cases, 12,607 were
drug cases, and 13,803 were violent crimes); Susan R. Klein & Ingrid B. Grobey, Debunking Claims of
Over-Federalization of Criminal Law, 62 EMORY L.J. 1, 6 (2012) (noting that “[a]side from prosecutions
of drug and immigration violators, which have increased significantly in recent years, the rate of
prosecution for most other federal offenses remains low and surprisingly static from year to year.”).
2.
United States v. Gosar, Case Nos. 19-306; 19-307; 19-308; 19-313; 19-315; 19-320, 2020 WL
231083 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 15, 2020) (protest at Senator Cantwell’s office relating to immigration detention
centers); see also United States v. Mumford, No. 3:17-CR-0008-JCC, 2017 WL 652449, at *3-4 (D. Or.
Feb. 16, 2017) (prosecution for causing disturbance in federal courthouse); United States v. Komatsu, 18cr-651 (ST), 2019 WL 2358020 (E.D.N.Y. Jun. 4, 2019) (same).
3.
Complaint and Affidavit in Support of Application for Arrest Warrants, United States v.
Bulloch, No. 20-MJ-327 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2020) (prosecution for accumulating with intent to resell for
excessive profit surgical masks that had been designated by the President as “scarce and critical material”
under the Defense Production Act).
4.
See Whitman v. United States, 574 U.S. 1003, 1004 (2014) (Scalia, J., statement respecting
denial of certiorari) (“[T]he rule of lenity . . . vindicates the principle that only the legislature may define
crimes and fix punishments. Congress cannot, through ambiguity, effectively leave that function to the
courts — much less to the administrative bureaucracy.” (citing United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5
Wheat) 76, 95 (1820)); Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 166 (1991) (acknowledging that “our cases
are not entirely clear” as to whether Congress need give “more specific” guidance for “regulations that
contemplate criminal sanctions,” but finding no need to resolve that issue in the case at hand)
5.
See, e.g., Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 768-74 (1996) (finding appropriate
Congress’s delegation to the President to set aggravating factors in capital murder cases trial under military
law). In Loving, the Court determined that “[t]here is no absolute rule[] [] against Congress’ delegation of
authority to define criminal punishments.” Id. at 768. The Court noted further: “We have upheld
delegations whereby the Executive or an independent agency defines by regulation what conduct will be
criminal, so long as Congress makes the violation of regulations a criminal offense and fixes the
punishment, and the regulations ‘confin[e] themselves within the field covered by the statute.’” Id.
(quoting United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 518 (1911)).
6.
See Brenner M. Fissell, When Agencies Make Criminal Law, 10 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 855, 859
(2020); Philip Hamburger, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 2-3, 377-78 (2014).
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prosecution of a defendant for violating regulations promulgated by the Attorney
General under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA).7
The Chief Justice and Justice Thomas joined a scorching dissent by Justice
Gorsuch that opened:
The Constitution promises that only the people’s elected representatives may
adopt new federal laws restricting liberty. Yet the statute before us scrambles that
design. It purports to endow the nation’s chief prosecutor with the power to write
his own criminal code governing the lives of a half-million citizens. Yes, those
affected are some of the least popular among us. But if a single executive branch
official can write laws restricting the liberty of this group of persons, what does
that mean for the next?8

Justice Alito, while finding the plurality’s specific application of nondelegation
doctrine unobjectionable, noted: “If a majority of this Court were willing to
reconsider the approach we have taken for the past 84 years, I would support that
effort.”9 While Justice Kavanaugh took no part in the case, he later wrote that
Justice Gorsuch’s dissent “raised important points.”10
It remains to be seen whether a majority of the Court favors recalibrating—
or jettisoning—the “intelligible principle” standard for assessing delegations.11
Nor did Justice Gorsuch’s analysis in Gundy explicitly call out delegations of
criminal lawmaking authority for special, more searching scrutiny.12 It is
possible that some of the Justices joining the dissent, particularly the Chief
Justice, are more concerned with regulatory delegation generally, rather than
criminal delegation specifically. Yet Justice Gorsuch made his own position
clear before Gundy, and it is not surprising that concerns about delegations often
sound loudest in the criminal context. Here, liberty interests are greatest, and
governmental authority is most scrutinized.
In a SORNA case while serving as a judge on the Tenth Circuit, Justice
Gorsuch elaborated on the intelligible principle’s place in criminal law:

7.
139 S. Ct. 2116, 2129-30 (2019) (plurality opinion).
8.
Id. at 2131 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
9.
Id. at 2131 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
10.
Paul v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 342, 342 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J., statement respecting denial
of certiorari).
11.
See, e.g., Kristin E. Hickman, Gundy, Nondelegation, and Never-Ending Hope,
REGULATORY REV. (July 8, 2019), https://www.theregreview.org/2019/07/08/hickman-nondelegation
[https://perma.cc/4ZX4-C6TR] (“[T]he intelligible principle standard survives another round, while its
opponents are given ample reason to hope and predict that, surely, the next case will see the standard’s
end.”); Julian Davis Mortenson & Nicholas Bagley, Delegation at the Founding, 121 COLUM. L. REV.
277, 288-89 (2021) (assessing the future of the Gundy dissent); see also Daniel E. Walters, Decoding
Nondelegation After Gundy: What the Experience in State Courts Tells Us About What to Expect When
We’re Expecting, 71 EMORY L.J. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 3), https://ssrn.com/abstract=380
9905 [https://perma.cc/L26T-PRPX] (surveying nondelegation case law in the states and concluding that
“the changes envisioned [by the wing of the Court in favor of nondelegation] in and of themselves will
not fundamentally change anything about how courts approach the problem of delegation”).
12.
See F. Andrew Hessick & Carissa Byrne Hessick, Nondelegation and Criminal Law, 107
VA. L. REV. 281, 283 (2021) (“None of the opinions in the case asked whether Congress’s ability to
delegate policy decisions ought to be assessed differently when the power being delegated is the power to
determine the scope of criminal laws.”).
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It’s easy enough to see why a stricter rule [than the “‘intelligible principle’”]
would apply in the criminal area. The criminal conviction and sentence represent
the ultimate intrusions on personal liberty and carry with them the stigma of the
community’s collective condemnation—something quite different than holding
someone liable for a money judgment because he turns out to be the lowest cost
avoider. Indeed, the law routinely demands clearer legislative direction in the
criminal context than it does in the civil and it would hardly be odd to think it
might do the same here. When it comes to legislative delegations we’ve seen, too,
that the framers’ attention to the separation of powers was driven by a particular
concern about individual liberty and even more especially by a fear of endowing
one set of hands with the power to create and enforce criminal sanctions. And
might not that concern take on special prominence today, in an age when federal
law contains so many crimes—and so many created by executive regulation—that
scholars no longer try to keep count and actually debate their number?13

It thus does not take much reading of the tea leaves to expect that, amid a general
reconsideration of the administrative state,14 the Court will soon return to the
issue of administrative crimes. Yet, before embracing the broad proposition that
only “the people’s elected representatives” can set the terms of federal criminal
offenses,15 the Court would do well to think more broadly about federal criminal
law. After all, administrative agencies are not the only entities to which Congress
has dynamically delegated the power to define crimes—the power to set, on an
on-going basis, the terms of the criminal offenses that federal prosecutors are
empowered to charge.
Delegation abounds in federal criminal law, extending far beyond the
agencies and departments that are the usual grist of nondelegation doctrine
discussions. Even as federal courts assiduously speak in the language of statutory
interpretation, a clear-eyed view of the role courts play in federal criminal law—
giving content to common-law terms, setting the scope of accessorial and entity
liability, defining defenses, setting mens rea terms, and defining liability under
statutes from antitrust to criminal civil rights—cannot avoid speaking in
delegation terms. Moreover, the elements of numerous federal criminal
offenses16 are often determined by dynamic delegation to state legislatures, and,
when there are gaps in federal coverage,17 state penal law is incorporated
wholesale under the Assimilative Crimes Act.18 Even foreign law can be the basis
of criminal prosecutions under several federal criminal statutes related to such
matters as wildlife regulation and bribery.19 The inclusion of marijuana on a
13.
United States v. Nichols, 784 F.3d 666, 672-73 (10th Cir. 2015) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting
from denial of rehearing en banc), rev’d, 136 S. Ct. 1113 (2016) (internal citations omitted).
14.
See Gillian E. Metzger, Foreword: 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, 131
HARV. L. REV. 1, 5 (2017) (“With Justice Gorsuch on the Court, some constitutionally rooted pullback in
deference doctrines appears increasingly likely.”).
15.
Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2131 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
16.
Infra Section II.B.1.
17.
See Nikhil Bhagat, Note, Filling the Gap? Non-Abrogation Provisions and the Assimilative
Crimes Act, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 77, 103 n.153 (2011) (collecting cases on whether agency regulations
constitute an “enactment of Congress” for purposes of the ACA).
18.
18 U.S.C. § 13 (2018).
19.
See infra Section II.C.1.
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Controlled Substances Act schedule was in part pursuant to an international
treaty. And to define the federal piracy offense, courts look to the “law of
nations.”
The goal of this Article is largely positive: it seeks to assess the critique of
administrative crimes not through an administrative law lens but a federal
criminal law one. To what extent does this critique carry over to other instances
of mostly well-accepted (and delegated) criminal lawmaking? Does doctrinal
acceptance of formal or effective delegations to courts, states, foreign nations,
and perhaps even international organizations,20 undercut the critique or,
alternatively, strengthen it?
As a normative matter, this Article is neither a full-throated defense of
delegation nor a devastating rejoinder to those who question it. A critic of
administrative crimes might, for instance, stick to her guns and flatly condemn
every criminal offense that is not defined by Congress. She will, however, have
to confront the size and strength of her target.
The Article will first seek to ring changes on the delegation theme by
exploring the broad variety of partners that Congress has recruited to the federal
criminal lawmaking project. Then, by applying Justice Gorsuch’s administrative
crime critique to these delegations, the Article destabilizes the critique’s
doctrinal foundations. Central to Justice Gorsuch’s critique is the notion that any
delegation of crime-definition authority requires heightened scrutiny and
constitutional justification. It turns out, however, that the delegation of just such
authority to a broad range of institutions is a regular, and largely well-accepted,
feature of federal criminal law.
From the broader vantage point of federal criminal law, however, a
powerful normative point does emerge—one which might support an affirmative
embrace of administrative agencies in particular as crime-definers, subject to
congressional review. If one really cares about liberty—not the abstract “liberty”
said to be protected by the separation of powers, but rather the lived liberty
gained through careful and accountable criminal lawmaking that is free from the
pathologies that have bedeviled federal criminal law for more than a century—
then administrative crimes are promising indeed, as is crime-definition by any
number of legislative sources other than Congress. Once one considers
Congress’s legislative track record and the strategic advantages of federal
prosecutors, the contributions of agencies to offense-definition are more to be
welcomed than scorned.
Part I of this Article explores the contours of Justice Gorsuch’s
nondelegation challenge and its implications for the legitimacy of administrative
crimes. On what constitutional or jurisprudential principles has that challenge
been based? The most straightforward and simple version of the critique is based
on arguments that appeal to the structure of the Constitution: in a world in which
legislative powers have been vested in Congress, and legislative supremacy is
20.
For a tour of contexts in which federal criminal lawmaking has been delegated, see DANIEL
C. RICHMAN, KATE STITH & WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, DEFINING FEDERAL CRIMES 867-900 (2d ed. 2019).
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constantly hailed as the touchstone of federal criminal law, why should it be
acceptable for Congress to abdicate its responsibilities and delegate
constitutional authority lying at the core of sovereign powers? The critique
condemns the affront to separation-of-powers principles entailed by the conferral
of such powers on the Executive, and it draws yet more strength from the very
nature of criminal law, which is supposed to represent some authoritative
community condemnation rather than bureaucratic promulgation.
In Part II, I turn to the reality of federal criminal law. Congress has
delegated sweeping crime-definition powers—often explicitly, but sometimes
implicitly—to a variety of governmental institutions that are far less responsive
to Congress than are federal agencies. I consider how, to varying degrees, these
powers are exercised by federal courts, states, foreign nations, and international
institutions. In each case, I explore the extent to which these institutions’
delegations find (or fail to find) justifications that immunize them from the
administrative crimes critique. Moreover, these crime-definition powers, like
those delegated to agencies, are conditional on the exercise of an extraordinary
delegation that Justice Gorsuch’s critique leaves unscathed: the delegation to
federal prosecutors of absolute, unreviewable gatekeeping power over the
bringing of criminal charges.21
In Part III, I reconsider the normative appeal of administrative crimes by
placing them in their larger context, a regime not just of sweeping prosecutorial
authority but of a broader political economy of federal criminal legislation that
has been extraordinarily resistant to change. Not only is it highly questionable
that the elimination of administrative crimes—which to prosecutors are often
mere items on a longer menu—would change the mix of defendants actually
prosecuted, but any such curtailment would considerably reduce the specificity
and clarity of federal criminal law. Embracing a formalist conception of “liberty”
along the lines of Justice Gorsuch’s critique would likely come at the expense of
actual liberty. I conclude by suggesting how the methodology employed here—
looking beyond Justice Gorsuch’s formalism to institutional interactions—draws
into question judicial competence to police congressional delegations of crimedefinition authority.
I. Critique of Administrative Crimes
The challenge to administrative crimes draws on two separate lines of
authority that reinforce one another. One line of authority arises out the very
nature of legislative power under constitutional separation of powers doctrine.
With Article I’s vesting of “[a]ll legislative Powers” in Congress comes, we are
told, a “mandate that Congress generally cannot delegate its legislative power to
21.
See Daniel M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 HARV. L. REV.
469, 470 (1996) (“[F]ederal criminal law, as a whole, is best conceptualized as a regime of delegated
common law-making.”); Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, Congressional Delegation, and
Enforcement Discretion, 46 UCLA L. REV. 757 (1999); Hessick & Hessick, supra note 12, at 329-37
(discussing this in a section titled “The Charging Power and Implicit Delegation”).
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another Branch.”22 The logic of this nondelegation principle—whatever its
precise contours—should bar not just the Executive from exercising the
legislative power that is Congress’s alone, but any other governmental or nongovernmental entity. The authority of administrative agencies to promulgate
rules or specifications that have the force of law must therefore be carefully
constrained.23
Where the rules or specifications of an administrative agency not only carry
the force of law but provide the bases for a criminal prosecution (because
Congress has allowed the agency—via penal statutes that dynamically
incorporate agency terms by reference—to define the elements of the offense),
the second line of authority comes into play. That line looks to the special nature
of criminal law and demands that Congress alone define crimes, not simply
because of its exclusive legislative role, but because it is the only true voice of
the community and the institution most capable of constraining executive efforts
to restrict liberty. Note how this second, criminal analysis, if taken seriously,
might easily extend to contexts in which other institutions besides administrative
agencies define federal crimes.
This Part will first consider the nature and prevalence of administrative
crimes. I define these as those crimes that Congress has broadly defined as
criminal offenses but whose operative terms—the precise conduct covered and
the offense elements thereof—are derived from an administrative agency’s rule
or specification. This Part then considers the nature and scope of Justice
Gorsuch’s constitutional critique of administrative crimes.
A. Administrative Crimes
Those condemning the creep of “overcriminalization” in federal criminal
law regularly decry the impossibility of determining the precise number of
criminal offenses and point to the number of regulatory violations that can
amount to crimes as a key cause of this indeterminacy.24 And it is certainly true,
as Darryl Brown has noted, that “willful violations of civil regulation are
routinely and innumerably defined as crimes.”25 Sometimes the legislative

22.
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371-72 (1989).
23.
See Gary Lawson, “I’m Leavin’ It (All) Up to You”: Gundy and the (Sort-Of) Resurrection
of the Subdelegation Doctrine, 2019 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 31, 33; Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original
Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 334 (2002); Justin Walker, The Kavanaugh Court and the Schechter-ToChevron Spectrum: How the New Supreme Court Will Make the Administrative State More
Democratically Accountable, 95 IND. L.J. 923, 938 (2020).
24.
See, e.g., Julie R. O’Sullivan, The Federal Criminal “Code”: Return of Overfederalization,
37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 57, 57-58 (2014) (“No definitive count of federal crimes is extant, and such
a count is probably not possible without too much work to make the task worthwhile.”); see also Neil M.
Gorsuch, Law’s Irony, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 743, 747 (2014) (“But today we have about 5000
federal criminal statutes on the books, most added in the last few decades. And the spigot keeps pouring,
with hundreds of new statutory crimes inked every few years. Neither does that begin to count the
thousands of additional regulatory crimes buried in the federal register.”).
25.
Darryl K. Brown, Criminal Law’s Unfortunate Triumph Over Administrative Law, 7 J.L.
ECON. & POL’Y 657, 664 (2011).
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mechanism broadly allows for the criminal enforcement of some category of
rules promulgated by an agency.26 Other times, a statute sets up a criminal
enforcement regime in which offense terms are supplied by an agency through
an administrative process.27 Whatever the agency’s contribution to the
production of federal criminal law, however, the decision to invoke that law to
prosecute remains in the exclusive discretionary control of federal prosecutors in
the Department of Justice (DOJ), who will also have full responsibility for the
way a case is pursued.28
Consider United States v. Grimaud,29 which, in 1911, established that
“Congress . . . could delegate power to an agency to adopt regulations subject to
criminal penalties, provided that Congress itself legislated the penalties.”30 In
1897, Congress initially authorized the Interior Department (and, later, the
Agriculture Department) to adopt rules regulating the “occupancy and use” of
public forests to protect them from “destruction” and “depredations.”31 Violation
of these rules could be pursued either criminally or civilly. When the Forest
Service found civil injunctions inadequate, it prevailed on DOJ to replead
regulatory violations as criminal indictments. Thus, a California shepherd who
violated forest grazing rules found himself charged with a misdemeanor.32
Upholding the charges, the Supreme Court reasoned that the Secretary of
Agriculture had simply acted within the scope of his delegation when
promulgating the rules, and the violation of these rules had been “made a crime,
not by the Secretary, but by Congress.”33
26.
See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, § 10(b), 48 Stat. 881, 891
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2018)) (making it “unlawful” to “use or employ, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention
of such rules and regulations as the [Securities Exchange] Commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.”); National Wildlife Refuge System
Act, 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(f)(1) (2018) (“Any person who knowingly violates or fails to comply with any of
the provisions of this Act or any regulations issued thereunder shall be fined under Title 18 or imprisoned
for not more than 1 year, or both.”).
27.
See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2018) (criminalizing the provision of material support or resources
to “foreign terrorist organizations” so designated by Secretary of State); 21 U.S.C. §§ 811, 841 (2018)
(providing for prosecution of trafficking in controlled substances so scheduled by the Attorney General).
28.
See, e.g., Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their Prosecutors,
103 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 758 (2003) (“At its heart, the relationship between federal prosecutors and
federal enforcement agents is a bilateral monopoly. Prosecutors are the exclusive gatekeepers over federal
court, but they need agents to gather evidence. Agencies control investigative resources, but they are not
free to retain separate counsel. If agents want criminal charges to be pursued against the target of an
investigation, they will have to convince the prosecutor to take the case.”); Michael Hertz, Structures of
Environmental Criminal Enforcement, 7 FORDHAM ENV’T L. REV. 679, 694-97 (1996) (discussing the
DOJ’s own arguments in favor of gatekeeping power). Deviations from this rule of exclusive gatekeeping
by prosecutorial bureaucracy may be found outside the federal system. See Roger A. Fairfax, Delegation
of the Criminal Prosecution Function to Private Actors, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 411, 413 (2009).
29.
220 U.S. 506 (1911).
30.
Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn T. Watts, Agency Rules with Force of Law, 116 HARV. L.
REV. 467, 501-02 (2002).
31.
Grimaud, 220 U.S. at 522.
32.
See generally Logan Sawyer, Grazing, Grimaud, and Gifford Pinchot: How the Forest
Service Overcame the Classical Nondelegation Doctrine to Establish Administrative Crimes, 24 J.L. &
POL. 169 (2008) (discussing the background and impact of the case).
33.
Grimaud, 220 U.S. at 522.
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Grimaud licensed the broad and varied regime that exists today.34 Thus,
section 32 of the 1934 Exchange Act makes violation of certain rules
promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) into federal
crimes punishable by up to twenty years imprisonment.35 Among these is Rule
10b-5,36 which is regularly charged in securities fraud cases, most notably those
involving insider trading. A statute targeting the smuggling of goods out of the
country looks to whether the exportation was “contrary to any law or regulation
of the United States.”37 The Ocean Dumping Act makes it a criminal offense to
“knowingly violat[e] any provision of this subchapter, any regulation
promulgated under this subchapter, or a permit under issued under this
subchapter[] . . . .”38 The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)
provides for up to five years’ imprisonment for anyone who “knowingly
transports or causes to be transported any hazardous waste identified or listed
under this subchapter to a facility which does not have a permit under this
subchapter.”39 Indeed, “Congress regularly passes statutes that delegate to an
agency the power to promulgate regulations, while providing that violations of
the yet to be written regulations will be crimes subject to statutory penalties.”40
Quite a few of these offenses, dynamically incorporating agency rules, are
misdemeanors,41 but many, like securities fraud, are punished quite severely.
B. Nature of Critique
The historical unwillingness42 of the Supreme Court to find any delegation
before it to lack the requisite “intelligible principle” has long been noted, and
34.
Grimaud was foreshadowed by In re Kollock, 165 U.S. 526 (1896), which upheld Kollock’s
conviction for selling margarine without complying with the labelling rules set by the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, occasioning the Court to note that “[t]he criminal offence [was] fully and completely
defined by the act and the designation by the Commissioner of the particular marks and brands to be used
was a mere matter of detail,” id at 533. See Mark D. Alexander, Increased Judicial Scrutiny for the
Administrative Crime, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 612, 617-18 (1992).
35.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, § 32, 48 Stat. 881, 891 (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 78ff (2018)).
36.
17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (2020).
37.
18 U.S.C. § 554 (2018). Although the statute covering smuggling into the country looks to
whether the “merchandise” was brought in “contrary to law,” 18 U.S.C. § 545 (2018), some, but not all,
courts have read the “law” reference to include administratively promulgated regulations, see United
States v. Sterling Islands, Inc., 391 F. Supp.3d 1027, 1042-59 (D.N.M. 2019) (reviewing conflicting case
law and concluding that “the statute’s text and legislative history unambiguously indicate that “contrary
to law” encompasses all laws and regulations”).
38.
33 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1) (2018). For this and other examples, see Fissell supra note 6, at 86061.
39.
42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) (2018).
40.
Richard E. Myers II, Complex Times Don’t Call for Complex Crimes, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1849,
1852 (2011).
41.
See, e.g., Grimaud v. United States, 220 U.S. 506, 509 (1911); 40 U.S.C. § 1315(c)(2)
(establishing a maximum punishment of thirty days for violation of GSA rules).
42.
See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 322 (2000)
(stating the nondelegation doctrine has had “one good year and [over 200] bad ones,” since the Supreme
Court’s only two invalidations of statutes on nondelegation grounds came in 1935); cf. Keith E.
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complained about by those on and off the Court.43 As will be seen, it is
impossible to fully separate the issue of administrative crimes from the
scholarly—and to some extent, judicial—debate about whether closer judicial
scrutiny of all congressional delegations of rulemaking authority to agencies is
appropriate.44 Yet this Article will attempt to do so both because it offers no
special perspective on that larger debate, and because I do not foresee the Court
implementing an across-the-board nondelegation doctrine with teeth. Gundy,
however, may well presage a reexamination of Grimaud and its progeny, and the
issue of administrative crimes seems well worth peeling off for separate
treatment to the extent possible. The focus here will thus be on that aspect of
Justice Gorsuch’s critique that specifically turns on the delegation of crimedefinition authority to executive and independent agencies and finds such
delegation of especial constitutional concern.
For an extended elaboration of Justice Gorsuch’s critique and the sins of
delegating specifically criminal lawmaking authority to agencies, the most useful
sources—which complement the perhaps limited opportunities offered by
Gorsuch’s dissenting opinions—are recent pieces by Andrew and Carissa
Hessick,45 and by Brenner Fissell.46 Basic doctrines placing substantive and
procedural limits on criminal laws are foundational to this critique. A long line
of cases rejecting the existence of common-law crimes provides support for a
rule of absolute legislative control in this area.47 This separation-of-powers
analysis not only would protect criminal law from non-congressional incursions
but would also make Congress squarely accountable for it.48
The unique nature of criminal law is captured by the “rule of lenity,” under
which statutory ambiguities are to be construed in favor of criminal defendants.49
Whittington & Jason Iuliano, The Myth of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 382-83,
417-29 (2017) (arguing, based on a dataset of 2500 federal and state supreme court decisions in the
nineteenth- and early-twentieth centuries, that “[t]here was no golden age in which the courts enforced a
robust nondelegation doctrine”).
43.
See William K. Kelley, Justice Scalia, the Nondelegation Doctrine, and Constitutional
Argument, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2107, 2108-15 (2017); Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original
Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 333 (2002); Hamburger, supra note 6, at 377-402; Douglas H. Ginsburg &
Steven Menashi, Our Illiberal Administrative Law, 10 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 475, 491-93 (2016); see
also Julian Davis Mortenson & Nicholas Bagley, Delegation at the Founding, 121 Colum. L. Rev. 277,
285-87 (2021) (discussing the influence that Hamburger and other scholarly supporters of the
nondelegation doctrine have had on Justices Thomas and Gorsuch); Metzger, supra note 14 at 22–24
(describing the criticisms of delegation levied by Justices Thomas and Alito).
44.
For an excellent overview of the debate, see Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Neoclassical
Administrative Law, 133 HARV. L. REV. 852, 858-82 (2020).
45.
Hessick & Hessick, supra note 12, at 300-21.
46.
Fissell, supra note 6, at 881-906.
47.
See, e.g., Hessick & Hessick, supra note 12, at 314 (quoting cases); United States v.
Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95 (1820) (Marshall, C.J.) (“[T]he power of punishment is vested in
the legislative, not in the judicial department. It is the legislature, not the Court, which is to define a crime,
and ordain its punishment.”).
48.
See Harlan S. Abrahams & John R. Snowden, Separation of Powers and Administrative
Crimes: A Study of Irreconcilables, 1 S. ILL. U. L.J. 1, 4-5 (1976) (arguing that the separation-of-powers
doctrine precludes agencies from making criminal law).
49.
See RICHMAN, STITH, & STUNTZ, supra note 20, at 97 (describing the “so-called rule of
lenity”).
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As Dan Kahan has noted, “lenity is best understood as a ‘nondelegation
doctrine’”50 peculiar to the liberty interests implicated by criminal statutes. In
other spheres, Congress might be permitted to legislate in broad strokes, leaving
other government actors to fill in the details. But by “compel[ing] legislatures to
detail the breadth of prohibitions in advance of their enforcement,” as Zachary
Price explains, the rule of lenity ensures that Congress is wholly accountable to
voters when criminalizing conduct.51
Coming at the issue from a different angle is the void-for-vagueness
doctrine, which demands that “[a] criminal statute must clearly define the
conduct it proscribes,”52 not only to prevent inappropriate legislative delegation,
but to give notice to citizens and avoid arbitrary enforcement. If this doctrine’s
objects of analysis are statutes broadly providing that violations of rules
promulgated by an agency are criminal offenses, rather than the rules themselves,
the relevant “laws” will often be troublingly vague indeed. Moreover, the
argument goes, standard administrative law doctrines counselling judicial
deference to an agency’s interpretation of statutes (Chevron)53 and its own
regulations (Auer and Kisor)54 make matters even worse, if they are allowed to
override the criminal law default of lenity.55

50.
Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 345, 347.
51.
Zachary Price, The Rule of Lenity as a Rule of Structure, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 885, 887-88
(2004).
52.
Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 415 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
53.
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984) (establishing
that the administering agency’s interpretation of a statute “is entitled to deference” from the courts”); see
also City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 296 (2013) (reasoning that “Chevron is rooted in a
background presumption of congressional intent,” and that Congress intentionally delegated interpretive
authority to the agency by enacting a statute with “capacious terms” rather than “plain terms.”).
54.
Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997); Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019); see Aditya
Bamzai, Delegation and Interpretive Discretion: Gundy, Kisor, and the Formation and Future of
Administrative Law, 133 HARV. L. REV. 164, 186 (2019).
55.
See, e.g., Esquivel-Quintana v. Lynch, 810 F.3d 1019, 1027 (6th Cir. 2016) (Sutton, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part), rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 1562 (2017) (“Chevron has no role to play in
the interpretation of criminal statutes.”); Guedes v. BATF, 140 S. Ct. 789, 790 (2020) (Gorsuch, J.,
statement respecting denial of certiorari) (“[W]hatever else one thinks about Chevron, it has no role to
play when liberty is at stake.”); Patrick J. Glen & Kate E. Stillman, Sixth Circuit Review, Chevron
Deference or the Rule of Lenity? Dual-Use Statutes and Judge Sutton’s Lonely Lament, 77 OHIO ST. L.J.
FURTHERMORE 129, 137-40 (2016) (examining and questioning Judge Sutton’s approach in EsquivelQuintana); see also Kristin Hickman, Of Lenity, Chevron, and KPMG, 26 VA. TAX REV. 905 (2007)
(analyzing the interplay between Chevron deference and criminal tax law).
The application of Chevron to firearms regulations with penal consequences remains the
subject of considerable debate. See Gun Owners of Am. v. Garland, 992 F.3d 446, 468 (6th Cir. 2021),
vacated and reh’g. en banc granted, 2 F.4th 576 (6th Cir. 2021) (“Declining to grant Chevron deference
to agency interpretations of criminal statutes respects the community’s responsibility to make value-laden
judgments on what should be criminalized, upholds the separation of powers, complies with the rule of
lenity, and avoids fair-notice concerns.”); Aposhian v. Wilkinson, 989 F.3d 890, 892 (10th Cir. 2021)
(Tymkovich, C.J., dissenting from decision to vacate en banc order as improvidently granted) (“I believe
the panel majority went looking for ambiguity where there was none. Then, having found ambiguity, it
unnecessarily placed a thumb on the scale for the government by invoking Chevron deference.”).
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Separation of powers promotes not merely accountability but liberty
itself.56 A second aspect of that principle is less about who makes the laws than
ensuring that legislative power is quite separate from prosecutorial power.57 In
Gundy, Justice Gorsuch drew particular attention to the fact that DOJ had both
promulgated the rule being criminally enforced and chose to enforce it against
Gundy.58 The concern is not just of executive aggrandizement but of self-dealing,
since executive enforcers can shape substantive law to facilitate their targeting
preferences. This problem goes beyond cases where the promulgating and the
enforcing agency are the same. Madison’s point—“[t]here can be no liberty
where the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person”—can
easily extend to the argument that liberty is best protected when the agreement
of two different branches is a prerequisite for prosecution.59 Thus, while Justice
Gorsuch’s critique gains special force when the same executive department first
defines criminal offenses and then prosecutes them, the critique extends to the
promulgations of any executive agency (and perhaps even to those of
independent agencies). Adherence to the requirements of bicameralism and
presentment not only inherently limits the supply of laws generally, but also
ensures that a body whose members might fear overreaching prosecutions of
themselves and their friends passes on all criminal laws.60 It also slows the rate
of legal change, since “agencies can change laws more quickly than Congress
can.”61
Hessick & Hessick go further and suggest that reasons like “expertise,
compromise, and efficiency that are traditionally offered in support of broad
delegations to agencies do not support—or at least do not strongly support—
delegations in the criminal law.”62 A specialized expertise justification resting
on an agency’s use of objective data and methodologies does not extend, Hessick
& Hessick suggest, to the moral judgments, or even utilitarian calculi that ought
to be at the heart of criminal lawmaking. They argue that
agencies do not have the relevant expertise in determining the costs and benefits
of criminal sanctions. Their expertise is in the substantive area that they regulate
— such as the environment, the securities markets, and the airwaves. They do not
specialize in determining either the benefits of criminal prohibitions to potential
victims and communities or the costs of criminal convictions to offenders, their
families and communities, and the department of prisons.63

Perhaps the most damning critique of administrative crimes arises out of
the very nature of criminal law, which, at least in a liberal democracy, is

56.
See Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1513,
1534 (1991).
57.
Hessick & Hessick, supra note 12, at 308.
58.
Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2131 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
59.
Hessick & Hessick, supra note 12, at 307 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James
Madison)).
60.
See id. at 308.
61.
Id. at 317.
62.
Id. at 321.
63.
Id. at 324.
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supposed to express the moral condemnation of specific conduct by a community
that speaks through its representatives. Fissell notes that “[t]he insight of
expressivist punishment theory is that the symbolic communication of
condemnation must come from the community and that therefore the duties
imposed by criminal law must be determined by a democratic institution.”64
Bureaucratic condemnation is no substitute, even where an agency is supposedly
“accountable” to the legislature.65
C. Scope of Critique
The forgoing critique could support a categorical condemnation of criminal
offenses defined by administrative agencies pursuant to congressional
delegation.66 Yet Justice Gorsuch’s Gundy dissent suggested that executive
agencies could play a limited, factfinding role in crime-definition.67 Even the
needed reform of the “intelligible principle” standard, he noted, would leave the
analysis in Touby v. United States68—which upheld the Attorney General’s
ability to temporarily schedule a controlled substance—largely undisturbed.69
In Touby, the defendant, who had been prosecuted for manufacturing
temporarily-scheduled “Euphoria,” claimed unconstitutional delegation, arguing
“that something more than an ‘intelligible principle’ is required when Congress
authorizes another Branch to promulgate regulations that contemplate criminal
sanctions.”70 Noting that its “cases are not entirely clear on the point,” the Court
found that the statutory provision “passes muster even if greater congressional
specificity is required in the criminal context.”71 While the Court addressed only
the Attorney General’s temporary scheduling powers, lower courts have found
its analysis a fortiori applies to the more rigorous permanent scheduling process,
and that “collateral attacks are not permitted in criminal cases involving
permanent scheduling orders.”72 Since very significant sentencing consequences
follow from the scheduling of a drug at a particular level, the Controlled
Substances Act comes close to authorizing crime-definition by the very
department in charge of prosecutions. Yet this, the most frequently charged
administrative crime, would apparently survive Justice Gorsuch’s scrutiny.73

64.
Fissell, supra note 6, at 891.
65.
See id. at 893-95.
66.
See Hessick & Hessick, supra note 12, at 333.
67.
Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2136 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting); cf. Aditya
Bamzai, supra note 54, at 184 (noting that this principle “requires a theory that distinguishes between
presidential ‘factfinding’ and presidential ‘policymaking’”).
68.
500 U.S. 160, 166 (1991).
69.
Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2141 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
70.
500 U.S. at 165-66.
71.
Id. at 166.
72.
United States v. Forrester, 616 F.3d 929, 937 (9th Cir. 2010) (emphasis omitted); see also
United States v. Carlson, 87 F.3d 440, 446 (11th Cir. 1996).
73.
See supra note 1.
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Justice Gorsuch also seemed open to delegations that “at least arguably,
implicate[] the [P]resident’s inherent Article II authority.”74 In this framing, he
acknowledged the authority of precedents75 like Cargo of the Brig Aurora, which
upheld Congress’s delegation to the President of authority to impose an embargo
against Great Britain conditional on the President’s finding that Britain’s enemy
France had stopped interfering with American trade.76 Indeed, he found two
bases on which the delegation in Cargo of the Brig Aurora passed muster: it
involved not only “limited executive fact-finding,” but also the sphere of foreign
affairs, where the authority the Constitution vested in the Executive can overlap
with Congress’s legislative authority.77
Justice Gorsuch’s reference to “at least arguably” could be taken as a quiet
acceptance of other cases, recently noted by Alexander Volokh, that allow
Congress to “delegate without an intelligible principle even when the delegate
lacks inherent power, as long as the subject matter of the delegation is interlinked
with an area where the delegate does have inherent power.”78 Thus extended, the
executive power to define crimes, or at least substantially contribute to crimedefinition, would easily encompass the President’s devising aggravating factors
in capital murder cases tried under military law;79 the executive designation of
“foreign terrorist organizations” that someone can be prosecuted for providing
“material assistance” to;80 and the President’s ability to promulgate sanctions
under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act that, if violated, can
be criminally prosecuted.81 Presumably, the prosecution of hoarders of personal
protective equipment during the COVID-19 pandemic82 would similarly pass
muster, as the sweeping terms of Defense Production Act of 195083 arguably
implicate the domestic application of the President’s national security powers.84
74.
Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2140 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
75.
Id. at 2136 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
76.
Cargo of the Brig Aurora v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382, 382-85 (1813); see also
Note, Nondelegation’s Unprincipled Foreign Affairs Exceptionalism, 134 HARV. L. REV. 1132, 1145-46
(2021).
77.
Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2136-37 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
78.
Alexander Volokh, Judicial Non-Delegation, the Inherent-Powers Corollary, and Federal
Common Law, 66 EMORY L.J. 1391, 1394 (2017).
79.
See Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748 (1996).
80.
18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2018) (criminalizing providing material support or resources to “foreign
terrorist organizations” designated by Secretary of State); see United States v. Ali, 799 F.3d 1008, 101920 (8th Cir. 2015) (rejecting a nondelegation challenge); United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316, 331
(4th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (same).
81.
50 U.S.C. §§ 1701 et seq.; United States v. Dhafir, 461 F.3d 211 (2d Cir. 2006) (upholding
IEPPA prosecution against delegation challenge); United States v. Ali Amirnazmi, 645 F.3d 564 (3d Cir.
2011) (same); see also United States v. Chi Tong Kuok, 671 F.3d 931 (9th Cir. 2012) (rejecting
nondelegation challenge in prosecution under Arms Export Control Act).
82.
Complaint and Affidavit in Support of Application for Arrest Warrants, United States v.
Bullock, No. 20-MJ-327 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/usao-edny/press-release/file/
1271741/download [https://perma.cc/63QC-BZMK].
83.
50 U.S.C. §§ 4501 et seq. (2018).
84.
See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export, 299 U.S. 304 (1936); see also United States v.
Melgar-Diaz, 2 F.4th 1263, 1268 (9th Cir. 2021) (finding no violation of nondelegation doctrine in

318

Defining Crime, Delegating Authority
The line Justice Gorsuch would draw between criminal delegations subject
to intense scrutiny and those he would find more within the Executive’s ken is a
bit hazy, as may be inevitable in such projects.85 He did cite United States v.
Grimaud, seemingly with approval.86 Did he really find the broad delegation of
criminal authority in that case acceptable? Or was he simply nodding his respect
for stare decisis, notwithstanding his willingness to question that principle in
other contexts?87
One need not, however, be sure of which administrative crimes would
survive Justice Gorsuch’s analysis to suspect that a great many would not, which
is, presumably, his goal. While on the Tenth Circuit, when presented with a
criminal prosecution, arising out of a tussle on the grounds of the Denver Federal
Center involving violations of regulations promulgated by the General Services
Administration (GSA) and the Department of Homeland Security, Justice
Gorsuch mused (in dicta, as the defendant had not raised the issue):
Can Congress so freely delegate the core legislative business of writing criminal
offenses to unelected property managers at GSA? Might this arrangement, though
arrived at with Congress’s assent, still blur the line between the Legislative and
Executive functions assigned to separate departments by our
Constitution? . . . Thanks to this and many other similar and similarly generous
congressional delegations, the Code of Federal Regulations today finds itself
crowded with so many “crimes” that scholars actually debate their
number. . . . And quite apart from the separation of powers questions these
arrangements pose, what about the “reasonableness” limitation found in the
specific delegation before us? In the statute at issue here, Congress says agency
officials may prescribe only “reasonable” criminal penalties within the limits it
has prescribed (30 days in prison, usually no more than $5,000 in fines). Who’s
to say what in that range is reasonable, and by what measure?88

Justice Gorsuch’s approach to criminal delegations would substantially end
the current regime, in which, in many policy spaces, broadly delegated
rulemaking authority to agencies is accompanied by statutory provisions making
violations of certain regulations a federal crime. Relative to all federal
prosecutions, these offenses are not often prosecuted, and many are
misdemeanors (carrying potential sentences of less than a year). But the cases
that are brought, or threatened, are of particular significance to individuals
operating within the regulatory purview. Firms in heavily regulated industries
will be even more concerned, because the criminal liability of any employee will
misdemeanor statute’s effective delegation to immigration officials of the designation of legal border entry
points, and noting that inherent executive power over immigration allows for even broader delegation than
usual).
85.
See Sunstein, supra note 42, at 326 (“[T]he real question is: How much executive discretion
is too much to count as ‘executive’?”).
86.
Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2136 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
87.
See Christopher R. Green, Justice Gorsuch and Moral Reality, 70 ALA. L. REV. 635, 66366, 663 n.174 (2019) (cataloging opinions in which Justice Gorsuch has called for reconsideration of
precedent, and discussing broader trends in his approach to stare decisis).
88.
United States v. Baldwin, 745 F.3d 1027, 1030-31 (10th Cir. 2014); see also United States
v. Wasylyshyn, 979 F.3d 165 (2d Cir. 2020) (upholding similar prosecution without addressing delegation
issue).
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usually trigger corporate criminal liability, which in turn can bring significant
collateral consequences.89 Moreover, while institutional fissures between civil
and criminal enforcement authorities often preclude fully-rationalized sorting of
the egregious (i.e., criminal) from the merely bad,90 the possibility of a criminal
referral surely affects the civil regulatory regime as well, providing coercive
leverage to civil enforcers.
Substantially curtailing the administrative crimes regime along the lines of
the Gorsuch critique would thus be quite consequential, at least to the extent that
federal prosecutors lose certain charging options. Yet even more consequential,
as we will see, would be the wholesale application of the critique’s rationale to
other aspects of federal criminal law. It turns out that administrative agencies are
far from the only institutions that Congress has permitted to define federal
criminal offenses. Like agencies, these institutions also lack the democratic
accountability of Congress, the competence to speak for the federal
“community,” and the formal separation from the Executive that only Congress
can provide. Acceptance of Justice Gorsuch’s rationale casts a harsh negative
light on these other delegations. Conversely, acceptance of their legitimacy casts
a harsh negative light on Justice Gorsuch’s critique.
II. Exploring Other Criminal Law Delegations
Let us turn to other contexts in which entities other than Congress have long
been permitted to define federal crimes. To what extent are these entities
susceptible to Justice Gorsuch’s critique of administrative crimes, because they
too suffer from deficiencies of democratic accountability, community
condemnation, notice, and lack of any separation-of-powers check? If these
entities are to survive the adoption of that critique, how might they be justified?
To the extent those justifications lack analytical power, the survival and wide
acceptance of these other mechanisms of delegated criminal law-making
severely weakens the force of Justice Gorsuch’s critique and argues against its
adoption.
This Part will consider the broad variety of institutions to which Congress
has explicitly—or in the case of courts, sometimes implicitly—delegated the
power the define the elements of federal criminal offenses. It starts with federal
courts, in part because the crime-definition work of these unelected actors is so
at odds with both formal separation-of-powers doctrine and Justice Gorsuch’s
demand for legislative authorship of criminal law. Starting with courts is also
historically appropriate, since their crime-definition work dates back to the very
beginnings of federal criminal law. Finally, appreciation of how the jurisgenerative capacity of courts and prosecutors—indispensable actors in any
89.
RICHMAN, STITH & STUNTZ, supra note 20, ch. 11 (on corporate criminal liability).
90.
See Anthony O’Rourke, Parallel Enforcement and Agency Interdependence, 77 MD. L. REV.
985 (2018); Daniel C. Richman, Overcriminalization for Lack of Better Options: A Celebration of Bill
Stuntz, in THE POLITICAL HEART OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: ESSAYS ON THEMES OF WILLIAM J. STUNTZ
64 (Michael Klarman et al. eds., 2012).
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criminal case—can far exceed “normal” expectations of interstitial lawmaking
gives important context to Justice Gorsuch’s embrace of ostensible legislative
supremacy. For it turns out that the role of the Executive in helping to define
criminal offenses is endemic to federal criminal law.
After courts, this Part considers other institutions to which Congress has
perhaps more explicitly delegated the authority to define federal crimes—
institutions that, unlike administrative agencies, are not even part of the federal
government: states, foreign states, and international law. What is the nature of
these delegations? What doctrinal or normative justifications can be offered for
them that would distinguish their constitutional legitimacy from that of
administrative crimes?
A. Courts
Much of the analytical rigor of Justice Gorsuch’s critique comes from a
proposition deeply rooted in the structure of the Constitution and two centuries
of judicial pronouncements: federal criminal law is created by Congress and
Congress alone.91 Yet a closer look at the context of those pronouncements
reveals, first, that they related only to Congress’s authority vis-à-vis the courts—
denying the existence of federal common-law crimes—and, second, that they are
true only if one counts the broad delegation of lawmaking authority to courts to
still be a species of congressional “creation.”92
Any exploration of judicial crime-definition faces a terminological
challenge. Federal courts almost invariably speak the language of “statutory
interpretation,” not lawmaking.93 Equally, if one rejects judicial selfcategorization and looks for effective delegation, some degree of the latter can
always be found.94 Every application of even a well-tailored statute to a specific
case is likely to involve interpretative work that can—if one is so perversely
inclined—be called “delegation.” The challenge, which I hope to meet, is to
highlight significant areas of federal criminal law where courts have exercised
particular license to define crimes, and where the congressional contribution has
91.
See, e.g., United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971) (“[B]ecause of the seriousness of
criminal penalties, and because criminal punishment usually represents the moral condemnation of the
community, legislatures and not courts should define criminal activity.”); Carissa Byrne Hessick, The
Myth of Common Law Crimes, 105 VA. L. REV. 965, 972 n. 17 (2019) (collecting citations).
92.
For recognition that denial of the existence of a federal common law of crimes is largely a
“myth,” see Kahan, supra note 50, at 347; see also Kahan, supra note 21, at 471 (“[T]he proposition that
federal crimes are ‘solely creatures of statute’ is a truth so partial that it is nearly a lie.” (quoting Liparota
v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 424 (1985))); Julie O’Sullivan, The Federal Criminal “Code” is a
Disgrace: Obstruction Statutes as Case Study, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 643, 666 (2006) (calling
the denial that there are federal common-law crimes “a central myth of federal criminal jurisprudence”);
Hessick, supra note 91, at 969 (noting how “common law continues to play an important role in shaping
the substance of criminal law”).
93.
See, e.g., United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 267 n.6 (1997); Sorrells v. United States,
287 U.S. 448 (1932).
94.
See Margaret H. Lemos, The Other Delegate: Judicially Administered Statutes and the
Nondelegation Doctrine, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 405, 421 (2008) (“[S]ome degree of lawmaking inheres in
the task of statutory interpretation and application . . . .”).
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been more like authorization or acquiescence, not definitional. In short, I
highlight areas where judicial crime-definition has much in common with agency
rulemaking that becomes the basis of administrative crimes. To be sure, the
fiction is generally that Congress licensed common-law type development by
either explicitly deploying a common-law term or implicitly legislating against
an intended backdrop of dynamic common-law principles. But fiction it is, absent
heroic imputations of congressional will or aggressive reliance on theories of
ratification. Not only do such areas of judicial crime-definition abound, but they
cannot be explained as a species of asymmetrical textualism, in which courts
deploy common-law principles to constrain liability but not expand it. As we will
see, while constraining efforts may well dominate, such principles have led to
expansion as well.
This Part highlights the scope of these judicial contributions by laying out
a continuum from ostensible statutory interpretation to wholesale lawmaking for
which the explicit congressional authorization seems quite plenary. The Part then
views these contributions through the lens of the Gorsuch critique and sees how
they fare.
1. Judicial Co-authorship of Federal Criminal Law from Its Beginnings–
Common-Law Elements
The foundational case usually cited for the proposition that only Congress
can create crimes, and that courts lack the power to create common-law crimes,
is United States v. Hudson & Goodwin.95 That case did not hold that courts
cannot create crimes, but rather that such power—if it existed—could come only
from Congress, which had not delegated it.96 Still, the case reflected a growing
acceptance that crime-definition was not within the judicial province. Years
before, while riding circuit, Justice Samuel Chase had found it “essential” “that
Congress should define the offences to be tried, and apportion the punishments
to be inflicted, as that they should erect Courts to try the criminal, or to pronounce
a sentence on conviction.”97 Yet, some, particularly Justice Joseph Story (who
stayed silent in Hudson), would not give up. Shortly after Hudson, Story drafted
a bill that “would have delegated broad powers to punish conduct not expressly

95.
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812); see also Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 415 (2010)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (citing Hudson for proposition that the
Court had “long ago abjured[] the power to define new federal crimes”).
96.
See Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 34 (“The legislative authority of the Union
must first make an act a crime, affix a punishment to it, and declare the court that shall have jurisdiction
of the offense.”). Charles Warren thought the case reflected a misunderstanding of the drafting history of
the 1789 Judiciary Act, see Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of
1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49, 73 (1923), but others have pushed back on his conclusions, see, e.g., Robert
C. Palmer, The Federal Common Law of Crime, 4 LAW & HIST. REV. 267, 274 (1986).
97.
United States v. Worrall, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 384, 394 (C.C.D. Pa. 1798); see Kathryn Preyer,
Jurisdiction to Punish: Federal Authority, Federalism and the Common Law of Crimes in the Early
Republic, 4 LAW & HIST. REV. 223, 231-32 (1986) (citing Worrall as example of one line of judicial
thinking at the time).
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prohibited in federal criminal statutes to the federal circuit courts.”98 It did not
pass, however, and by 1820, Chief Justice Marshall could explain that the rule of
lenity is
founded on the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals; and on the plain
principle that the power of punishment is vested in the legislative, not in the
judicial department. It is the legislature, not the Court, which is to define a crime,
and ordain its punishment.99

As Dan Kahan has noted, however, the rule of lenity, as a guarantee of
legislative supremacy in the criminal law arena, has always been in competition
with the Court’s quiet embrace of a delegated judicial lawmaking authority that
can only with extreme disingenuity be called statutory interpretation.100 As
Kahan relates, the Court’s key initial move was, in United States v. Kelly,101 to
use Congress’s deployment of a common-law term as an implicit invitation for
courts to exercise their common-lawmaking powers.102 In Kelly, presented with
the claim that Congress had failed sufficiently to define the offense of
“endeavoring to make a revolt” aboard ship in the 1790 Crimes Act, Justice
Bushrod Washington (whom Kahan persuasively suggests was channeling
Justice Story103) wrote: “[A]lthough the act of Congress does not define this
offence, it is, nevertheless, competent to the Court to give a judicial definition of
it.”104
Kelly began a line of cases that continues to this day. Where a federal
criminal statute includes a common-law term like “fraud,” the Court will have
no compunction tapping into robust lines of common-law authority—drawing on
tradition but adding its own elaborations. Vagueness issues will be dismissed, if
they even come up, as the Court will find the broad statutory language clear
enough. To be sure, the Court will speak the language of interpretation. Thus in
Neder v. United States, when finding that the government needed to show
98.
Gary D. Rowe, The Sound of Silence: United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, The Jeffersonian
Ascendancy, and the Abolition of Federal Common Law Crimes, 101 YALE L.J. 919, 926 n.44 (1992); see
also Preyer, supra note 97, at 258-59 (describing Justice Story’s lobbying efforts).
99.
United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95 (1820); see also United States v.
Bevans, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 336, 391 (1818) (Marshall, C.J.) (finding the inquiry to be “not the extent of
the power of Congress, but the extent to which that power has been exercised”); Wayman v. Southard, 23
U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 42-43 (1825) (“It will not be contended that Congress can delegate to the Courts, or
to any other tribunals, powers which are strictly and exclusively legislative.”); RICHMAN, STITH &
STUNTZ, supra note 20, at 83 (citing Wiltberger and Bevans as evidence of Chief Justice Marshall’s
acceptance of the result in Hudson & Goodwin).
100.
Kahan, supra note 50, at 367 (“[L]enity is in competition with—indeed, has been largely
eclipsed by—another basic principle of federal criminal jurisprudence, a principle that has never been
formally acknowledged but that is as old as lenity itself[,] . . . that Congress may delegate, and courts
legitimately exercise, criminal lawmaking authority.”). For an exploration of “federal courts’ hesitancy to
strike down criminal statutes as violating legality-related doctrines” and “the frequency with which the
courts expansively interpret statutory language,” see Samuel W. Buell, The Upside of Overbreadth, 83
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1491, 1521 (2008).
101.
United States v. Kelly, 4 U.S. (11 Wheat) 417, 418 (1826).
102.
Kahan, supra note 50, at 372-73 (“Kelly supplied what was, in effect, a blueprint for the
hidden rule of delegated lawmaking in federal criminal law. Through enacting incompletely specified
criminal statutes, Congress could implicitly transfer lawmaking authority to the judiciary.”).
103.
Id. at 373 n.127.
104.
Kelly, 4 U.S. (11 Wheat) at 418.
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“materiality,” notwithstanding the absence of that element from several fraud
statutes, the Court invoked the “well-established rule of construction that,
‘[w]here Congress uses terms that have accumulated settled meaning
under . . . the common law, a court must infer, unless the statute otherwise
dictates, that Congress means to incorporate the established meaning of these
terms.’”105 Finding no effort by Congress to preclude the imposition of this
element, the Court did so.106 Justice Scalia’s analysis of why the “extortion”
charged in United States v. Sekhar107 was not “extortion” under the Hobbs Act
began in similar terms, quoting Felix Frankfurter: “‘[I]f a word is obviously
transplanted from another legal source, whether the common law or other
legislation, it brings the old soil with it.’”108
This is not to say that the Court will invariably reach for common law as a
constraining principle. In Durland v. United States,109 it brushed aside the
defendant’s (correct) claim that common-law understanding precluded using the
mail fraud statute against a defendant who misled investors only about future
performance:
[B]eyond the letter of the statute is the evil sought to be remedied, which is always
significant in determining the meaning. It is common knowledge that nothing is
more alluring than the expectation of receiving large returns on small
investments. . . . In the light of this the statute must be read, and, so read, it
includes everything designed to defraud by representations as to the past or
present, or suggestions and promises as to the future. The significant fact is the
intent and purpose. . . .110

Congress’s response to Durland was to codify it in 1909.111 Since then, the
Court has embraced the protean flexibility of the federal fraud statutes, at least
with respect to non-governmental property deprivations.112 Similarly, the Court
has paid little heed to Justice Thomas’s recurring point that the Court’s
interpretation of “extortion” “under color of official right” in the Hobbs Act to
105.
Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 21 (1999) (quoting Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden,
503 U.S. 318, 322 (1992)). But see United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 490-99 (1997) (declining to read
a “materiality” element into a false statement statute that lacked any such reference, even though many
false statement statutes have explicit “materiality” requirements).
106.
Neder, 527 U.S. at 25.
107.
570 U.S. 729 (2013).
108.
Id. at 733 (quoting Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47
COLUM. L. REV. 527, 537 (1947)).
109.
161 U.S. 306 (1896).
110.
Id. at 313; see RICHMAN, STITH & STUNTZ, supra note 20, at 85 (“It is hard to square
Durland and Neder. The bottom line seems to be that common-law definitions are sometimes controlling,
and sometimes not.”).
111.
See McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 357 & n.6 (1987) (detailing amendments to
the mail fraud statute).
112.
See United States v. Maze 414 U.S. 395, 405-06 (1974) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“When
a ‘new’ fraud develops—as constantly happens—the mail fraud statute becomes a stopgap device to deal
on a temporary basis with the new phenomenon, until particularized legislation can be developed and
passed to deal directly with the evil.”); Samuel W. Buell, Novel Criminal Fraud, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971,
2029 (2006); see also RICHMAN, STITH & STUNTZ, supra note 20, 181-264 (discussing the sweep of fraud
liability for property deprivations). For the Court’s constrained understanding of governmental property
deprivations, see Kelly v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 1565, 1572 (2020); and Cleveland v. United States,
531 U.S. 12, 23 (2000).
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encompass bribery of public officials amounts to a judicially created crime—
quite different from common-law understandings of extortion by a public officer,
which required pretense of official entitlement.113
Justice Stevens was the rare Justice to explicitly speak in delegation terms.
Dissenting from the Court’s 1987 rejection, in McNally v. United States, of the
“right to honest services” as a cognizable deprivation under the mail fraud
statute, Justice Stevens noted:
Statutes like the Sherman Act, the civil rights legislation, and the mail fraud statute
were written in broad general language on the understanding that the courts would
have wide latitude in construing them to achieve the remedial purposes that
Congress had identified. The wide open spaces in statutes such as these are most
appropriately interpreted as implicit delegations of authority to the courts to fill in
the gaps in the common-law tradition of case-by-case adjudication. The notion
that the meaning of the words “any scheme or artifice to defraud” was frozen by
a special conception of the term recognized by Congress in 1872 is manifestly
untenable.114

It is worth noting that the Court’s articulated rationale in McNally for
cutting back on judicial handiwork was substantially based in federalism and the
need to restrain the federal government’s “setting standards of disclosure and
good government for local and state officials.”115 The Court’s mail fraud analysis
thus distinguished,116 and fully accepted, an extraordinarily broad reading of a
different statute that covers “fraud” against the federal government.117 When it
comes to “defraud[ing] the United States,” current case law pushes beyond the
term’s traditional common-law definition to a capacious and bespoke
interpretation lacking clear foundation in “plain meaning, legislative history, or
interpretive canons,” and reaching “‘any conspiracy for the purpose of impairing,
obstructing or defeating the lawful function of any department of
Government.’”118
So far, my focus has been on the Supreme Court’s role in giving content to
broad common-law terms. But the real work occurs in the lower courts and, in a
113.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (2018); Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 278 (1992)
(Thomas, J., dissenting); Ocasio v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1423, 1437 (2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting);
see also Kate Stith, No Entrenchment: Thomas on the Hobbs Act, the Ocasio Mess, and the Vagueness
Doctrine, 127 YALE L.J.F. 233, 234 (2017) (“Justice Thomas showed that the Court’s interpretation
effectively eliminated the longstanding distinction between bribery and extortion”).
114.
McNally, 483 U.S. at 372-73 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also United States v. Kozminski,
487 U.S. 931, 965-66 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting); cf. Kahan, supra note 50, at 375 (“If anything, the
criminal fraud statutes have proven even more potent as fonts of independently operative legal rules than
any of the recognized ‘common law’ statutes, including the Sherman Act.”).
115.
McNally, 483 U.S. at 360.
116.
See id. at 358 n.8 (distinguishing the broad interpretation given to “the scope of the
predecessor statute” in Hammerschmidt v. United States, 265 U.S. 182, 188 (1924)).
117.
See 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2018) (criminalizing conspiracies to, among other things, “defraud
the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose”).
118.
United States v. Coplan, 703 F.3d 46, 61 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Dennis v. United States,
384 U.S. 885, 861 (1966)); see also United States v. Gas Pipe, Inc., 997 F.3d 231, 235 (5th Cir. 2021)
(rejecting, as “foreclosed,” defendants’ argument that “the word ‘defraud’ as used in 18 U.S.C. § 371,
should be cabined to its common law,” noting that “a long line of Supreme Court and circuit precedent
holds otherwise”) (citing cases).
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world in which most defendants eventually plead guilty and waive their appellate
remedies, it stays there.119 To be sure, the Supreme Court will occasionally upset
robust lines of common-law development below, as it did in McNally,120 and later
in Skilling v. United States.121 Yet one of the most notable aspects of these cases
is how long it took for the Court to intervene in a doctrinal issue fully teed up
and briefed for years.122
Perhaps we can see the Court’s embrace of something more than interstitial
common lawmaking authority as a species of Volokh’s “inherent powers
corollary” for assessing delegations.123 Even a firm adherent to legislative
supremacy might see the legitimacy of considerable judicial crime-definition
where Congress has explicitly spoken in common-law terms and, in so doing,
implicitly invoked the expertise and traditions of courts. Perhaps the “inherent”
common-law making authority that the Court denied itself in Hudson & Goodwin
springs back with the explicit blessing of Congress? Yet judicial crime-definition
does not stop there.
2. Limiting and Expanding Criminal Liability Across Offenses
Moving onward on the continuum between, on one end, ostensible
exercises in statutory interpretation—as one may characterize cases that use
common-law terms as points of analytical departure—and the other, of wholesale
judicial crime-definition, we come to a middle ground: federal criminal
lawmaking by courts where statutes are utterly silent, or where statutory
language is largely unheeded.
Defenses are one area over which the Court has taken virtual ownership.
Perhaps this is not strictly an area of substantive criminal lawmaking, as it does
not involve offense definition. Yet if the former term is understood to cover law
that sets the terms of who can be convicted, it certainly covers defenses. In
United States v. Bailey,124 even though the statute criminalizing escape from
federal custody failed to mention a defense of duress or coercion, the Court, after
a brief nod to legislative supremacy, reasoned that “because
Congress . . . legislates against a background of Anglo-Saxon common law”
when it enacts federal criminal statutes, “a defense of duress or coercion may
well have been contemplated by Congress when it enacted” the escape offense.125
119.
See generally RICHMAN, STITH & STUNTZ, supra note 20, at 18-19 (providing an
introduction to federal criminal practice).
120.
See McNally, 483 U.S. at 368 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting how decision “upset the
settled, sensible construction that the federal courts have consistently endorsed”).
121.
561 U.S. 358, 408-09 (2010) (paring down “honest services” fraud to cases of bribery and
kickback only).
122.
See Sorich v. United States, 555 U.S. 1204 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari); United States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124, 158-65 (2d Cir. 2003) (en banc) (Jacobs, J. dissenting);
Lisa Kern Griffin, The Federal Common Law Crime of Corruption, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1815, 1822 (2011)
(noting conflicts among Circuits between enactment of § 1346 and Skilling).
123.
See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
124.
444 U.S. 394 (1980).
125.
Id. at 414 n.11.
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The concern that defense-recognition can undermine a statutory scheme underlay
the Court’s hostility to the necessity defense in United States v Oakland
Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative.126 But by 2006, in Dixon v. United States,127 the
Court unanimously took on a broad defense-definition role—to the extent that
one takes the operationalization of a defense as part of its definition—with
methodology being the only issue.
Reading Dixon is like walking into an ALI Restatement drafting meeting.
The Court, citing Bailey, assumed the existence of a federal duress defense, but
it disclaimed any need to nail down its elements.128 It needed only to determine
who bore the burden of proof and by what standard. Because federal crimes are
“solely creatures of statute,”129 Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, felt bound
to decide how Congress “‘may’ have contemplated” the duress defense when, in
1968, it enacted the particular offenses in the case.130 But in the absence of
“evidence in the [Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets] Act’s structure or
history that Congress actually considered the question of how the duress defense
should work,”131 the Court would simply look to “the long-established commonlaw rule.”132
Concurring, Justice Kennedy noted:
While the Court looks to the state of the law at the time the statute was
enacted . . . the better reading of the Court’s opinion is that isolated authorities or
writings do not control unless they were indicative of guiding principles upon
which Congress likely would have relied. Otherwise, it seems altogether a fiction
to attribute to Congress any intent one way or the other in assigning the burden of
proof.133

Put differently, in Justice Kennedy’s view, Congress had left defense-definition
to the Court, and the Court was free to draw on a range of respectable sources
like the Model Penal Code and the National Commission on Reform of Federal
Criminal Laws to set a consistent rule for all criminal statutes.
Justice Alito, joined by Justice Scalia, concurred in Justice Stevens’s
opinion, “with the understanding that it does not hold that the allocation of the
burden of persuasion on the defense of duress may vary from one federal criminal
statute to another” (thus denying precisely what Justice Stevens said).134 For
Justice Alito, however, the contours of this transsubstantive defense would come
from the common law in 1789. Congress started passing criminal statutes against
a common-law backdrop, and since it had never addressed the defense but simply
126.
See 532 U.S. 483, 489-95 (2001); id. at 490 n.3.
127.
548 U.S. 1 (2006).
128.
Id. at 4 n.2.
129.
Id. at 12 (quoting Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 424 (1985)).
130.
Id. at 13.
131.
Id.
132.
Id. at 14. Justice Stevens took comfort in the fact that “when a congressional committee did
consider codifying the duress defense, it would have had the courts determine the defense ‘according to
the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted in the light of reason and experience.’” Id.
at 14 n.8 (quoting S. 1437, 95th Cong., § 501 (1978)).
133.
Id. at 18 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
134.
Id. at 19 (Alito, J., concurring).
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kept passing new criminal laws, Justice Alito would presume that the 1789
version remained operative.135
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Souter, dissented. Like every member of
the Court except for Justice Stevens, he thought defenses should look the same
across all statutes.136 But Justice Breyer—second only to Justice Stevens in
embracing the notion that the Court exercises delegated power to refashion
criminal statutes—read congressional silence to mean “that Congress expected
the courts to develop burden rules governing affirmative defenses as they have
done in the past, by beginning with the common law and taking full account of
the subsequent need for that law to evolve through judicial practice informed by
reason and experience.”137 Across all the opinions in Dixon, Congress looms
more as a figurehead than a legislature.
As Caleb Nelson has observed, “the lower federal courts do not use the
rhetoric of statutory interpretation quite so consistently,” and one regularly sees
references to “common-law defenses” and “federal common law.”138 But the
Supreme Court largely makes a pretense of engaging in statutory interpretation,
even though in entrapment cases, one needs to follow the citations back to
Sorrells for a reminder that the extensive judicial crafting of this defense finds
its ostensible roots in a legislative enactment.139 In Sorrells, a Prohibition agent
had badgered the defendant into selling him some whiskey. Here the Court,
finding nothing in the National Prohibition Act140 on point, simply reached for
the absurdity doctrine and found itself
unable to conclude that it was the intention of the Congress, in enacting this
statute, that its processes of detection and enforcement should be abused by the
instigation by government officials of an act on the part of persons otherwise
innocent in order to lure them to its commission and to punish them.141

Lest one think that the Court’s exercises a broad license to tailor criminal
liability only to constrain it, one need look no further than the Pinkerton142
doctrine—“a judicially-created rule that makes a conspirator criminally liable for
the substantive offenses committed by a co-conspirator when they are reasonably
foreseeable and committed in furtherance of the conspiracy.”143 Conspiracy
135.
Id. at 19-20 (Alito, J., concurring).
136.
Id. at 21-22 (Breyer, J., concurring).
137.
Id. at 22 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
138.
Caleb Nelson, State and Federal Models of the Interaction Between Statutes and Unwritten
Law, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 657, 756 & n.439 (2013) (citing cases); see also RICHMAN, STITH & STUNTZ,
supra note 20, at 112-18 (examining range and bases of federal defenses); United States v. Waldman, 835
F.3d 751 (7th Cir. 2016) (setting contours of self-defense defense in prison context).
139.
Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
140.
Pub. L. No. 66-66, 41 Stat. 305 (1919), voided by U.S. Const. amend XXI.
141.
Id. at 448; see Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 553 (1992) (quoting same passage
from Sorrells); Jessica A. Roth, The Anomaly of Entrapment, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 979 (2014) (exploring
the consequences of the treatment of entrapment as substantive law question rather than a procedural
protection).
142.
See Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 645-48 (1946).
143.
United States v. Long, 301 F.3d 1095, 1103 (9th Cir. 2002); see Michael Manning,
Comment, A Common Law Crime Analysis of Pinkerton v. United States: Sixty Years of Impermissible
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liability is a statutory creation that draws on a long Anglo-American statutory
tradition.144 But nothing in conspiracy statutes—which, after all, often carried
lesser punishments than the substantive offense a defendant is alleged to have
conspired to commit—makes a defendant automatically liable for the foreseeable
substantive crimes of his co-conspirators.145 That extension of substantive
liability was a purely judicial construct—albeit one anchored in common-law
agency principles—and a massively consequential one at that.146
Corporate criminal liability is also a largely judicial creation. Congress has
explicitly allowed for such liability in certain statutes—including the one
charged in the landmark 1909 New York Central case.147 Yet that principle had
already been established long before by prosecutors and courts “applying general
criminal laws—laws that, by their terms, did not extend to corporations as
entities—to corporate conduct.”148 Thereafter, corporate criminal liability spread
across all offenses, even to those without clear statutory authorization for that
doctrine.149
Another purely judicial construct, just as consequential, has been the
establishment of “willful blindness” as satisfying the requirement of
“knowledge” across federal statutes.150 This was largely the handiwork of the
lower courts,151 with the Supreme Court deigning to acknowledge the doctrine
only recently, in the context of a civil patent infringement case.152 Even when
Judicially-Created Criminal Liability, 67 MONT. L. REV. 89 (2006); Miriam H. Baer, Insider Trading’s
Legality Problem, 127 YALE L.J. F. 129, 135 (2017) (citing Pinkerton and willful blindness as examples
of “judge-developed doctrines that curtail or extend criminal liability”).
144.
See Mark L. Noferi, Towards Attenuation: A “New” Due Process Limit on Pinkerton
Conspiracy Liability, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 91, 95 n.14 (2006); Francis Sayre, Criminal Conspiracy, 35
HARV L. REV. 393, 394-409 (1922); Note, Developments in the Law, Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L.
REV. 922, 923 (1959).
145.
See Alex Kreit, Vicarious Liability and the Constitutional Dimensions of the Pinkerton
Doctrine, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 585, 595 (2008) (“As a matter of statutory interpretation, [the Pinkerton
dissent’s] reasoning appears to be far more persuasive than the majority’s. Indeed, the majority did not
identify any statutory basis at all for holding defendants liable for the substantive crimes of their coconspirators in the absence of proof of aiding and abetting.”).
146.
See Jens David Ohlin, Group Think: The Law of Conspiracy and Collective Reason, 98 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 147, 147-48 (2008) (noting the sweep of Pinkerton liability).
147.
N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 491-92, 495 (1909)
(upholding the corporate-criminal-liability provisions of the Elkins Act); Edward B. Diskant, Note,
Comparative Corporate Criminal Liability: Exploring the Uniquely American Doctrine Through
Comparative Criminal Procedure, 118 YALE L.J. 126, 138 (2008) (“[B]oth before and after New York
Central, Congress enacted thousands of statutes creating new or additional criminal liability for
corporations.”).
148.
Diskant, supra note 147 at 136; see also RICHMAN, STITH & STUNTZ, supra note 20, at 80607 (on development of corporate criminal liability doctrine).
149.
Diskant, supra note 147, at 136-37.
150.
Under the willful blindness doctrine, the prosecution may satisfy a mens rea of knowledge
by proving that the defendant consciously chose “to avoid learning the truth.” United States v. Jewell, 532
F.2d 697, 700-04 (9th Cir. 1976) (en banc); see RICHMAN, STITH & STUNTZ, supra note 20, at 510-11;
Gregory M. Gilchrist, Willful Blindness as Mere Evidence, 54 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 405, 411-16 (2021).
151.
See Jonathan L. Marcus, Note, Model Penal Code Section 2.02(7) and Willful Blindness,
102 YALE L.J. 2231, 2233-34 (1993).
152.
See Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 766 (2011) (“The doctrine of
willful blindness is well established in criminal law.”); see also United States v. Goffer, 721 F.3d 113,
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complicity liability has a clear statutory basis, as is the case for aiding and
abetting,153 the Court continues to treat broad issues of criminal responsibility as
among its special provinces,154 perhaps as an extension of yet another area in
which the Court has assumed considerable ownership: mens rea.
When recognizing and defining defenses, the Supreme Court at least has
the “benefit” of absolute legislative silence.155 When setting mens rea standards,
however, it must reckon with variegated statutory language, with little
consistency in how Congress uses, or doesn’t use, terms like “knowingly,” or
“willful.” Yet this legislative insouciance has not particularly inhibited the Court
from taking the laboring oar in defining the statute-specific contours of this
critical element.
Teaching the Court’s mens rea cases is a joy for those who love pushing
students hard. Relatively stable principles do emerge from those cases, but they
often have little to do with the statutory definition of the requisite mens rea (if
there is one), and much to do with the Court’s larger project of protecting the
“morally blameless” from punishment.156 In a cogent distillation of the cases,
Stephen Smith explains:
The first step of the mens rea analysis, at which the Court seeks to identify the
potential for morally undeserved punishment, operates outside of the literal
definition of the crime. The Court decides whether conduct encompassed within
the literal terms of a criminal law might nonetheless be regarded as “innocent” or
“blameless.” Quite inconsistently, however, the important second stage, devoted
to fashioning the heightened standards of mental culpability necessary to
guarantee blameworthiness, operates within the definition of the offense. That is
128 (2d Cir. 2013) (“Global-Tech simply describes existing case law.”); cf. Spurr v. United States, 174
U.S. 728, 738 (1899) (using a concept similar to willful blindness).
153.
See 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2018).
154.
See Rosemond v. United States, 572 U.S. 65, 72- 81 (2014) (refining actus reus and mens
rea requirements in the context of an aiding and abetting case); Kit Kinports, Rosemond, Mens Rea, and
the Elements of Complicity, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 133, 143 (2015) (critiquing Rosemond).
155.
The exception is the insanity defense, which Congress redefined after the acquittal of John
Hinckley, Jr. See 18 U.S.C.§ 17 (2018); see also Jodie English, The Light Between Twilight and Dusk:
Federal Criminal Law and the Volitional Insanity Defense, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 1 (1988) (noting that the
Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984 was “first time in history[] [that] Congress passed comprehensive
legislation pertaining to the defense of criminal responsibility”).
156.
Stephen F. Smith, “Innocence” and the Guilty Mind, 69 Hastings L.J. 1609, 1653 (2018)
(“[T]he project of limiting the reach of criminal statutes in accordance with moral blameworthiness takes
a back seat to inferences of presumed legislative intent.”); see also Darryl K. Brown, Federal Mens Rea
Interpretation and the Limits of Culpability’s Relevance, 75 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 130-31 (2012)
(noting how judicial interpretative “canons are instead designed simply to yield interpretations that fulfill
legislative intent regarding mens rea and culpability, which is no easy goal given the congressional track
record of employing a range of statutory drafting conventions”); John S. Wiley Jr., Not Guilty by Reason
of Blamelessness: Culpability in Federal Criminal Interpretation, 85 U. VA. L. REV. 1021, 1023 (1999)
(finding that “the Court now routinely assumes that Congress believes that criminal liability should follow
moral culpability,” and therefore “suppose[s] that Congress does not want blameless people to be
convicted of serious federal crimes”); Jeffrey A. Meyer, Authentically Innocent: Juries and Federal
Regulatory Crimes, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 137, 139 (2007) (criticizing the Court’s “apparent innocence rule”
for “quietly allow[ing] the conviction of a wide range of blameless defendants for crimes that are among
the most commonly charged in our federal courts today”); Alan C. Michaels, Constitutional Innocence,
112 HARV. L. REV. 828, 834 (1999) (finding “Court’s consistent adherence” to the principle of
“constitutional innocence,” under which “strict liability is constitutional when, but only when, the
intentional conduct covered by the statute could be made criminal by the legislature”).
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to say, the Court looks to the wording of the statute for clues about whether or not
Congress would have accepted additional, more demanding mens rea
requirements.157

Since the Court has generally resisted constitutionalizing substantive
criminal law158 and it can hardly declare mens rea—a foundational element of
every offense—as a common law space, its opinions must sound in statutory
interpretation. Yet as Smith notes, “To the extent the Court . . . remains in the
business of enforcing judicially created mens rea requirements, it must be
because the Court is not fully committed to the textualist faithful-agent model in
this context.”159 Its approach instead is what Smith calls the
“cooperative/partnership model,” which entails an
institutional division of labor between Congress and the courts in criminal cases.
Congress focuses primarily on defining the prohibited act and grading the offense.
The definition of the mental element of federal crimes, however, is left principally
to the courts. Naturally, when Congress has selected a particular mens rea option,
the choice is binding upon the courts. Courts are otherwise impliedly delegated
the power to flesh out the mental elements of the crime in light of background
principles of the criminal law, including the notion that “an injury can amount to
a crime only when inflicted by intention.”160

In cases involving criminal offenses that lack a common law origin and are
not mala in se, a statute’s mens rea requirement will often be consequential
indeed, with the defendant’s guilt frequently turning on it. Yet courts have carved
out this space as their special province, usually looking to Congress only for
material, not direction.
3. Judicially Crafted Elements
Moving along the continuum of judicial lawmaking engagement, we have
seen the statutory use of common law words being taken as an invitation to
provide content to open-textured terms, and the reliance on statutory silence
(defenses) or perceived under-specification (mens rea) to justify transsubstantive
judicial projects. What we haven’t yet seen is judicial crime-definition akin to
the explicit and self-conscious criminal lawmaking we see agencies do when
exercising delegated powers. Yet one can find examples of just those sorts of
common law criminal projects within the context of a sweeping congressional
delegation.
The most dramatic example of criminal common lawmaking comes in the
area of civil rights crimes. Since 1968, Congress has taken some pains to define
civil rights offenses, particularly with respect to private conduct, with the 2009
157.
Smith, supra note 156, at 1653.
158.
See William J. Stuntz, Substance, Process, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 7 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 1, 6-7 (1996) (discussing the underdevelopment of substantive constitutional criminal law);
Louis D. Bilionis, Process, the Constitution, and Substantive Criminal Law, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 1269, 1333
(1998) (“[T]he tale of the unfulfilled promise of substantive constitutional criminal law . . . is incomplete
and misleading so long as it omits the process account of the Constitution and criminal law.”).
159.
Smith, supra note 156, at 1657.
160.
Id. at 1657-58 (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952)).
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Hate Crimes statute a conspicuous example.161 But two stalwarts of federal
criminal civil rights enforcement remain: 18 U.S.C. § 241, which traces its
lineage back to the Enforcement Act of 1870,162 and 18 U.S.C. § 242, whose
origins are in the Civil Rights Act of 1866.163 Once its commitment to
Reconstruction crumbled in the 1870s, DOJ stopped enforcing these statutes
until the mid-1930s, and to this day, it has exercised considerable control on their
deployment.164
Once charged, however, these statutes have extraordinary sweep. Section
241 broadly targets conspiracies “to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any
person . . . in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to
him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having so
exercised the same.”165 Section 242 has an explicit state action component and
targets anyone who “under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or
custom, willfully subjects any person . . . to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the
United States.166 The Reconstruction Amendments gave enforcement authority
to Congress, which in turn exercised that authority to create offenses whose
content is tethered to judicial constitutional interpretations. Put differently, these
crimes are defined by constitutional common law.167
Concern about the sweep and vagueness of these offenses—as well as the
free hand the Court has long exercised in setting mens rea terms—led the Court
in Screws v. United States,168 its first criminal civil rights case since the demise
of Reconstruction, to impose a “willfulness” standard for both statutes.169 This
requires the government to show that the defendant acted with a specific intent
to interfere with the federal right in question. To be sure, figuring out what this
161.
The Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr., Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2009, Pub. L.
No. 111-84, 123 Stat. 2835 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 249 (2018)); see also 18 U.S.C. § 245 (2018)
(criminalizing interference with specified “federally protected activities”).
162.
Ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140.
163.
Ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27; see RICHMAN, STITH & STUNTZ, supra note 20, at 430; Frederick M.
Lawrence, Civil Rights and Criminal Wrongs: The Mens Rea of Federal Civil Rights Crimes, 67 TUL. L.
REV. 2113, 2138 (1993).
164.
RICHMAN, STITH & STUNTZ, supra note 20, 432-44; see Robert J. Kaczorowski, THE
POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION: THE FEDERAL COURTS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND CIVIL
RIGHTS 1866-1876 (1985); Robert K. Carr, FEDERAL PROTECTION OF CIVIL RIGHTS: QUEST FOR A SWORD
29 (1947); Brian K. Landsberg, ENFORCING CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE DISCRIMINATION AND THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (1997).
165.
18 U.S.C. § 241 (2018).
166.
Id. §242.
167.
See David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L. REV.
1457, 1458 (2001) (suggesting that “through most of our history, the amendment process has not been an
important means of constitutional change”); David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional
Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 877 (1996) (“[I]n the day-to-day practice of constitutional
interpretation, . . . the specific words of the text play at most a small role, compared to evolving
understandings of what the Constitution requires”).
168.
325 U.S. 91 (1945).
169.
This standard was then applied to § 241 in Anderson v. United States, where the Court
stated that, “since the gravamen of the offense under § 241 is conspiracy, the prosecution must show that
the offender acted with a specific intent to interfere with the federal rights in question.” 417 U.S. 211, 223
(1974).
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standard means has not always been easy for the lower courts, but the need for
some heightened inquiry is well-established.170
Yet even as these mens rea interventions sought to address notice concerns,
there remained a legislative specificity problem: how to define the actus reus of
these offenses. In particular, what are the “rights” of which Sections 241 and 242
protect against deprivation, and who would decide this question? Apparently, the
scope of protections would be defined solely through judicial dynamic
incorporation of constitutional common law, with (possibly) no legislative
contribution save the invocation of the Constitution in those statutes. It was just
this answer, as well as the attending notice concerns, that troubled the Sixth
Circuit when the government charged a Tennessee judge with sexually assaulting
a number of women who had the misfortune to have business before him. He was
charged with depriving them of “rights and privileges which are secured and
protected by the Constitution and the laws of the United States, namely the right
not to be deprived of liberty without due process of law, including the right to be
free from willful sexual assault.”171 Writing for an en banc majority, Judge
Merritt spoke the language of statutory interpretation: in passing and codifying
section 242, “Congress [did] not [evince] . . . a deliberate intent to create an
evolving criminal law which expands to include new constitutional rights as they
become a part of our civil constitutional law.”172 But, he complained, the
Supreme Court had regrettably been undeterred: “Screws is the only Supreme
Court case in our legal history in which a majority of the Court seems willing to
create a common law crime.”173 Lacking the ability to overturn this troubling
artifact, the Sixth Circuit would substantially limit its scope to situations in which
the Supreme Court had announced the right in question on fundamentally similar
facts. Because “the right not to be assaulted . . . [was] not publicly known or
understood . . . [to] rise[] to the level of a ‘constitutional right,’” and because it
was not “declared as such by the Supreme Court,” nor is it “listed in the
Constitution, nor . . . a well-established right of procedural due process,”174 its
deprivation could not form the basis for criminal liability.
When the Supreme Court took the case and reversed, it showed none of the
Sixth Circuit’s qualms with this judicially defined offense. Justice Souter,
writing for a unanimous Court in United States v. Lanier, recognized “the irony
that a prosecution to enforce one application of its spacious protection of liberty
can threaten the accused with deprivation of another.”175 But rather than engage
with the Sixth Circuit’s separation-of-powers challenge, he focused on the fair
warning concerns that had also troubled the Sixth Circuit and found them amply

170.
RICHMAN, STITH & STUNTZ, supra note 20, at 442-43.
171.
United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 261-62 (1997) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted), vacating and remanding 73 F.3d 1380 (6th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
172.
Lanier, 73 F.3d at 1387.
173.
Id. at 1391.
174.
Id. at 1392
175.
Lanier, 520 U.S. at 265.
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answered without any methodological restrictions on how a right had been made
sufficiently specific. He noted:
Although the Sixth Circuit was concerned, and rightly so, that disparate decisions
in various Circuits might leave the law insufficiently certain even on a point
widely considered, such a circumstance may be taken into account in deciding
whether the warning is fair enough, without any need for a categorical rule that
decisions of the Courts of Appeals and other courts are inadequate as a matter of
law to provide it.176

In a footnote, and only there, Souter addressed Judge Merritt’s scurrilous
allegation:
Screws did not “create a common law crime”; it narrowly construed a broadly
worded Act of Congress, and the policies favoring strict construction of criminal
statutes oblige us to carry out congressional intent as far as the Constitution will
admit . . . . Further, the Sixth Circuit’s conclusion that Congress never intended
§ 242 to extend to “newly-created constitutional rights,” is belied by the fact that
Congress has increased the penalties for the section’s violation several times since
Screws was decided, without contracting its substantive scope . . . .177

As a practical matter, Section 242 liability is quite limited. DOJ brings a
relatively small number of these cases—at least relative to what are likely the far
more numerous instances of malicious or reckless violence or other rightsviolating misconduct by officials at all levels of government.178 Lower courts
have proceeded gingerly, as when the Third Circuit rejected the government’s
effort to charge the Bridgegate defendants with violating New Jersey residents’
“right to localized travel on public roadways free from restrictions unrelated to
legitimate government objectives.”179 Still, every aspect of the offense is an
artifact of judicial decision making, subject only to a congressional delegation
that both encompasses the entire scope of rights established through ongoing
judicial interpretations of the Constitution and attaches penalties to deprivations
of those rights. As Tom Merrill put it, the Court has interpreted “the text to mean
that the enacting body specifically intended that the relevant legal norms in a

176.
Id. at 269; see also Trevor Morrison, Fair Warning and the Retroactive Judicial Expansion
of Federal Criminal Statutes, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 455, 469 (2001) (“[T]he fair warning requirement
described in Lanier ‘bars courts from applying a novel construction of a criminal statute to conduct that
neither the statute nor any prior judicial decision has fairly disclosed to be within its scope.’” (quoting
Lanier, 520 U.S. at 266)).
177.
Lanier, 520 U.S. at 267 n.6 (quoting Lanier, 73 F.3d at 1387) (internal citations omitted).
178.
Police Officers Rarely Charged for Excessive Use of Force in Federal Court, TRAC (June
17, 2020), https://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/crim/615 [https://perma.cc/9PPW-G562] (“Altogether in FY
2019, federal prosecutors brought § 242 charges in just 49 cases in the United States. . . . Historically very
few referrals under § 242 are actually prosecuted by the Department of Justice.”). The George Floyd
Justice in Policing bill that has passed the House of Representatives and now pends in the Senate would
reduce the mens rea demanded by § 242 from “willfully” to “knowingly or recklessly.” H.R. 1280, 117th
Cong. § 101 (passed by the House, Mar. 3, 2021); see also Michael D. Shear & Nicholas Fandos, George
Floyd’s Family Meets with Biden Amid Push for Police Reform, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/25/us/politics/george-floyd-white-house-meeting.html [https://perma
.cc/SKY9-W2HA].
179.
United States v. Baroni, 909 F.3d 550, 585 (3d Cir. 2018) (internal citation omitted), rev’d
on other grounds sub nom, Kelly v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 1565 (2020).
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specific area are to be developed by the federal courts in accordance with the
incremental decisionmaking process of the common law.”180
The Court can sometimes seem to be in almost comic denial of its civil
rights crime-definition role. Thus, in United States v. Kozminski,181 where
defendants were charged under Section 241, as well as another more specific
statute,182 for conspiring to interfere with an individual’s Thirteenth Amendment
right to be free from “involuntary servitude,” the Court rejected a prosecution
theory of “involuntariness” that went beyond “the use or threatened use of
physical or legal coercion.”183 Invoking the rule of lenity, the Court noted that
the Government’s interpretation would delegate to prosecutors and juries the
inherently legislative task of determining what type of coercive activities are so
morally reprehensible that they should be punished as crimes. It would also
subject individuals to the risk of arbitrary or discriminatory prosecution and
conviction.184

But, of course, for guidance in the “inherently legislative task” of defining
Thirteenth Amendment “coercion,” the Court simply cited its own constitutional
precedents.185
When casting about for areas in which Congress has delegated criminal
lawmaking authority to the courts, Justice Stevens would regularly cite antitrust
cases,186 and, as a formal matter, he was quite correct to do so. Indeed, in this
area, as Tom Merrill explains, the Court has largely dropped the pretense of
statutory interpretation, making “Section 1 of the Sherman Act . . . a paradigm
of implied delegated lawmaking.”187 And violations of the Sherman Act can be
and are regularly prosecuted as crimes. Indeed, during the Act’s early years,
prosecutors brought criminal cases charging a broad variety of anticompetitive

180.
Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 40
(1985).
181.
487 U.S. 931 (1988).
182.
18 U.S.C. § 1584 (2018) (making it a crime knowingly and willfully to hold another person
“to involuntary servitude”).
183.
487 U.S. at 944.
184.
Id. at 949.
185.
Id. at 943.
186.
Id. at 965-66 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment); McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350,
372-73 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Kahan, supra note 50, at 395 n.254 (collecting these same
citations in support of the fact that “Justice Stevens has declined to apply lenity when he has concluded
that Congress intended [a criminal statutory] definition to be developed in the common-law tradition of
case-by-case adjudication,” due to the fact that if “lenity [were] to be treated as lexically prior to all other
conventions, it would preclude recourse to all the sources of normative inspiration that guide delegated
lawmaking” (internal quotation omitted)).
187.
Merrill, supra note 180, at 45; see, e.g., Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435
U.S. 679, 688 (1978) (explaining that the scope of § 1 of the Sherman Act was determined by a process
of giving “shape to the statute’s broad mandate by drawing on common-law tradition.”); see also Daniel
A. Crane, Antitrust Antitexualism, 96 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1205, 1207 (2021) (going further and
suggesting that, in the antitrust area, “courts have not merely abandoned statutory textualism or other
modes of faithful interpretation out of a commitment to a dynamic common-law process” but “[r]ather,
they have departed from text and original meaning in one consistent direction—toward reading down the
antitrust statutes in favor of big business”); see also Thomas C. Arthur, Farewell to the Sea of Doubt:
Jettisoning the Constitutional Sherman Act, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 263, 267, 267-68 n.9 (1986) (noting
separation-of-powers concerns with judicial lawmaking under the Sherman Act).
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and monopolistic behaviors.188 But the offense was originally a misdemeanor,
and as Daniel Sokol notes:
More than a generation has passed since there have been any criminal indictments,
let alone jail time, for § 1 and § 2 noncollusion cases. The DOJ has brought a
single criminal noncollusion antitrust case since the introduction of the felony
penalties.189

Virtually all criminal cases have been limited to per se illegal instances of
horizontal collusion—like price-fixing, bid rigging, and market allocation—
involving little or doctrinal development.190 This case selection is a matter of
articulated prosecutorial policy. The DOJ’s Antitrust Manual states that
“current . . . policy is to proceed by criminal investigation and prosecution in
cases involving horizontal, per se unlawful agreements.”191 And in recent
litigation, the government noted that it had “long eschewed prosecuting conduct
subject to the rule of reason, and it has no interest in doing so here.”192 Sokol
goes on to suggest that any effort to proceed criminally beyond per se illegal
conduct might well render the Sherman Act void-for-vagueness.193 What might
seem as a massive space for common law criminal development has thus, by dint
of executive and judicial restraint, been compressed to a series of discrete and
well-defined offenses. The Antitrust Division’s recent prosecutions of firms for
agreeing not to “poach” each other’s employees is thus raising the issue of
whether such agreements are per se illegal.194
For an example of a purely statutory space—with no common law or
constitutional roots—that Congress has left for courts to fill in, one need only
consider the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statute. It
criminalizes little conduct that was not already covered by a federal or state penal

188.
Gregory J. Werden, Individual Accountability Under the Sherman Act: The Early Years,
31 ANTITRUST 100, 100 (2017).
189.
D. Daniel Sokol, Reinvigorating Criminal Antitrust?, 60 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1545, 1557
(2019).
190.
So hardened has the adjudicative presentation of per se cases become that defendants
recently challenged the judicial framing as a violation of their right to have the jury decide all the elements
of the crime. See United States v. Sanchez, 760 F. App’x 533 (9th Cir. 2019), cert. denied., 140 S. Ct. 909
(2020).
191.
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIV., ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL, at III-12 (5th ed.
2018).
192.
United States v. Kemp, 907 F.3d 1264, 1274 (10th Cir. 2018) (quoting the government’s
brief).
193.
See Sokol, supra note 189, at 1594 (“Without a clear and objective standard for what
criminal enforcement would look like for noncollusion cases under the Sherman Act, antitrust may have
a void[-]for[-]vagueness problem.”). Recently, the government argued that it was free to bring criminal
charges involving anticompetitive conduct not per se illegal, but the issue was ultimately mooted. See
Kemp, 907 F.3d at 1278.
194.
See Alex Malyshev & Jeffrey S. Boxer, With DOJ’s Focus on Wage Fixing and No Poach
Agreements, Non-compete and Antitrust Laws Collide, REUTERS (Aug. 23, 2021), https://www.reuters
.com/legal/legalindustry/with-dojs-focus-wage-fixing-no-poach-agreements-non-compete-antitrust-laws
-2021-08-23/ [https://perma.cc/2MQC-MXTR]; see also Matthew Perlman, Surgical Care Blasts DOJ
Criminal Case Over Employee Pacts, LAW360 (May 17, 2021, 6:59 PM EDT), https://www.law360.com
/articles/1385417/surgical-care-blasts-doj-criminal-case-over-employee-pacts [https://perma.cc/A39U-T
TWY] (describing defense arguments that challenged conduct is not per se illegal and that criminal
prosecution is thus a due process violation).
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law, nor does it necessarily increase a defendant’s sentencing exposure. But it
massively increases the ability of federal prosecutors to pull together a sprawling
set of offenses and defendants, gaining proof synergies (known to defendants as
“spillover prejudice”195) that incentivize the investment of investigative
resources and extend the scope and likelihood of conviction. Access to this
powerful charging tool requires—over and above proof of predicate federal or
state crimes—proof of elements like “enterprise,” “pattern,” and “association,”
that, with scant assistance from Congress, courts have made their peculiar
province.196
4. Assessing Judicial Delegation in Context
The Sherman Act and the Reconstruction civil rights criminal statutes thus
offer dramatic instances of both maximal legislative delegation and considerable
doctrinal self-restraint by prosecutors and courts. A pragmatist might sit back
and posit some natural equilibrium of criminal lawmaking across all three
branches, in the shadow of constitutional notice and vagueness concerns.
Moreover, broad delegation does not preclude congressional intervention and
full appreciation by courts and prosecutors of that possibility. Still, broad
acceptance of this state of affairs should pose a considerable challenge to a
formalist attracted to the Gorsuch critique.
How do these crime-definition delegations to courts—particularly maximal
ones like Sections 241 and 242—fare when judged against the challenged
delegations to administrative agencies? As Margaret Lemos has noted,
“[V]irtually no effort has been made to fit delegations to courts into
nondelegation theory or practice.”197 The “intelligible” principle for these civil
rights statutes is the U.S Constitution, as interpreted by courts over time. Most
readers surely find the Constitution quite intelligible, and the case establishing
the “intelligibility” standard allows for considerable flexibility. Back in 1928,
the Court noted that, when “determining what [Congress] may do in seeking
assistance from another branch, the extent and character of that assistance must
be fixed according to common sense and the inherent necessities of the
government coordination.”198 Yet it is hard to see how such a massive delegation
is consistent with the standards Justice Gorsuch would demand for crimedefinition. As Lemos notes, “The focus of the intelligible principle requirement
is not on the characteristics of Congress’s chosen delegate, but on Congress itself

195.
See United States v. Martinez, 994 F.3d 1, 14-17 (1st Cir. 2021).
196.
RICHMAN, STITH & STUNTZ, supra note 20, at 576-608; see Kahan, supra note 21, at 473
(“RICO is best conceptualized . . . as an implicit delegation of authority to courts to fashion their own
rules.”); Brian Slocum, RICO and the Legislative Supremacy Approach to Federal Criminal Lawmaking,
31 LOY. U.CHI. L.J. 639, 655-56 (2000).
197.
Lemos, supra note 94, at 408.
198.
W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928); see also Mistretta v.
United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372-73 (1989) (“[T]his Court has deemed it ‘constitutionally sufficient if
Congress clearly delineates the general policy, the public agency which is to apply it, and the boundaries
of this delegated authority’” (quoting Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946))).
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and the choices it must make.”199 Perhaps justification can be found in the
analysis—which Justice Gorsuch found applicable to certain delegations to the
Executive—that excuses sweeping delegations that overlap with the delegatee
branch’s inherent powers. After all, the courts are the final arbiters of the
Constitution.200 But that is an idiosyncratic and limited analysis.
Measured against the criteria usually used by those normatively assessing
delegations to agencies, particularly the concern about democratic
accountability, the delegations to courts explored here—at least those at the
maximal end of the continuum—fare poorly. Perhaps courts—at least federal
ones with life-tenure judges—should be excused from standard delegation
scrutiny, because “judges are more insulated from the political process and so
pose a lesser danger to liberty than do agencies.”201 Yet other features of maximal
judicial delegations push hard in the opposite direction, since the accountability
that Justice Gorsuch seeks is the antithesis of insulation. Courts are not subject
to controls that Congress can place on agencies202 or to the political
accountability that agencies have through the President.203
Perhaps the very nature of courts, with their adherence to precedent-based
reasoning and incremental change, makes their accountability of less concern
than that of agencies, where policy-driven decision making can lead to dramatic
legal discontinuities demanding close scrutiny.204 But one can flip that point and
draw on the literature on the political accountability of agencies, which would
valorize (or condemn) these discontinuities as reflecting the increasing
domination of the bureaucracy by a politically-responsive (albeit inexpert)
Executive.205 Because agencies proceed categorically rather than case-by-case,
they can also more easily be held to account for changing the legal landscape.
Maybe judicial law development derives accountability from its
institutional setting, for it cannot occur without prosecutors presenting factual

199.
Lemos, supra note 94, at 436.
200.
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the
province of the judicial department to say what the law is.”).
201.
Volokh, supra note 78, at 1414 (citing DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT
RESPONSIBILITY 113, 189 (1993)).
202.
Whatever agenda control Congress has over courts has rarely been exercised in practice.
See Richard Fallon, Jurisdiction-Stripping Reconsidered, 96 VA. L. REV. 1043, 1045 (2010). But
Congress can and, particularly in the criminal area, has legislatively nullified statutory rulings. See infra
note 209 and accompanying text.
203.
Lemos, supra note 94, at 449; Volokh, supra note 78, at 1414; Jerry L. Mashaw,
Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81, 93-94
(1985).
204.
Justice Gorsuch recently complained that “these days it sometimes seems agencies change
their statutory interpretations almost as often as elections change administrations.” Guedes v. BATF, 140
S. Ct. 789, 790 (2020) (Gorsuch, J., statement with respect to denial of certiorari).
205.
See Peter L. Strauss, The Trump Administration and the Rule of Law, 170 REVUE
FRANÇAISE D’ADMINISTRATION PUBLIQUE 433, 439 (2019) (noting “trend to presidentialism” in recent
administrations); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2272-2363 (2001)
(offering normative critiques and defenses of presidential accountability and control); see also Kirti Datla
& Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and Executive Agencies), 98 CORNELL L.
REV. 769, 818-24 (2013) (examining sources of independent agency “dependence” on the President).
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narratives and crafting legal liability theories.206 How does the conditional nature
of judicial crime-definition cut with respect to the Gorsuch critique?
Prosecutorial gatekeeping ensures some separation of powers and brings a degree
of political accountability. To be sure, direct prosecutorial accountability is
somewhat limited because, as Hessick notes, federal prosecutorial decisions are
usually made below the level of a political appointee.207 But even mine-run
decisions come with a degree of networked accountability that I have described
elsewhere.208 More importantly, prosecutors must take at least co-ownership of
any judicial expansions of criminal liability, an ownership that comes with at
least potential accountability to Congress. One need only look at the exceptional
centralized control that DOJ has exercised over criminal civil rights and antitrust
prosecutions—two spheres of ostensible common law development that also
potentially target groups with considerable political power—to see this political
accountability at work. Conversely, when judicial legal development curtails
criminal liability, the Executive will regularly turn to Congress for a legislative
fix.209
Of course, the democratic accountability that prosecutorial gatekeeping and
prosecutorial-mediated congressional oversight bring to the judicial crimedefinition project comes with the risk of self-dealing that is a separate concern
of Justice Gorsuch.210 Dan Kahan has cogently suggested that the prosecutorial
“power of initiative” comes with its own pathology.211 Prosecutors not only
anchor judicial lawmaking to a larger political environment but also pursue their
own agendas. By controlling what courts learn about an enforcement
environment, picking cases whose facts counsel liability expansion in sometimes
troubling directions, and pleading out cases that would lead to adverse decisions,
prosecutors have an influence on judicial law development that is likely greater,
and is certainly less transparent, than the influence they have over agency rulepromulgation, particularly when the agency is not the DOJ.212
206.
See Richman, supra note 28, at 758 (discussing the gatekeeping role of prosecutors).
207.
Hessick, supra note 91, at 1003.
208.
Daniel Richman, Accounting for Prosecutors, in PROSECUTORS AND DEMOCRACY: A
CROSS-NATIONAL STUDY 40, 68 (M. Langer & D. Sklansky eds., 2017).
209.
See, e.g., Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, § 2(f)(1)(B),
123 Stat. 1617, 1618 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(9) (2018)), overriding United States v. Santos, 553
U.S. 507 (2008); Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-325, § 411(c)(1), 108 Stat. 2160, 2253 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 5324(c) (2018)),
overriding Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994); An Act to Prevent the Manufacturing,
Distribution, and Use of Illegal Drugs, and for Other Purposes, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7603, 102 Stat.
4181, 4508 (1988) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2018), overriding McNally v. United States, 483 U.S.
350 (1987). See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation
Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991) (detailing the phenomenon of statutory overrides).
210.
See Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2131 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
211.
See Kahan, supra note 21, at 479-80; see also Samuel Buell, The Upside of Overbreadth,
83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1491, 1514 (2008) (“Broader liability rules afford prosecutors more freedom to apply
them to novel contexts, generating more cases that require courts to decide whether to interpret liability
rules broadly, and so on.”).
212.
Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from
Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 882-83 (2009) (“With his or her power to choose from a range
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Indeed, relying on agencies to craft regulations on which prosecutors can
base criminal charges is far superior to common law development if one worries
about the combination of crime-definition and enforcement power. In both
scenarios, prosecutorial gatekeeping and litigation control will bring a degree of
influence over effective crime-definition that can be abused. But the separation
between prosecutors and an agency rulemaking process may be far greater than
their separation from the crime-definition process that, to varying extents, plays
out in federal courts. The latter context has an independent judge tethered to a
process over which prosecutors have considerable sway. The former offers an
agency that is usually quite separate from prosecutors, one that must comply with
an open and transparent rule-making process, with notice and comment from
affected parties,213 and that may worry about losing control over law
development once prosecutors take a case.
A rulemaking agency will not only be focused on its own equities but will
be obliged to adhere to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).214 Interested
parties will be able to challenge a rule’s consistency with the asserted statutory
mandate or claim policy arbitrariness215 in a process that finds no parallel for
theories of liability generated by courts and prosecutors.216 DOJ has, in contrast,
not shown the slightest interest in offering up its legal theories for notice and
comment rulemaking, and has taken pains to ensure that litigants cannot rely on
internal guidance manuals.217 Moreover, an APA rulemaking challenge to an
agency rule will be facial and brought by a party that need not suffer from the
bad facts that are the usual burden of a criminal defendant. Nor do the functional
of federal criminal laws, to exercise significant leverage over defendants to obtain pleas and cooperation,
and to control the sentence or sentencing range through charging decisions, the prosecutor combines
enforcement and adjudicative power.”).
213.
See Peter L. Strauss, Speech, From Expertise to Politics: The Transformation of American
Rulemaking, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 745, 755-56 (1996) (describing a shift in the 1960s and 1970s
from agency adjudication as the primary method of regulation to informal rulemaking due in part to the
belief rulemaking was “more democratic”); Lauren Moxley, E-Rulemaking and Democracy, 68 ADMIN.
L. REV. 661, 663-64 (2016) (arguing that notice-and-comment rulemaking promotes both participatory
and epistemic democracy by involving the public in the regulatory process on the one hand, and drawing
on its “widely dispersed information power” on the other).
214.
Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–706) (2018)).
215.
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (C) (2018).
216.
See ROBERTA A. KARMEL, REGULATION BY PROSECUTION: THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION VS. CORPORATE AMERICA 96 (1982) (noting that in a criminal prosecution
“[o]ther regulated persons who will become subject to that regulatory policy do not have the opportunity
to object to or to comment upon the new interpretation or rule, as they would have in a rulemaking
proceeding”).
217.
Kahan, supra note 21, at 497 n.145 (explaining DOJ’s reluctance to promulgate binding
internal regulations); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE MANUAL § 1-1.200 (2018), https://www.justice.gov
/jm/jm-1-1000-introduction [https://perma.cc/XS8Q-ZDRV] (“The Justice Manual provides internal DOJ
guidance. It is not intended to, does not, and may not be relied upon to create any rights, substantive or
procedural, enforceable at law by any party in any matter civil or criminal. Nor are any limitations hereby
placed on otherwise lawful litigation prerogatives of DOJ.”); United States v. Apel, 571 U.S. 359, 369
(2014) (rejecting defendant’s citation of U.S. Attorneys’ Manual to support statutory interpretation and
stating the Court has “never held that the Government’s reading of a criminal statute is entitled to
deference”); United States v. Holder, 256 F.3d 959, 965 n.10 (10th Cir. 2001) (giving no deference to the
U.S. Attorneys’ Manual’s interpretation of a criminal statute).
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defenses of agency lawmaking easily apply to courts, which cannot offer the
access to information, national uniformity, and flexibility that agencies can.218
Finally, while the advantage of administrative crimes over broad statutes
that hand interstitial lawmaking authority to a prosecutorial-judicial collective is
only arguable with respect to self-dealing concerns, it seems certain with respect
to due process values like notice and ex ante specificity. An agency’s expertise
and civil enforcement experience will not invariably push it to such specificity,
particularly when it prefers enforcement to rulemaking. But when selfconsciously executing a delegated rulemaking assignment, an agency faces a
legal accountability that Congress rarely faces in the criminal area.
Digging into the Code of Federal Regulations in addition to the U.S. Code
involves extra work. Yet the potential defendant required to do that by an
administrative crime will generally (but not always) find clarity and detail
unavailable to the person worried about being charged under a congressionally
drafted statute with a judicial gloss—particularly when that gloss arises primarily
in lower federal courts and is not always consistent across them. In short, the
main reason crime-definition delegations to courts come out so well compared
to those to agencies (which pass, but sometimes with grumbling219) is probably
that judges are grading their own papers.
B. States
As we have seen, broad congressional crime-definition delegations to
courts not only flout formal notions of legislative supremacy but raise special
problems relating to the nature of the institution. How, then, ought one assess
delegations to not federal, but state legislatures? Here again, one finds a
continuum of contexts in which state statutes provide the terms of a federal
criminal offense. First, we will consider federal statutory regimes in which
Congress has explicitly incorporated a specific set of state penal laws into an
offense definition. We will then turn to the Assimilative Crimes Act (ACA)220
and its explicit adoption of a far broader range of offenses defined by the relevant
state legislature. The most significant aspect of this continuum, for our purposes,
is complete doctrinal acceptance, even by Justice Gorsuch, of the effective
delegation of federal crime-definition authority to institutions whose very lack
of federal status is considered a source of comfort, not concern.
1. State Law Predicates
State law figures prominently in federal criminal law. This ought not to be
surprising to anyone familiar with the federal history. While federal criminal law
started as a means of “targeting activity that injured or interfered with the federal

218.
219.
220.

Lemos, supra note 92, at 444.
See supra note 4.
18 U.S.C. § 13(a) (2018).
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government itself, its property, or its programs,”221 by the beginning of the
twentieth century, “[federal] legislators began to think of [f]ederal criminal
jurisdiction . . . as supplementing local enforcement efforts supporting local
exertions, and compensating for local inadequacies or corruption . . . .”222
Initially the federal offense created to support state efforts deployed a modified
common law term, as when the 1919 Dyer Act criminalized interstate car
thefts.223 But sometimes Congress employed a more capacious term of its own
devising, as when the 1910 Mann Act criminalized the interstate transportation
of a woman or girl “for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or for any
other immoral purpose.”224 It wasn’t until 1986 that Congress withdrew the
invitation to courts to judge morality and amended the statute to cover
transportation for the purpose of prostitution “or [] any sexual activity for which
any person can be charged with a criminal offense,” implicitly drawing on
existing state and federal offenses.225
This state law incorporation strategy would not only alleviate the troubling
vagueness of a federal definition but would accommodate state laboratories of
experimentation,226 whose main experiment was legal gambling. Thus, when
Congress rolled out its first comprehensive gambling statute in 1970, it defined
an “illegal gambling business” with reference to “the law of a State or political
subdivision in which it is conducted.”227 Complaints that the gambling statute
was deficient because, by relying on state law, its effect would “not be uniform
throughout the United States,” were largely brushed aside.228
221.
RICHMAN, STITH & STUNTZ, supra note 20, at 3.
222.
Daniel C. Richman, The Changing Boundaries Between Federal and Local Law
Enforcement, in 2 NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 2000: BOUNDARY CHANGES IN CRIMINAL
JUSTICE ORGANIZATIONS 81, 87 (Charles M. Friel ed., 2000); see also Susan R. Klein, Independent-Norm
Federalism in Criminal Law, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1541, 1548 (2002).
223.
Daniel Richman & Sarah Seo, How Federalism Built the FBI, Sustained Local Police, and
Left Out the States, 17 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. (forthcoming 2021); see United States v. Turley, 352 U.S.
407, 416-41 (1957) (holding that the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act is not limited to “situations which
at common law would be considered larceny” because “[p]rofessional thieves resort to innumerable forms
of theft and Congress presumably sought to meet the need for federal action effectively rather than to
leave loopholes for wholesale evasion.”).
224.
Ch. 395, 36 Stat. 825 (1910) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 398 (1940)). For cases broadly
applying the “immorality” prong, see, for example, Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917)
(upholding the conviction of a man who transported a woman to be his “concubine and mistress”) and
Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946) (upholding the conviction of a Fundamentalist Mormon
who transported a woman for purposes of polygamy).
225.
Child Sexual Abuse and Pornography Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-628, § 5, 100 Stat. 3510,
3511 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (2018)); see Michael Conant, Federalism, the Mann Act,
and the Imperative to Decriminalize Prostitution, CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 99, 116-17 (1996).
226.
See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of
the country.”).
227.
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub L. No. 91-452, § 803(a), 84 Stat. 922, 937
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (2018)); see G. Robert Blakey & Harold A. Kurland, The
Development of the Federal Law of Gambling, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 923, 979 (1978).
228.
United States v. Sacco, 491 F.2d 995, 1003 (9th Cir. 1974). But see id. at 1004 (Ely, J.,
dissenting) (“[T]he statute in question . . . is intolerably discriminatory and thus denies to some . . . the
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Arguably even more explicit instances of dynamic incorporation of state
law occurred in the Travel Act of 1964229 and the RICO statute230 in 1970, both
of which created complex federal offenses whose elements could, should
prosecutors so choose, include violations of specified varieties of state law
relating to, say, “extortion” or “bribery.”231 These statutes made perfect sense as
a policy matter, since they allowed federal enforcers to selectively take crimes
defined by state law and usually handled by local authorities and pursue them as
part of an “organized crime” project (without, at least for the Travel Act, bearing
any legal burden of showing a connection to a larger criminal operation).232 A
similar strategy has been used in a proposed federal domestic terrorism statute.233
One challenge to the Travel Act condemned it as “an unconstitutional
delegation of Federal legislative power to the States.”234 In response, a DOJ
official, Herbert J. Miller, Jr., noted that, unlike the Assimilative Crimes Act,
which entailed wholesale delegation to the states, “the ‘Travel Act’ is restricted
to certain defined kinds of criminal activity . . . .”235 Indeed, subsequent years
would see a line of Supreme Court and lower court cases determining whether
conduct charged both violated some state penal law and fit within some generic
federal definition of “extortion,”236 “bribery,”237 arson,238 and other Travel Act
terms, and they found no need for juries to be instructed as to the state crimedefinition. Concerns about ostensible legislative delegation of federal criminal
lawmaking authority to states will thus be mitigated when federal courts exercise
a gatekeeping role in assessing what conduct and which state statutes “count” for
federal criminal law purposes. Federal courts may not be democratically
equal protection of the law. By its express terms, the criminal sanctions of the statute may be applied only
to those citizens who commit their alleged unlawful gambling activities in communities wherein gambling
is already prohibited by local law.”).
229.
Interstate Travel in Aid of Racketeering, Pub. L. No. 87-228, § 1(a), 75 Stat. 498, 498
(1961) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2018)).
230.
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, Pub. L. No. 91-452, title IX, §901(a),
84 Stat. 941 (1970) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2018)).
231.
18 U.S.C. § 1955(b); 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A).
232.
See Craig M. Bradley, Racketeering and the Federalization of Crime, 22 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 213, 245 (1984).
233.
See Confronting the Threat of Domestic Terrorism Act, H.R. 4192, 116th Cong. (2019)
(designating “prohibited acts” with reference to both state and federal laws). More recent domestic
terrorism legislative proposals have not sought to create new offenses. See, e.g., S. 964, 117th Cong.
(2021); H.R. 350, 117th Cong. (2021).
234.
Herbert J. Miller, Jr., The “Travel Act”: A New Statutory Approach to Organized Crime in
the United States, 1 DUQ. U. L. REV. 181, 185 (1963).
235.
Id. at 189.
236.
United States v. Nardello, 393 U.S. 286, 295 (1969) (“[T]he inquiry is not the manner in
which States classify their criminal prohibitions but whether the particular State involved prohibits the
extortionate activity charged.”).
237.
Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 49 (1979) (concluding that Congress intended “the
generic definition of bribery, rather than a narrow common-law definition”).
238.
United States v. Conway, 507 F.2d 1047, 1051 (5th Cir. 1975) (concluding that there was
no need for the jury to have been instructed on the definition of “arson” under Maryland law); see also
United States v. Owens, 159 F.3d 221, 228 (6th Cir. 1998) (rejecting claim that court failed to instruct on
elements of state gambling and prostitution offenses); United States v. Gomez, 801 F. App’x. 715 (11th
Cir. 2020) (following Conway and finding “no requirement that the jury be instructed on the state-specific
definition of the predicate crime”).
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accountable, but, unlike state legislatures, they are federal. And, at least so far,
the federal statutes on which their gatekeeping is based have not been deemed
void for vagueness.239
Still, strategic recourse to state criminal law predicates via the Travel Act
can permit federal prosecutors to circumvent limitations, whether
congressionally devised or judicially constructed, on purely federal statutes. One
such limitation arose in 2016, when, in McDonnell v. United States, the Supreme
Court construed the federal fraud and extortion statutes to reach only those cases
of bribery where the quid pro quo was with respect to a rather limited range of
“official acts.”240 Prosecutors quickly responded, in at least one case, by charging
bribery defendants under the Travel Act, using state law predicates that lacked
any such limitation.241
2. The ACA and Wholesale Adoption of Non-Duplicative State Penal
Law for Federal Enclaves
The gatekeeping-role federal courts play when deciding which state statutes
can apply to a defendant via the Travel Act or RICO is substantially (but not
completely) absent when a defendant in a federal enclave is charged under the
ACA.242 Here, there is wholesale dynamic incorporation (in the absence of a
federal statute on point). The ACA provides, in pertinent part:
Whoever [in a federal enclave] . . . is guilty of any act or omission which,
although not made punishable by any enactment of Congress, would be
punishable if committed or omitted within the jurisdiction of the State, Territory,
Possession, or District in which such place is situated, by the laws thereof in force
at the time of such act or omission, shall be guilty of a like offense and subject to
a like punishment.243

The ACA dates back to Joseph Story’s dismay that, after Hudson &
Goodwin, federal prosecutors and courts simply lacked an adequate supply of
federal criminal law from Congress to address core federal interests and govern
federal enclaves. Failing to obtain legislative authorization for a federal common
law of crimes, Justice Story complained:
The criminal Code of the United States is singularly defective and inefficient . . . .
Few, very few, of the practical crimes (if I may so say) are now punishable by
statutes, and if the courts have no general common law jurisdiction (which is a
239.
It has been argued, so far unsuccessfully, that the Supreme Court’s recent void-forvagueness cases, see, e.g., United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019), require reconsideration of this
line of Travel Act cases, see United States v. Rogers, 389 F. Supp. 3d 774, 790 (C.D. Cal. 2019).
Considerable credit for my discussion of this statute goes to Jillian Williams, Columbia Law School ’21,
on whose research and analysis I draw.
240.
136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016).
241.
See United States v. Ferriero, 866 F.3d 107, 128 (3d Cir. 2017) (finding McDonnell’s
limitations not to apply to New Jersey bribery statute charged as Travel Act predicate). Of course,
prosecutors have also used other federal statutes to avoid McDonnell’s limitations. See United States v.
Ng Lap Seng, 934 F.3d 110, 130 (2d Cir. 2019) (declining to read McDonnell’s limitation into either 18
U.S.C. § 666 (2018) or the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act).
242.
18 U.S.C. § 13(a) (2018).
243.
Id.
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vexed question), they are wholly dispunishable. The state courts have no
jurisdiction of crimes committed on the high seas, or in places ceded to the United
States. Rapes, arsons, batteries, and a host of other crimes may in these places be
now committed with impunity. Suppose a conspiracy to commit treason in any of
these places, by civil persons, how can the crime be punished? These are cases
where the United States have an exclusive local jurisdiction. And can it be less fit
that the government should have power to protect itself in all other places where
it exercises a legitimate authority? That Congress has power to provide for all
crimes against the United States is [incontestable].244

Justice Story thereafter drafted the original ACA, which Representative Daniel
Webster introduced in 1825.245
Initially, the ACA provided for “static conformity” with the state law of a
federal enclave: the relevant state crime-definition was that in force when the
ACA, or subsequent versions of it, was enacted.246 Then in 1948, Congress
changed its drafting strategy, opting for dynamic incorporation of state law. As
the Court put it in United States v. Sharpnack, which upheld the new statute’s
constitutionality: “Congress has thus at last provided that within each federal
enclave, to the extent that offenses are not preempted by congressional
enactments, there shall be complete current conformity with the criminal laws of
the respective States in which the enclaves are situated.”247 The ACA does not
authorize recourse to state law where some applicable federal enactment was
intended to fill the field or otherwise preclude such recourse.248 But, as Wayne
Logan explains, absent such preclusion, the ACA effects
a legal metamorphosis[,] [] transforming “a crime against the state into a crime
against the federal government.” Upon conviction, the sentence imposed by the
federal court is not to “exceed any maximum sentence and may not fall below any
mandatory minimum sentence that is required under the law of the state in which
the crimes occur.”249

Before Sharpnack, two lower courts found the ACA’s dynamic
incorporation of “future legislation constituted an improper delegation and

244.
United States v. Press Pub. Co., 219 U.S. 1, 12 (1911) (quoting 1 JOSEPH STORY, LIFE OF
JUSTICE STORY 293 (Boston 1851)).
245.
Williams v. United States, 327 U.S. 711, 721 (1946) (identifying Daniel Webster as the
bill’s sponsor); see also Note, The Federal Assimilative Crimes Act, 70 HARV L. REV. 685, 685 (1957).
246.
United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286, 291 (1958); see also Franklin v. United States,
216 U.S. 559, 569 (1910) (“There is plainly no delegation to the states of authority in any way to change
the criminal laws applicable to places over which the United States has jurisdiction.”).
247.
Sharpnack, 355 U.S. at 293.
248.
Lewis v. United States, 523 U.S. 155, 164 (1998); see also United States v. Rocha, 598
F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2010) (rejecting ACA charge based on assimilation of California penal law in a federal
prison assault case, on finding that “Congress has enacted a comprehensive assault statute by which it has
fully occupied the law of assault within federal enclaves”); see also United States v. Do, 994 F.3d 1096,
1102 (9th Cir. 2021) (noting that ACA’s “application is predicated on analysis of the federal statute, not
a prosecutorial desire to obtain a higher sentence.”).
249.
Wayne A. Logan, Creating a “Hydra in Government”: Federal Recourse to State Law in
Crime Fighting, 86 B.U. L. REV. 65, 72-73 (2006) (first quoting United States v. Kiliz, 694 F.2d 628, 629
(9th Cir. 1982); then quoting United States v. Garcia, 893 F.2d 250, 251-52 (10th Cir. 1989)).
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abdication of legislative duties,”250 and indeed pre-New Deal precedent held:
“Congress cannot transfer its legislative power to the States—by nature this is
nondelegable.”251 The Sharpnack Court, however, calmly rejected the delegation
challenge on pragmatic grounds. Vagueness was not a problem: “Whether
Congress sets forth the assimilated laws in full or assimilates them by reference,
the result is as definite and as ascertainable as are the state laws themselves.”252
Neither was wholesale and dynamic incorporation of state criminal statutes
constitutionally troubling:
Rather than being a delegation by Congress of its legislative authority to the
States, it is a deliberate continuing adoption by Congress for federal enclaves of
such unpreempted offenses and punishments as shall have been already put in
effect by the respective States for their own government. Congress retains power
to exclude a particular state law from the assimilative effect of the Act. This
procedure is a practical accommodation of the mechanics of the legislative
functions of State and Nation in the field of police power where it is especially
appropriate to make the federal regulation of local conduct conform to that already
established by the State.253

Since Congress could undoubtedly incorporate state law piecemeal or wholesale,
and “obviously” could “renew such assimilation annually or daily,”254 why force
it to go through the charade?
“To protect liberty,” an adherent to the Gorsuch critique might respond, and
she might echo Justice Douglas’ dissent in Sharpnack:
Under the scheme now approved, a State makes such federal law, applicable to
the enclave, as it likes, and that law becomes federal law, for the violation of which
the citizen is sent to prison.
Here, it is a sex crime on which Congress has never legislated. Tomorrow it
may be a blue law, a law governing usury, or even a law requiring segregation of
the races on buses and in restaurants. It may be a law that could never command
a majority in the Congress, or that in no sense reflected its will. It is no answer to
say that the citizen would have a defense under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments
to unconstitutional applications of these federal laws or the procedures under
them. He is entitled to the considered judgment of Congress whether the law
applied to him fits the federal policy. That is what federal lawmaking is . . .
There is some convenience in doing what the Court allows today. Congress is
saved the bother of enacting new Assimilative Crimes Acts from time to time.

250.
Note, The Assimilative Crimes Act, 7 U. RICH. L. REV. 116, 123 (1972) (citing Hollister v.
United States, 145 F. 773, 779 (8th Cir. 1906); and United States v. Barnaby, 51 F. 20, 23 (D. Mont.
1893)).
251.
Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 164 (1920) (McReynolds, J.); see also
Sharpnack, 355 U.S. at 294 n.10 (distinguishing Knickerbocker); Michael C. Dorf, Dynamic
Incorporation of Foreign Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 139, 140 (2008) (citing Cooley v. Board of
Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851)); Calhoun v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 40 F.3d 622, 629 n.8 (3d Cir.
1994)) (“Although [Knickerbocker and similar cases] have not been explicitly overruled by the Court,
they rest on a strong nondelegation doctrine the likes of which has not been seen since the 1930s.”).
252.
Sharpnack, 355 U.S. at 293.
253.
Id. at 294.
254.
Id. at 293.
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Federal laws grow like mushrooms without Congress passing a bill. But
convenience is not material to the constitutional problem.255

Why then is the wholesale delegation of federal criminal-definition to the
states—that is, once a federal court identifies a gap in federal law—so
uncontroversial that even then-Judge Gorsuch could laud the arrangement, going
so far as to observe that “[a] testament to its efficacy and economy of design, the
ACA remains today little changed from its original form”?256 Certainly, if one
puts aside the delegation doctrine, disregards the lack of an “intelligible”
principle, and uses a grading rubric anchored in federalism, comity, and the
traditional primacy of states in criminal law matters, the ACA passes with flying
colors. As the Court noted in 1911 regarding the static version of the ACA:
Congress, in adopting it, sedulously considered the twofold character of our
constitutional government, and had in view the enlightened purpose, so far as the
punishment of crime was concerned, to interfere as little as might be with the
authority of the states on that subject over all territory situated within their exterior
boundaries, and which hence would be subject to exclusive state jurisdiction but
for the existence of a United States reservation.257

More recently, Joshua Divine has suggested, “[I]t is not clear that a
nationally representative body cannot conclude that the problem of crime is
primarily local, not national, and that criminal laws should thus conform to local
laws and the facts and needs underlying those laws.”258 Sure, national uniformity
and horizontal equity across federal districts are regularly proclaimed
transcendent values within the federal criminal justice system, particularly for
sentencing. But especially since the demise of mandatory federal sentencing
guidelines (and even before, because of massive variation in prosecutorial
discretion), such values regularly give way to local norms.259 There is something
to be said for measures that recognize and formalize the adoption of these
norms—at least to the extent that federal enforcement targets local conduct (as
its violent crime work generally does).260
Yet unless alternative values like federalism and local consistency are
“trumps,”261 one is hard pressed indeed to see how the arrangement squares with
very real concerns of the sort raised by the Gorsuch critique of administrative

255.
Id. at 299 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
256.
United States v. Christie, 717 F.3d 1156, 1170 (10th Cir. 2013) (Gorsuch, J.).
257.
United States v. Press Pub. Co., 219 U.S. 1, 9 (1911); see also Paul J. Larkin, Jr., The
Dynamic Incorporation of Foreign Law and the Constitutional Regulation of Federal Lawmaking, 38
HARV. J. L. PUB. POL’Y 337, 376 (2014) (noting that “the Constitution as a whole expressly recognizes
the pre-existing, independent sovereignty of the states,” and that “it presumes the fact and legitimacy of
the rule that state law will serve as the primary vehicle for regulating private conduct”).
258.
Joshua M. Divine, Statutory Federalism and Criminal Law, 106 VA. L. REV. 127, 184
(2020).
259.
See Daniel Richman, Federal Sentencing in 2007: The Supreme Court Holds—The Center
Doesn’t, 117 YALE L.J. 1374, 1405-11(2008).
260.
See id. at 1403-07.
261.
See Harold J. Krent, Fragmenting the Unitary Executive: Congressional Delegations of
Administrative Authority Outside the Federal Government, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 62, 67 (1990) (stating that
delegations to states “can perhaps be justified by the principle of federalism—the constitutional interest
in state sovereignty may trump the competing constitutional norm of a centralized federal executive”).
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crimes. As Wayne Logan notes, “By utilizing state laws and outcomes to achieve
its own policy ends, the U.S. [Congress] abdicates its criminal lawmaking
authority in deference to individual states[,] . . . undermining U.S. political
transparency and democratic accountability.”262 One might respond with “an
alternative view[,] [that] federal deference actually enhances sensitivity to
democratic norms by tying U.S. law to decisions of ‘the People’ of individual
states,”263 but this “misses the essential point that what is lacking is federal
decision-making input, which ideally reflects collective national interests and
values. State laws naturally reflect the distinct positions of state legislators, who
are not held accountable to, and need not accommodate the interests of, the nation
as a whole.”264 Certainly, federal agencies are more accountable to the federal
government than are their state counterparts. Nor can the ACA’s regime find
justification in the fact that those charged will also be citizens of the state whose
law applies.265 Maybe they will be, but there is no reason to assume that those
who, say, visit “Indian country,”266 a military base,267 or are incarcerated in a
federal prison268 come from the surrounding state.
To be sure, a considerable degree of federal accountability comes from the
vast discretion federal prosecutors exercise over whether to invoke state law via
the ACA. And they do not do that frequently in serious cases.269 Yet that
explanation proves too much, as it is true for all federal offenses, however and
by whomever defined. Indeed, Joshua Divine has turned the vastness of federal
enforcement discretion, and the paucity of effective constraining mechanisms,
into an argument for extending the ACA’s dynamic incorporation of state law in
the ACA to other contexts: “State legislatures, subject to less inertia and

262.
Logan, supra note 249, at 85.
263.
Id. at 89; see also Krent, supra note 261 (explaining that state legislators “possess an
independent interest in fashioning public-regarding laws, and are checked by “the state electorate,” which
“serves, in essence, as a replacement for the executive branch”).
264.
Logan, supra note 249, at 89.
265.
See Moore v. Illinois, 55 U. S. (14 How.) 13, 19-20 (1852) (“Every citizen . . . may be said
to owe allegiance to two sovereigns, and may be liable to punishment for an infraction of the laws of
either.”).
266.
See United States v. Smith, 925 F.3d 410, 418 (9th Cir. 2019) (explaining how the ACA
applies to “Indian country” under the Indian Country Crime Act, 18 U.S.C. § 7 (2018)).
267.
See Lewis v. United States, 523 U.S. 155 (1998) (providing an example of a prosecution
under the ACA for the murder of a child on military base); United States v. Dotson, 615 F.3d 1162 (9th
Cir. 2010) (providing an example of a prosecution under the ACA for furnishing of liquor to underage
servicemen on military base).
268.
See United States v. Rocha, 598 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2010) (reversing a conviction under
ACA and California law for assault in federal prison because the federal assault statute was deemed to
leave no gap to fill).
269.
See Divine, supra note 258, at 140 (suggesting most ACA prosecutions are for traffic
offenses); FY 2020 Annual Statistical Report at 11, tbl. 3A (detailing only eighty-eight ACA cases filed
in district courts); cf. 32 C.F.R. § 634.25(e) (2020) (“In States where traffic law violations are State
criminal offenses, such laws are made applicable under the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 13 to military
installations having concurrent or exclusive Federal jurisdiction.”)
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politically more distant from the federal system,” he suggests, “can check
enforcement discretion where Congress has not.”270
Federal courts can also help ensure that state offenses invoked via the ACA
are fit for federal purposes. Recently, in an ACA prosecution of a soon-to-be
released federal prisoner for violating Colorado’s stalking statute, the Tenth
Circuit found that the district court had rightly imported federal mens rea
principles when applying the statute.271 The Court reasoned that “[o]nce [the
state statute was] assimilated, the district court was free to interpret [its] elements
in the same way it would any other federal statute.”272 If the ability of federal
courts to deploy standard interpretative principles is a saving grace of the ACA’s
delegation regime, so too should it benefit administrative crimes or indeed all
federal offenses, regardless of which institutions defined them. The weight one
gives judicial interpretive freedom as a delegation safeguard, however, will
affect the degree to which one sees Chevron deference as appropriate for
administrative crimes.
Absent clarity on precisely what game we’re playing—that is, what grading
rubric we’re using—normative bottom lines are elusive. Suffice it to say,
however, that notwithstanding its troubling effects—summarized by Logan as
“the lessening of democratic pluralism and experimentation, resulting from the
attendant lack of direct congressional input; the blurring of federal political
accountability; and the injection of a large measure of arbitrariness into the
federal criminal justice system”273—the ACA remains not only quite secure
doctrinally, but apparently excused from the terms of the Gorsuch critique.
Broad doctrinal acceptance of the role Congress has permitted state
criminal law to play when defining federal crimes has left the constitutional
justifications for this regime undertheorized. Yet the foregoing discussion should
drive home the extent to which state law is embedded in and mediated though
federal institutional interactions. The federal “brand” is protected because federal
prosecutors and courts will be exclusive gatekeepers. But with prosecutorial
gatekeeping comes the strategic use of state law, along with the attendant selfdealing concerns that loom so large in the Gorsuch critique.
C. Delegations to Foreign and International Institutions
While lacking any specified role in the formal separation-of-powers
doctrine that Justice Gorsuch looks to, states are most certainly not just
American, but federal constitutional actors, channeling the views of citizens
through liberal democratic processes that adhere to the U.S. Constitution. The

270.
Divine, supra note 258, at 181; cf. Jessica Bulman-Pozen, From Sovereignty and Process
to Administration and Politics: The Afterlife of American Federalism, 123 YALE L.J. 1920, 1935 (2014)
(“The main role states play in federal statutory schemes is as administrators of national programs, a sort
of second executive branch operating alongside the President and the D.C. bureaucracy.”).
271.
United States v. Twitty, 859 F. App’x 310 (10th Cir. 2021).
272.
Id. at 315.
273.
Logan, supra note 249, at 67-68.
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same is not, however, necessarily true of foreign states, international institutions,
and the “law of nations.” None of these have anything like the federal
accountability of administrative agencies, yet Congress has effectively delegated
to each of these some degree of authority over federal criminal offenses. Perhaps
the comparatively limited nature of these delegations suggests far more
congressional oversight and adoptive lawmaking than we have yet considered.
That possibility, combined with prosecutorial gatekeeping, weighs in favor of
broad acceptance of this sort of delegation. Yet it is also a reminder that
congressional delegation to administrative agencies can also involve a
considerable degree of deliberation, as opposed to abdication.
1. Foreign States
Where federal criminal offenses turn on the conduct specifications of
foreign states, one might expect that a degree of comfort could be drawn from
the degree of federal executive involvement required in any criminal
prosecution. After all, the Executive’s broad foreign affairs authority regularly
mediates between U.S. persons and the actions of foreign sovereigns.274 Indeed,
given the recent proliferation of criminal cases with foreign affairs implications,
federal prosecutors have increasingly become significant foreign policy
actors.275
Yet this is one area where the Supreme Court has not treated Executive
control as much of a guarantee of federal accountability and appropriate
deliberation. Thus, in Small v. United States,276 where the defendant was charged
with being a felon-in-possession of a weapon, based on his prior conviction in a
Japanese court, the Court nodded at the presumption against extraterritoriality,
even as it admitted it did not really apply here: defendant’s possession occurred
in the U.S. and the only question was whether a foreign conviction could supply
the felony element.277 But its rationale for quashing the conviction focused on
foreign offenses for conduct that the U.S. would consider untroubling or even
laudable, seeming to suggest that judges and prosecutors may not be wellequipped for the job of “weed[ing] out inappropriate foreign convictions.”278 It
didn’t matter, as Justice Thomas noted in dissent, that “the handful of

274.
See Curtis A. Bradley, A New American Foreign Affairs Law?, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1089,
1109 (1999) (noting “executive domination” in the area); see also Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid Wuerth,
The Normalization of Foreign Relations Law, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1897, 1903-04 (2015) (noting recent
inroads into that long-standing principle).
275.
Steven Arrigg Koh, Foreign Affairs Prosecutions, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 340, 342 (2019)
[hereinafter Koh, Foreign Affairs Prosecutions] (describing “foreign affairs prosecutions”); Steven Arrigg
Koh, The Criminalization of Foreign Relations, 90 FORDHAM L. REV. 737, 787 (2021) [hereinafter Koh,
The Criminalization of Foreign Relations] (suggesting that “overzealous prosecutors and overinclusive
legislators . . . are combining with overreaching presidential authority to propel U.S. law enforcement
abroad” and calling for “a principled role for U.S. extraterritorial law enforcement policy”).
276.
544 U.S. 385 (2005).
277.
Id. at 389-91.
278.
Id at 389-90.
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prosecutions thus far rested on foreign convictions perfectly consonant with
American law.”279
A lower court drew on Small’s reasoning where an American was charged
under the Mann Act280 with molesting a Russian boy he had brought to the United
States for ballet training.281 The specified criminal offense for purposes of the
Mann Act was a provision of the Russian Criminal Code that “criminalizes
compelling a person to engage in a sexual act ‘by means of blackmail, threat of
destruction, damaging, or seizure of property or by taking advantage of the
material or other dependence of the victim.’”282 Throwing out the defendant’s
conviction post-trial, upon finding the Russian offense “too vague to satisfy
American standards of due process,” the court declined to reach defendant’s
argument that the law was “potentially unconstitutional, insofar as many other
countries outlaw sexual conduct which is legal in the United States, including
non-marital sexual activity and sexual activity between two people of the same
sex.”283 But confidence that federal prosecutors would refrain from proceeding
in such cases did not figure in the court’s reasoning.
Another statute that might find U.S. courts proceeding gingerly is 18 U.S.C.
§ 1956(c)(7)(B)(iv), which criminalizes the use of a U.S. financial institution to
launder the proceeds of “an offense against a foreign nation . . . involving bribery
of a public official or the misappropriation, theft, or embezzlement of public
funds by or for the benefit of a public official.”284 Particularly in nations where
corruption laws are passed for show or strategic enforcement, such offenses can
potentially be broad and poorly considered. As yet, however, lower courts have
been quite deferential when drawing on foreign crime-definition in this context,
with one citing “principles of international comity.”285 Perhaps respect for
international comity, and recognition of the importance of transborder
cooperation against transborder criminal activity, will turn such concerns into
trumps like federalism in the case of the ACA. The centrality of federalism to
the constitutional structure, however, makes it hard (but not impossible) to argue
that international comity should get equal weight.286
279.
Id. at 403 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
280.
The Mann Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (2018), provides:
Whoever knowingly transports any individual in interstate or foreign commerce, or in any
Territory or Possession of the United States, with intent that such individual engage in
prostitution, or in any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal
offense, or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 10 years,
or both.
281.
See United States v. Schneider, 817 F. Supp. 2d 586, 602-03 (E.D. Pa. 2011).
282.
Id. (citation omitted).
283.
Id. at 605.
284.
Considerable credit for my discussion of this statute goes to Jake Sidransky, Columbia Law
School ’21, on whose research and analysis I draw.
285.
See United States v. Thiam, 934 F.3d 89, 94 (2d Cir. 2019); see also United States v. HeonCheol Chi, 936 F.3d 888, 897 (9th Cir. 2019) (drawing on Travel Act cases and finding that a South
Korean statute falls within the generic federal definition of “bribery”).
286.
A negative variety of delegated lawmaking can be found in the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act, which, even while seeking to promote international anti-corruption norms, provides an affirmative
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Perhaps because it is more of a regulatory offense of the sort that critics of
criminal delegation like to target, the Lacey Act has been the subject of far more
scrutiny, at least by commentators. That Act makes it “unlawful for any
person . . . to import, export, transport, sell, receive, acquire, or purchase in
interstate or foreign commerce . . . any fish or wildlife taken, possessed,
transported, or sold in violation of any law or regulation of any state or in
violation of any foreign law.”287 The relevant “law” here is defined as that which
“regulate[s] the taking, possession, importation, exportation, transportation, or
sale of fish or wildlife or plants.”288 Paul Larkin writes that “[it] would certainly
seem bizarre to most Americans to suggest that the world’s oldest surviving
representative democracy should give to a foreign country the bedrock right that
our ancestors, families, and friends have purchased with blood, treasure, and
honor for more than two centuries.”289 Larkin condemns the Act as an
unconstitutional delegation, because it supplies “no ‘intelligible principle’ for
foreign governments to use when deciding what conduct to make a crime and
leaves American importers, for example, bereft of the ability to rely on the
general legal principles that someone learns in the United States.”290
For their part, lower courts have been remarkably accepting of this broad
delegation. As the Ninth Circuit noted:
Because of the wide range the forms of law may take given the world’s many
diverse legal and governmental systems, Congress would be hard-pressed to set
forth a definition that would adequately encompass all of them. . . . Thus, if
Congress had sought to define “any foreign law” with any kind of specificity
whatsoever, it might have effectively immunized . . . [conduct] under the Act
despite violation of conservation laws of a large portion of the world’s regimes
that possess systems of law and government that defy easy definition or
categorization.291

Foreign legislative processes are categorically different from state
legislative processes. Indeed, since the foreign regulations enforced criminally
through the Lacey Act need not carry penal sanctions, one cannot assume that
defense for payments that are “lawful under the written laws and regulations” of a foreign official’s
country. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(c) (2018); see United States v. Kozeny, 582 F. Supp. 2d 535, 537-40
(S.D.N.Y. 2008).
287.
16 U.S.C. § 3372(a)(2)(A) (2018).
288.
Id. § 3371(d) (2018).
289.
Larkin, supra note 257, at 340.
290.
Id. at 346; see also Michael C. Dorf, Dynamic Incorporation Foreign Law, 157 U. PA. L.
REV. 103, 115 (2008) (“Dynamic incorporation of foreign law poses a prima facie threat to the democracy
of the incorporating polity because it takes decisions out of the hands of the people’s representatives in
that polity and delegates them to persons and bodies that are accountable only different polity.”).
291.
United States v. 594,464 Pounds of Salmon, 871 F.2d 824, 827-28 (9th Cir. 1989)
(O’Scannlain, J.); see also United States v. Lee, 937 F.2d 1388, 1392-94 (9th Cir. 1991) (rejecting the
argument—by fisherman convicted of illegal salmon fishing—that Congress did not intend to impose
criminal penalties under the Lacey Act for violations of a regulation that itself carried no criminal
sanctions); United States v. McNab, 331 F.3d 1228, 1235-47 (11th Cir. 2003) (upholding Lacey Act
conviction even though (1) the “law” defendant violated consisted of Honduran regulations, not statutes,
governing lobster fishing, and (2) the Honduran government filed papers in the appeal saying that its prior
official representations of Honduran law “were invalid”); United States v. Hansen-Sturm, 44 F.3d 793,
795 (9th Cir. 1995) (rejecting the claim that the Lacey Act is an unconstitutional delegation of
congressional authority as “frivolous”); RICHMAN, STITH & STUNTZ, supra note 20, at 895-96.
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any thought was given to criminal responsibility and community condemnation.
And while federal prosecutorial gatekeeping injects a degree of federal
accountability, that does not, as we have seen, seem to carry weight
doctrinally.292 Analogies have therefore been made to caselaw constraining
delegations to private entities.293 Yet what the Lacey Act has going for it is the
limited subject matter of the delegation and the inherent demands of a concerted
federal legislative policy to support international conservation efforts in a way
that values both comity and notice to those operating (at least initially) in a
foreign jurisdiction (even though American defendants might not be able to read
the relevant foreign laws).
2. International Organizations and Conventions
What about delegation to international organizations or conventions? How
much of a leap is it from a domestic regime that delegates classification, say of
controlled substances, to an expert federal agency and provides for criminal
prosecutions based on those classifications, to a regime in which such
classifications are delegated by international treaty signatories (including the
United States) to a group of international experts?294 As with foreign states, these
crime-defining authorities cannot be held to account in the same way that a
domestic agency subject to congressional oversight hearings may be.295 Yet,
unlike foreign legislation, the U.S. has a direct role in the international process,296
and the involvement of other states in that process can provide a needed source
of restraint.297 The issue298 has yet to squarely emerge, for when a defendant was
charged under the Lacey Act with violating the Convention on International
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES),299 the First

292.
See infra text accompanying notes 272-275.
293.
Larkin, supra note 257, at 403.
294.
See James M. Rice, Note, The Private Nondelegation Doctrine: Preventing the Delegation
of Regulatory Authority to Private Parties and International Organizations, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 539, 542
(2017).
295.
Kristina Daugirdas, International Delegations and Administrative Law, 66 MD. L. REV.
707, 738 (2007).
296.
Cf. Dorf, supra note 290, at 152 (“[P]olitical representation of the dynamically
incorporating polity (or representation of its citizens) within the polity whose laws are incorporated can
compensate for the loss of local democratic control that irrevocable or nearly irrevocable dynamic
incorporation entails.”).
297.
Cf. Edward T. Swaine, The Constitutionality of International Delegations, 104 COLUM. L.
REV. 1492, 1613 (2004) (“[D]elegations of lawmaking authority to international institutions may promote
the values underlying domestic federalism . . . .”).
298.
This issue is quite different from the one raised where Congress passes a federal enabling
statute, carefully or thoughtlessly, pursuant to a treaty obligation. See Bond v. United States, 572 U.S.
844, 848 (2014); Curtis A. Bradley, Federalism, Treaty Implementation, and Political Process: Bond v.
United States, 108 AM. J. INT’L L. 486, 493 n.46 (2014). Compare The Hostage Taking Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1203 (2018) (implementing the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 18,
1979, T.I.A.S. No. 11,081, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205), with United States v. Ferreria, 275 F.3d 1020, 1022 (11th
Cir. 2001) (upholding prosecution under Hostage Taking Act), and United States v. Wang Kun Lue, 134
F.3d 79, 80-81 (2d Cir. 1997) (same).
299.
Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243.
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Circuit was careful to explain how the treaty’s provisions had been codified by
separate U.S. law.300
Still, delegation to a treaty obligation has figured prominently in the long
saga of marijuana’s scheduling under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA).301
Soon after it was scheduled, the government urged, as one justification for
scheduling, that the Act’s provision requiring the Attorney General (without
regard to the normal administrative process) to select the “appropriate” schedule
for a drug where “control is required by United States obligations under
international treaties, conventions, or protocols,”302 was indeed covered by the
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs.303 And it continues to cite that Convention
as a reason for denying petitions to reschedule marijuana.304 The D.C. Circuit
has found that the Attorney General has some discretion on where to schedule
marijuana.305 But it is far from clear she could refuse to put it on any schedule.306
Perhaps a principle will emerge that international organization delegations
of crime-definition authority going beyond the explicit terms of a domestic
statute are acceptable as long as they closely resemble the narrow expertisejustifications that even Justice Gorsuch finds acceptable in the domestic
context.307 But, of course, this approach relies on the assumption that expertise
300.
United States v. Place, 693 F.3d 219, 222-23 (1st Cir. 2012); see also United States v.
Lawson, 377 F. App’x. 712, 716 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding a violation of regulations related to the CITES
punishable under 18 U.S.C. § 545 because violation of regulations was criminalized under the Endangered
Species Act).
301.
21 U.S.C. §§ 801 et seq. (2018).
302.
21 U.S.C. § 811(d)(1) (2018).
303.
March 30, 1961, 18 U.S.T. 1407, 520 U.N.T.S. 280 (ratified by United States in 1967); see
United States v. Kiffer, 477 F.2d 349, 351-52 (2d Cir. 1973) (noting the government’s position that
because marijuana was covered by the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, its scheduling could not be
reconsidered); see also Petition to Remove Marihuana From Control or in the Alternative To Control
Marihuana in Schedule V of the Controlled Substances Act, 37 Fed. Reg. 18097, 18,907-08 (Sept. 7, 1972)
(denying a petition on the grounds that the Attorney General has the sole authority to schedule drugs when
U.S. treaty obligations require doing so).
304.
Denial of Petition to Initiate Proceedings to Reschedule Marijuana, 81 Fed. Reg. 53,688,
53,688-89 (Aug. 12, 2016) (citing the Single Convention on Narcotics for the proposition that “schedules
I and II [of the CSA] are the only possible schedules in which marijuana may be placed”).
305.
See Nat’l Org. for Reform of Marijuana Law (NORML) v. DEA, 559 F.2d 735, 752 (D.C.
Cir. 1977) (“Even under a narrow reading of subsection (d), the Attorney General to satisfy treaty
requirements is directed to establish a minimum schedule below which the substance in question may not
be placed.”).
306.
But see Washington v. Barr, 925 F.3d 109, 119-20 (2d Cir. 2019) (citing NORML, 529 F.2d
735, for the proposition that “the D.C. Circuit has [] held [that] . . . foreign treaty commitments have not
divested the Attorney General of the power to re- or deschedule marijuana”); see also Eric Blumenson &
Eva Nilsen, No Rational Basis: The Pragmatic Case for Marijuana Law Reform, 17 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y &
L. 43 n.121 (2009) (suggesting that “decriminalization and/or nonenforcement [of marijuana possession]
are likely consistent with [U.S. treaty obligations],”while legalization may violate the Single Convention
on Narcotic Drugs of 1961, March 30, 1961 18 U.S.T. 1407, 50 U.N.T.S. 280); State v. Kurtz, 309 P.3d
472, 476 n.7 (Wash. 2013) (en banc) (noting, in a challenge to a state agency’s placement of marijuana in
Schedule I of a CSA analog, that the now-outmoded statute, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.50.203 (1993),
required the state to mirror CSA scheduling where the federal government acted to comply with treaty
obligations). In December 2020, the U.N. Commission for Narcotic Drugs voted to recommend the
removal of cannabis from the Single Convention. See Isabelle Kwai, U.N. Reclassifies Cannabis as a Less
Dangerous Drug, N.Y. Times, (Dec. 2, 2020) https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/02/world/europe
/cannabis-united-nations-drug-policy.html [https://perma.cc/FC4T-89DH].
307.
See supra text accompanying note 66.
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has no national boundaries, which some—either because of their deep immersion
in the sociology of science or their naked parochialism—might question. Suffice
it to say that should the political will to revisit marijuana’s scheduling develop
domestically to the extent that scheduling rests solely on the Single Convention,
the principles of comity and transborder cooperation would be tested.308 In that
test, however, a U.S. court might well consider that the United States was the
primary driver of the cannabis prohibition in the Convention.309 Query whether
that dominating U.S. role would argue for greater deference or less to those
principles.
3. Delegation to the Law of Nations–Piracy
Whatever constitutional or policy concerns one has with the delegation of
crime-definition authority to foreign authorities must reckon with one such
“delegation” (in the sense of dynamic incorporation by reference of lawmaking
done by others) that dates back nearly to the Founding: the law of piracy. Article
I gives Congress the power to “define and punish Piracies and Felonies
committed on the high Seas.”310 As Eugene Kontorovich writes, “[t]he First
Congress exercised [this] power when it enacted the first criminal statute in
1790,” broadly defining piracy to include what was well-understood to be
“piracy” under international law, while further exercising its “defining” authority
to expand the offense to include “a variety of maritime misdeeds” beyond that
well-understood meaning.311 When Congress revisited the matter in 1819, it
changed strategies and explicitly incorporated international law by reference:
[I]f any person or persons whatsoever shall, on the high seas, commit the crime
of piracy, as defined by the law of nations, and such offender or offenders shall
afterwards be brought into or found in the United States, every such offender or
offenders shall, upon conviction thereof . . . be punished by death.312

308.
See Robert A. Mikos, Using One Dying Regime to Save Another: The Influence of
International Drug Conventions on United States’ Cannabis Research Policy, 114 AM. J. INT’L L.
UNBOUND 296, 296 (2020) (discussing how “international conventions are currently helping to stifle
national cannabis reforms”).
309.
See Ely Aaronson, The Strange Career of the Transnational Legal Order of Cannabis
Prohibition, 4 UC IRVINE J. INT’L, TRANSNAT’L, AND COMP. L. 78, 82 (2019) (citing cannabis prohibition
in the Convention as “a paradigmatic example” of “globalized localism,” “a process by which policy
models that originated in the distinctive cultural and institutional contexts of a powerful country come to
be perceived as global standards due to their inclusion in treaties”).
310.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10; cf. Nicholas R. Parrillo, A Critical Assessment of the
Originalist Case Against Administrative Regulatory Power: New Evidence from the Federal Tax on
Private Real Estate in the 1790s, 130 YALE L.J. 1288, 1302 (2021) (exploring explicit congressional
delegation of coercive, domestic rulemaking authority in 1798 tax legislation).
311.
Eugene Kontorovich, The “Define and Punish” Clause and the Limit of Universal
Jurisdiction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 149, 175 (2009); see Ruth Wedgwood, The Revolutionary Martyrdom
of Jonathan Robbins, 100 YALE. L.J. 229, 243 (1990) (“Stepping beyond the law of nations, Congress also
extended the definition of piracy to include murder on the high seas, running away with a ship or vessel
or with goods or merchandise of the value of fifty dollars, or any other offense punishable by death on
land.”).
312.
Act of March 3, 1819, ch. 77, § 5, 3 Stat. 510, 513-14; see also Kontorovich, supra note
311, at 188.
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The current provision, 18 U.S.C. § 1651, is almost identical, save for a
mandatory punishment of life imprisonment (rather than death), and thus
effectively delegates authority to “define” piracy to the “law of nations.”313 This
is one of the offenses charged against some Somali pirates who “imprudently
launched an attack on the USS Nicholas, having confused that mighty Navy
frigate for a vulnerable merchant ship.”314 Defendants claimed that “piracy”
entailed only robbery at sea, i.e., seizing or otherwise robbing a vessel (which
they never had a chance to do). The district court, however, found that the statute
necessarily incorporated modern developments in international law; for
authority, it looked to the Geneva Convention on the High Seas,315 adopted in
1958 and ratified by the United States in 1961, and the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea,316 which the United States has not ratified but
recognizes as reflecting customary international law.317 Affirming defendants’
conviction, the Fourth Circuit agreed and noted
[I]f the Congress of 1819 had believed either the law of nations generally or its
piracy definition specifically to be inflexible, the Act of 1819 could easily have
been drafted to specify that piracy consisted of “piracy as defined on March 3,
1819 [the date of enactment], by the law of nations,” or solely of, as the defendants
would have it, “robbery upon the sea.318

The piracy statute’s dynamic incorporation strategy is certainly not unique,
the court observed, citing the Lacey Act, among other provisions.319 As for
defendants’ claim that “giving ‘piracy’ an evolving definition would violate the
principle that there are no federal common law crimes,” the Fourth Circuit
backhanded it in much the same way as the Supreme Court did in Lanier: “The
18 U.S.C. § 1651 piracy offense cannot be considered a common law crime,” the
court explained, “because Congress properly ‘ma[de] an act a crime, affix[ed] a
punishment to it, and declare[d] the court that shall have jurisdiction of the
offence.’”320 And it noted that “in its 1820 Smith decision, the Supreme Court
unhesitatingly approved of the piracy statute’s incorporation of the law of
nations, looking to various sources to ascertain how piracy was defined under the
law of nations.”321
To be sure, federal courts play a key mediating role when dynamically
incorporating international norms, thus rendering the “federal” role in crime313.
18 U.S.C. § 1651 (2018) (“Whoever, on the high seas, commits the crime of piracy as
defined by the law of nations, and is afterwards brought into or found in the United States, shall be
imprisoned for life.”).
314.
United States v. Dire, 680 F.3d 446, 449 (4th Cir. 2012).
315.
Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 U.N.T.S. 11.
316.
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.
317.
Dire, 680 F.3d at 459-64.
318.
Id. at 467-68.
319.
Id. at 468.
320.
Id. at 468 (citing United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812)); see also
United States v. Said 798 F.3d 182, 193 (4th Cir. 2015) (following Dire, 680 F.3d 446); United States v.
Beyle, 782 F.3d 159, 169 (4th Cir. 2015) (same).
321.
680 F.3d at 468 (citing United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 159-61 (1820)); see
also Eugene Kontorovich, Note on Dire, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 644, 648 (2013) (“That a crystal-clear
customary definition can substitute for a congressional definition has been clear since Smith.”).
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definition more salient than in the Lacey Act. The stability of the definition of
“piracy” under international law (as opposed to “municipal” definitions that are
artifacts of national will322) might therefore be said to encompass a clear
“intelligible principle.” Moreover, courts can—perhaps through the void-forvagueness or lenity doctrines—ensure that troubling shifts in the international
understanding of “piracy” will not be the basis of federal criminal charges.323 Yet
courts cannot be counted on to do so, and one might well worry about courts,
spurred by prosecutors in the face of egregious facts, “cobbling potentially
diffuse and debatable international legal sources into an open-ended criminal
norm.”324 After all, the piracy statute entails less a delegation to courts than a
delegation to the collectively established “law of nations,” as mediated by federal
courts. In any event, this legislative delegation to some mix of federal courts and
international authorities is about as far removed from the model valorized by the
Gorsuch critique as can be realistically imagined.
Query which is better: on the one hand is Congress’s original strategy of
setting its own definition of “piracy,” which presumably would have led federal
courts to develop the term in their own common law fashion, the way they do for
“fraud.” On the other is the strategy Congress selected, which has federal courts
anchoring their definition of the term in the “law of nations.” The first makes the
offense purely American but hostage to ad hoc judicial lawmaking and
prosecutorial pressure. The second is far more stable and perhaps ascertainable,
but only by using an international benchmark. Of course, neither approach has
the legislative supremacy demanded by Justice Gorsuch, who would have
Congress do all the definitional work.325
Perhaps a “trump” can be found in the transcendent value less of comity
than of transnational uniformity in what, operationally, must be a multilateral
effort. Should U.S. courts embrace the reasoning that they would do well to
“consult the numerous decisions by courts around the world arising from the
eruption of Somali piracy”?326 The point goes beyond operational utility: while
those decrying administrative crimes are dismayed by the lack of community
condemnation,327 there is an international community, of which the United States
and any defendant are members, that stands united on so few things. Piracy is
one, and the availability of prosecutorial and judicial gatekeepers to protect
322.
See Edwin D. Dickinson, Is the Crime of Piracy Obsolete?, 38 HARV. L. REV. 334, 335
(1925) (“[T]he crime of piracy . . . has long been regarded as an international crime as well as a crime by
municipal law.”).
323.
See United States v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 599, 637-39 (E.D. Va. 2010) (rejecting the
claim that 18 U.S.C. § 1651 is unconstitutionally vague, noting “the high hurdle for establishing customary
international law, namely the recognition of a general and consistent practice among the overwhelming
majority of the international community”).
324.
Kontorovich, supra note 321, at 648.
325.
Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2134-36 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
326.
Kontorovich, supra note 321, at 649. When looking at foreign case law, the district court
in Dire was careful to note: “While the Court is mindful of the controversy regarding reference to judicial
decisions of other countries, those concerns are not applicable where Congress has specifically chosen to
define a crime by reference to the ‘law of nations.’” Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 616 n. 16.
327.
See Fissell, supra note 6, at 894.
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American interests allows sufficient national modulation of that international
condemnation.
Good normative rationales thus support the instances of congressional
delegation of crime defining authority to foreign and international institutions
discussed here. But these delegations are nonetheless quite at odds with the
constitutional framework on which the Gorsuch critique relies to challenge
administrative crimes. To be sure, removal of those institutions from federal
executive control addresses the Gorsuch critique’s concern about Executive selfdealing and arrogation of power. But the self-dealing concern still rears its head
when we consider prosecutorial charging discretion. And the democratic
accountability and liberty-protecting restraints on legislative processes that
Justice Gorsuch finds absent in federal administrative procedures are similarly
absent—or at least limited—when undifferentiated foreign states (from
democracies to autocracies) exercise legislative authority or when international
norms arise out of treaties or practice.
III. Reconsidering Administrative Crimes
So far, we have seen how the relative lack of controversy attending broad
congressional delegations to federal courts, state legislatures, and foreign and
international entities destabilizes Justice Gorsuch’s critique of administrative
crimes, which valorizes constitutional features and values that these delegations
give short shrift to. Yet our exploration of the normative and doctrinal
justifications for those other delegations also highlights aspects of administrative
crimes to which Justice Gorsuch gives little consideration: the extent to which
courts and prosecutors will inevitably be co-producers of federal criminal
offenses, whatever their origin stories, and the consequent need for any
normative assessment of administrative crimes to account for these institutional
interactions. Indeed, full consideration of the actual role played by courts,
prosecutors, and Congress ends up showing how the procedural regularity and
ex ante clarity of agency promulgations can offset the pathologies of federal
criminal law. In so doing, it ends up being a defense—albeit a measured one—
of administrative crimes.
This Part begins by using securities fraud law to dramatize the constrained
role that an administrative agency will often, or at least potentially, play in the
construction of a federal offense that it formally “created” pursuant to
congressional delegation. It then explains how the elimination of administrative
crimes might, as a practical matter, change little in way of federal felony
prosecutions, apart from reducing the ex ante clarity of the offenses charged.
Finally, against this pragmatic backdrop and the reduced expectations it
generates, a normative case for administrative crimes will emerge.
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A. Agencies and Their Institutional Counterparties
Lacking a comparative advantage to do so, I have not engaged with Justice
Gorsuch’s overall vision of the sorts of delegation the Constitution permits.
Others, of course, have. As a formal matter, Tom Merrill has cogently suggested
that
Article I, Section 1 should be construed as mandating the [so-called] exclusive
delegation doctrine, not the nondelegation doctrine. Such an exclusive delegation
doctrine would entail two subsidiary principles[:] First, that executive and judicial
officers have no inherent authority to act with the force of law, but must trace any
such authority to some provision of enacted law. . . . [T]his [is] the anti-inherency
principle. Second, that Congress has the power to vest executive and judicial
officers with authority to act with the force of law, including the authority to
promulgate legislative regulations functionally indistinguishable from
statutes. . . . [T]his [is] the transferability principle.328

When Congress unambiguously transfers crime-definition authority to agencies,
it complies with these principles.329 Merrill also pushes back against the claim
that a strict nondelegation doctrine “would promote greater deliberation,” noting
that “unless we stack the deck by defining deliberation to mean legislative
deliberation, there is not much doubt that promoting deliberation is a policy that
more generally favors broad delegation.”330 We now turn to the issue of
deliberation with respect to federal criminal legislation.
When one considers the values and pathologies of federal criminal law,
agencies fare quite well, at least if over-criminalization and fear of excessive
intrusions on liberty are a dominant concern. The deficiencies of Congress’s
criminal work have been long noted, with legislative specificity poorly rewarded
politically and concerns about overbreadth generally left for prosecutors to
handle (and carry the blame for).331 Even when a disproportionately affected
group has considerable political power, it rarely has been able, or even tried, to
curtail the sweep of federal criminal statutes. Business interests make little effort
to lobby for Congress to cut back on the sweep of fraud statutes, and the breadth
of the obstruction statute (passed in the wake of Enron332) is a reminder that white
collar legislation is as crisis-driven as any other area of federal criminal law.333

328.
Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section I: From Nondelegation to Exclusive
Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2101 (2004).
329.
See Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law:
The Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467, 472 (2002); United States v. Palazzo, 558 F.3d 400,
405-08 (5th Cir. 2009) (upholding prosecution based on failure of clinical investigators to adhere to the
Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) regulations regarding record-keeping and reporting).
330.
Merrill, supra note 328, at 2154-55.
331.
See Kahan, supra note 21, at 474-75; Richman, supra note 21, at 763-65; WILLIAM J.
STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 305-07 (2011); Buell, supra note 100, at 151314.
332.
See Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 531-32 (2015).
333.
But note the absence of white-collar mandatory minimums—Congress’s way of really
making a point. See Daniel C. Richman, Federal White Collar Sentencing in the United States: A Work in
Progress, 76 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 56 (2013).
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Agency rulemaking and interpretation offers a far more accommodating sphere
for so-called “respectable constituencies” to shape crime-definition.334
The recent history of criminal securities fraud law, particularly with respect
to insider trading, ought to give pause to those committed to legislative
supremacy as a mechanism for liberty protection. It’s a story that reminds us not
only that the actual institutional dynamic across agencies, Congress, and courts
often differs from the idealized one in the Gorsuch critique, but that stricter
scrutiny of administrative crimes might not bring the benefits Justice Gorsuch
and others would seek.
As Richard Myers noted, “Insider trading is a textbook example of the
process of creating crimes through delegation to an agency.”335 The crimedefinition story begins with Congress’s passage of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, which, in Section 10(b), made it “unlawful” to “use or employ, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . . any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as
the [Securities Exchange] Commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.”336 Section 32
of the Act made violation of rules so promulgated into federal crimes punishable
by up to two (now twenty) years’ imprisonment, while providing that “no person
shall be subject to imprisonment under this section for the violation of any rule
or regulation if he proves that he had no knowledge of such rule or regulation.”337
This was no wholesale delegation of crime-definition authority. As Steve Thel
has noted, “While criminal penalties are available for willful violation of any
section of the [Exchange Act] . . . they are available for only a subset of SEC
rules.”338 And he reports that this limitation “was the product of considerable
legislative attention to widely held concerns about the propriety of granting an
administrative agency license to create new crimes.”339
For its part, the SEC did little in the way of prospectively articulating the
limits of the fraud that would be targeted. The agency promulgated Rule 10b-5,
which targets “any person” who “employ[s] any device, scheme, or artifice to
defraud,” or “engage[s] in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person . . . in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.”340 Thereafter, in the wake of these opentextured provisions, the work of crime-definition soon moved to the courts,

334.
See Einer Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV.
2162, 2202 (2002).
335.
Richard E. Myers II, Complex Times Don’t Call for Complex Crimes, 89 N.C. L. REV.
1849, 1853 (2011).
336.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, § 10b, 48 Stat. 881, 891 (codified at
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2018)).
337.
Id. § 32, 48 Stat. 881, 904-05 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (2018)).
338.
Steve Thel, Taking Section 10(b) Seriously: Criminal Enforcement of SEC Rules, 2014
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 11 (2014) (internal footnote omitted).
339.
Id. at 13.
340.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(a), (c) (2020); see Thel, supra note 338, at 6 (noting that the SEC’s
general authority to promulgate rules arises out of a different provision of the Exchange Act).
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particularly with respect to insider trading. Thel notes: “The Supreme Court
created the law, and, as it typically does in Rule 10b-5 cases, paid very little
attention to the rule in its insider trading cases.”341 The SEC contributed
significantly to doctrinal development, but it did so chiefly through the cases it
brought and the liability theories it offered.342
This judicial domination understandably provoked calls for greater
legislative specificity. As a future SEC Commissioner wrote in 1966,
It is suggested that ultimately better law, better national law, can be developed if
the effort is made through legislative means, with the opportunity it affords for a
more sweeping study of the problems than is possible in the courts. As the law in
this area develops, each district judge and each appellate judge confronting 10b-5
must become a legislator. Granted, judges often perform quasi-legislative
functions, but it is suggested that the present state of the law permits and invites
too great an admixture of legislation with adjudication.343

Securities lawyers and scholars would make similar calls over succeeding
decades.344 But Congress was unwilling to clarify insider trading law, “for fear
that a statutory definition would amount to a roadmap for fraud, charting ways
for informed traders to circumvent prosecution.”345 For its part, the SEC may
have resisted greater specificity less out of fear of providing a roadmap, than, as
Donald Langevoort has suggested, for fear that
the political character of the law-making process, so visible and contested, will
one way or another lead to a prohibition that does not have the scope the
Commission thinks it should. Special interests often disingenuously seek freedom
in the name of clarity.346

As always, the Executive played a key gatekeeping role, deciding when this
administrative rule with a common law content would be charged. But it has
played its own strategic lawmaking role as well. In the absence of clarity from
the Supreme Court as to whether Rule 10b-5 covered misappropriation theories

341.
Thel, supra note 338, at 29; see Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723,
737 (1975) (Rehnquist, C.J.) (“When we deal with private actions under Rule 10b-5, we deal with a
judicial oak which has grown from little more than a legislative acorn.”); Adam C. Pritchard, United States
v. O’Hagan: Agency Law and Justice Powell’s Legacy for the Law of Insider Trading, 78 B.U. L. REV.
13, 14 (1998) (“The law of insider trading is judicially created; no statutory provision explicitly prohibits
trading on the basis of material, non-public information.”); Baer, supra note 143, at 144 (noting how both
Congress and the SEC left definition of insider trading to the courts).
342.
See Jill E. Fisch, Federal Securities Fraud Litigation as a Lawmaking Partnership, 93
WASH. U. L. REV. 453, 481 (2015) (“Although enforcement has been the agency’s primary lawmaking
role, the SEC has also responded to restrictive judicial decisions through formal rulemaking.”).
343.
A. A. Sommer Jr., Rule 10b-5: Notes for Legislation, 17 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 1029,
1053 (1966).
344.
See Baer, supra note 143, at 134; Donald C. Langevoort, Watching Insider Trading Law
Wobble: Obus, Newman, Salman, Two Martomas, and a Blaszczak, 89 FORDHAM L. REV. 507, 528 (2020)
(echoing calls for Congress to “writ[e] a clear statutory definition of insider trading” and lamenting “the
unnecessary complications courts have caused”). For a recent reform proposal, see Preet Bharara, et al.,
Report of the Bharara Task Force on Insider Trading 14-18 (2020), https://static1.squarespace.com/static
/5e1f2462d354fa5f5bac2699/t/5e2a1e9d12e0c33aefc41303/1579818654541/Report+of+the+Bharara+T
ask+Force+on+Insider+Trading.pdf [https://perma.cc/HU44-L2YH].
345.
Thel, supra note 338, at 30.
346.
Donald C. Langevoort, Rereading Cady, Roberts: The Ideology and Practice of Insider
Trading Regulation, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1319, 1340 (1999).
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of insider trading liability, prosecutors reached for the Title 18 mail fraud statute,
which the Supreme Court found to easily encompass the conduct.347 And when,
in 1997, the Court finally found Rule 10b-5 to encompass those theories,348
prosecutors often charged both offenses. Indeed, there is good reason to think
that insider trading can more easily be prosecuted as mail or wire fraud than
under Rule 10b-5.349
In 2002, in the wake of the Enron scandal, Congress enacted a broad
securities fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1348, as part of the Sarbanes-Oxley package.
As Karen E. Woody writes,
Senator Leahy explained that § 1348 was necessary because “there is no generally
accessible statute that deals with the specific problem of securities fraud. In these
cases, prosecutors are forced either to resort to a patchwork of technical Title 15
offenses and regulations, which may criminalize particular violations of securities
law, or to treat the cases as generic mail or wire fraud cases and to meet the
technical elements of those statutes . . . .”350

Of course, Section 1348 added little in the way of specificity. And prosecutors
initially had little use for it, preferring to stay on the well-trodden paths of Rule
10b-5 caselaw.351 But in time, the accretion of judicial doctrines designed to
separate the illegal use of material nonpublic information from merely aggressive
research limited their ability to pursue the “tippees” who traded on inside
information obtained from “tippers” under some duty to keep it confidential. The
Supreme Court’s key move was to require that the “tipper” have received some
“personal benefit” for transmitting the information,352 and lower courts soon
found that requirement unsatisfied in some significant prosecutions of
“tippees.”353 Consequently, prosecutors switched tracks and found they could
side-step this 10b-5 requirement by resorting to Title 18 (where most, but hardly
all, standard federal crimes are codified) and charging under Section 1348.354 A
DOJ publication observed:
Bad cases make bad law, and section 10b-5 . . . has spawned a wide variety of
cases across the circuits which can cause confusion for prosecutors and judges
alike. Section 1348, both because of its newness and the lack of a civil cause of

347.
Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 28 (1987); see William K.S. Wang, Application of
the Federal Mail and Wire Fraud Statutes to Criminal Liability for Stock Market Insider Trading and
Tipping, 70 U. MIAMI L. REV. 220, 248 (2015).
348.
United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 653-59 (1997).
349.
Wang, supra note 347, at 222.
350.
Karen E. Woody, The New Insider Trading, 52 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 594, 615-16 (2019) (quoting
148 Cong. Rec. S7420 (2002) (daily ed. July 26, 2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy)).
351.
Cf. id. at 616 (finding “far less precedent for the application and interpretation of § 1348
than for § 10(b), given that § 1348 was enacted just under twenty years ago”).
352.
Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 647 (1983)
353.
See United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 442 (2d Cir. 2014), abrogated by Salman v.
United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 429 (2016) (holding that “personal benefit” can include the benefit one
receives by making a gift of confidential information). Paring back the Second Circuit’s Newman analysis,
the Supreme Court in Salman rejected the defendant’s appeal to the rule of lenity, finding that his conduct
was within the “heartland” of Supreme Court doctrine. Baer, supra note 143, at 149.
354.
Peter J. Henning, A New Way to Charge Insider Trading, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2015)
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/25/business/dealbook/a-new-way-to-charge-insider-trading.html
[https://perma.cc/6LUL-MWLW]; RICHMAN, STITH & STUNTZ, supra note 20, at 883.
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action, offers a simpler approach, without the unwelcome freight which decades
of litigation — much of it civil — has piled onto 10b-5.355

In a case where the jury acquitted on Rule 10b-5 charges but convicted on
wire fraud and Section 1348 counts, the Second Circuit recently rejected the
applicability of the so-called “personal benefit test” to Section 1348, reasoning
that the test is a “judge made doctrine premised upon the Exchange Act’s
statutory purpose,” and thus not applicable to the new statute.356
Perhaps this is just a story of path-dependence peculiar to securities fraud,
with its high-frequency criminal litigation and parallel civil development.
Moreover, as previously discussed, the common-law-like history of federal
“fraud” doubtless contributed to the openly collaborative role the courts sought
to play in defining an ostensibly administrative crime.357 But, with these caveats,
one might still find the story to highlight the role courts could play in shaping
the contours of other such crimes. The 10b-5 offense was authorized by
Congress, unleashed by the SEC, developed by courts, and controlled (in its
criminal form) by prosecutors. Renewed legislative attention simply gave
prosecutors a new blank slate, with the level and nature of judicial attention yet
to be determined, and the possibility, as Karen E. Woody notes, that a Section
10b-5 civil enforcement action could be harder to prove than a Section 1348
criminal action arising from the very same conduct.358 If the core “nondelegation concern in Gundy . . . is the concentration of power in one branch,”359
one certainly finds no such concentration in this collaborative account, save for
the usual (and massive) discretion that prosecutors have to choose among
available statutory options.360

355.
Sandra Moser & Justin Weitz, 18 U.S.C. § 1348 — A Workhorse Statute for Prosecutors,
66 DOJ J. FED. L. & PRAC. 111, 120-21 (2018).
356.
United States v. Blaszczak, 947 F.3d 19, 35-36 (2d Cir. 2019). The Supreme Court vacated
and remanded this case for “consideration in light of Kelly v. United States, [140 S. Ct. 1565 (2020)].”
141 S.Ct. 1040 (2021). Because, on remand, the government retreated, on the basis of Kelly, from its prior
analysis of what constituted “property,” Letter Brief for the Government at 1, United States v. Blaszczak,
Nos. 18-2811(L) et al., 2021 WL 2315183, at *1 (June 4, 2021), the Second Circuit may reverse without
reaching the personal benefit issue. For a thoughtful defense of the panel’s initial understanding of Section
1348, see Zachary J. Lustbader, Note, Title 18 Insider Trading, 130 YALE L.J. 1828, 1858-63 (2021).
357.
Cf. Fisch, supra note 342, at 483 (“Existing insider trading law is the product of a
lawmaking partnership,” in which the “Court, Congress, and the SEC have made multiple adjustments
and refinements.”); Baer, supra note 143, at 138 (“If one conceptualizes the legality principle as a
spectrum between code-driven and common-law systems, one can quickly conclude that insider trading
falls on the common-law side of that spectrum.”).
358.
Woody, supra note 350, at 639-40; see Langevoort, supra note 344, at 525-28.
359.
Divine, supra note 258, at 194.
360.
See United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123-25 (1979) (noting longstanding doctrine
that “when an act violates more than one criminal statute, the Government may prosecute under either so
long as it does not discriminate against any class of defendants,” and rejecting the argument that this
discretion amounts to an unconstitutional delegation); Stephen Smith, Overcoming Overcriminalization,
102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 537, 554 (2013) (criticizing doctrine that allows “incremental
punishment” to be “determined solely by an arbitrary factor — namely, the prosecutor’s choice as to which
statute to proceed under — rather than differences in culpability or a considered legislative judgment that
higher penalties are warranted for that type of behavior”); Hessick, supra note 91, at 1015 (noting how
overlapping statutes effectively “delegate the scope of the criminal law to prosecutors”).

363

Yale Journal on Regulation

Vol. 39:304 2022

A Gorsuch critique’s gloss on this history would tell of congressional
abdication to the SEC in 1934, and marvel at how, in 2002, even in the face of
political demand for some legislative response in the wake of a crisis, Congress
still refrained from serious crime-definition work—presumably after the
legislative deliberation that the critique valorizes. Would a more serious demand
for legislative specificity, effected through a more muscular use of the rule of
lenity and a more searching inquiry into “intelligible principles” have forced
Congress to do better? Not without a sea-change in the crime-defining load that
the term “fraud” has been allowed to bear. One would hardly expect that change
to come from courts, which, as we have seen, have embraced their definition role
whenever that term has been used. Perhaps we are seeing a combination of
legislative abdication and judicial imperialism. But it is unrealistic to expect that
courts, so comfortable with their outsized role in this area, would deploy the
legislation-forcing interpretative canons that Justice Gorsuch would invoke.361
The story of Section 1348 is thus an object lesson for those who believe that
efforts to force congressional attention will be rewarded. It also serves as a
reminder that the ability of agencies with delegated authority to define criminal
offenses can be quite limited when their handiwork is filtered through courts and
prosecutors.
B. A World Without Administrative Crimes?
A serious adherent to Gorsuch’s critique could fairly accuse this Article of
egregiously leveling down. The Sixth Circuit attack on the sweep of Section 242
liability has considerable intellectual rigor, as does the longstanding
condemnation of the sweep of federal fraud liability by many commentators and
even some lower courts. The Lacey Act has its critics, and pirates surely feel
unfairly treated. Hasn’t this Article cherry-picked some of the worst examples of
federal crime-definition, and then turned around and suggested that
administrative crimes are “no worse”?
My response is to deny the cherry-picking, and simply welcome readers to
the world of federal criminal law. Rather than leveling down, I am merely levelsetting. Consider a world without administrative crimes, which in fact might not
be very different (except maybe for the criminal cases agencies merely threaten
to refer to prosecutors). Already, when it comes to pursuing environmental
crimes, prosecutors turn to Title 18 in almost forty-five percent of cases, charging
standard conspiracy, false statement, obstruction, and fraud statutes.362 That
361.
See Elhauge, supra note 334, at 2165.
362.
David M. Uhlmann, Prosecutorial Discretion and Environmental Crime Redux: Charging
Trends, Aggravating Factors, and Individual Outcome Data for 2005-2014, 8 MICH. J. ENV’T. & ADMIN.
L. 297, 315 (2019) [hereinafter Uhlmann, Redux]; see also David M. Uhlmann, Prosecutorial Discretion
and Environmental Crime, 38 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 159, 184-86 (2014) [hereinafter, Uhlmann,
Prosecutorial Discretion] (examining all cases investigated by the EPA from 2005-2010 and finding Title
18 used against 375 of 864 defendants); Joshua Ozymy & Melissa Jarrell, Wielding the Green Stick:
Criminal Enforcement at the EPA Under the Bush and Obama Administrations, 24 ENV’T. POL. 38, 47
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figure is somewhat inflated because “the object of the conspiracy charges will
often be a substantive violation of the underlying environmental statute. . . .”363
But the figure understates the availability of Title 18 charges because prosecutors
often charge false statements under environmental statutes instead of the generic
18 U.S.C. § 1001, which punishes false statements to any federal official.364
Moreover, instead of charging conspiracies to violate environmental statutes,
prosecutors could likely charge conspiracies to defraud the government of
information, since the regulatory violations that are pursued criminally will
inevitably entail some degree of deception. As the Supreme Court has noted, 18
U.S.C. § 371 “reaches any conspiracy for the purpose of impairing, obstructing
or defeating the lawful function of any department of Government.”365 A court
recently noted: “[C]onspiracies to defraud the government by interfering with its
agencies’ lawful functions are illegal because § 371 makes them illegal, not
because they happen to overlap with substantive prohibitions found in other
statutes.”366 Mail or wire fraud charges are also available when the failure to
disclose regulatory violations can be framed as the deceit of, say, customers, as
one finds in the recent indictment of Blue Bell Creamery’s former president for
his alleged efforts to conceal what the company knew about Listeria
contamination.367
One finds the same pattern in cases involving workplace fatalities that could
be pursued as criminal violations of Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) regulations.368 One observer reported:
(2015) (reviewing environmental prosecutions for fiscal years 2001-2011 and finding 36.3 percent
involved general non-environmental-specific offenses).
363.
Uhlmann, Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 362, at 185.
364.
Compare Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(4) (2018) (providing for a two-year
maximum for any person “who knowingly makes any false material statement, representation, or
certification in any application, record, report, plan, or other document filed or required to be maintained
under this chapter or who knowingly falsifies, tampers with, or renders inaccurate any monitoring device
or method required to be maintained under this chapter”), with 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2018) (providing for
a five-year maximum term of imprisonment); see Uhlmann, Prosecution Discretion, supra note 362, at
186 n.118. On the sweep of liability under Section 1001, see Lisa Kern Griffin, Criminal Lying,
Prosecutorial Power, and Social Meaning, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1515, 1517 (2009); and Erin Murphy,
Manufacturing Crime: Process, Pretext, and Criminal Justice, 97 GEO. L.J. 1435, 1468 (2009).
365.
Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 128 (1987); see Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S.
855, 861 (1966); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 66 (1942); Hammerschmidt v. United States, 265
U.S. 182, 188 (1924); Haas v. Henkel, 216 U.S. 462, 479 (1910); see also United States v. Gas Pipe, Inc.,
997 F.3d 231, 235 (5th Cir. 2021) (prosecuting conspiracy to defraud the Food and Drug Administration
by misbranding drugs); United States v. Atilla, 966 F.3d 118, 122, 130 (2d Cir. 2020) (prosecuting
conspiracy to obstruct U.S. enforcement of economic sanctions laws); United States v. Kelerchian, 937
F.3d 895, 905 (7th Cir. 2019) (prosecuting conspiracy to defraud the FDA by obstructing the agency’s
ability to perform two regulatory functions); United States v. Rodman, 776 F.3d 638, 642 (9th Cir. 2015)
(“[T]he submission of fraudulent forms to a governmental agency by two or more persons when those
fraudulent forms impede that agency’s lawful functions constitutes a conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371”).
366.
United States v. Concord Mgmt., 347 F. Supp. 3d 38, 47 (D.D.C. 2018).
367.
Press Release, Department of Justice, Former Blue Bell Creameries President Charged in
Connection With 2015 Ice Cream Listeria Contamination, (Oct. 21, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa
/pr/former-blue-bell-creameries-president-charged-connection-2015-ice-cream-listeria [https://perma.cc/
2MAX-LBZZ].
368.
See United States v. DNRB, Inc., 895 F.3d 1063, 1066 (8th Cir. 2018) (upholding the
misdemeanor conviction of a construction company for workplace fatality).
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In the forty plus years since Congress enacted the [Occupational Safety and Health
(OSH)] Act, there have been more than 400,000 workplace fatalities, yet fewer
than eighty total OSH Act criminal cases have been prosecuted — fewer than two
per year — and only approximately a dozen have resulted in criminal convictions.
Historically, [prosecutors] typically have targeted cases in which the employers
were alleged to have falsified documents and lied to OSHA in conjunction with
underlying regulatory violations relating to an employee fatality.369

Doing away with explicit administrative crimes would thus vastly reduce
the notice and legislative specificity of the charged offenses, leaving the
prosecutorial landscape dominated by sweeping statutes that the Supreme Court
refuses to curtail—in part because the federal interests implicated leave no room
for constraining federalism canons.370 Instead of charging technical statutes that
guide lawyers ex ante and leave defendants room to maneuver ex post, criminal
cases would be about “doing the Government wrong.” And defendants might
well face greater punishments, since Congress has often taken care to render
certain regulatory projects toothless—as it has by making criminal OSHA
violations misdemeanors.
The claim is not that regulations will invariably be clear and technical.
Consider Rule 10-5’s sweeping language and how courts took control of its
meaning. Still, the ex ante clarity and notice of rule-based administrative crimes
is likely to be far greater than that of a world dominated by Title 18 offenses.
Would elimination of administrative crimes change who is prosecuted?
Probably not substantially, at least with respect to felonies. It is already quite
difficult for regulatory agencies to get prosecutors to take their cases. Part of the
problem is that agencies often lack the resources to investigate the serious cases
that are less likely to be declined. David Uhlmann reports that “[i]n recent years,
EPA often has had far less than the mandatory 200 agents, which makes it even
more difficult to maintain a robust law enforcement program and results in fewer
investigations and prosecutions.”371 The larger problem is that agencies must
compete hard for prosecutorial attention: the competition is most severe in U.S.
Attorneys’ Offices, which have wide-ranging responsibilities, but even dedicated
Main Justice units like the Environment and Natural Resources Division—which
brings OSHA cases as well as environmental cases372—are likely to look for
aggravating factors, going far beyond willful regulatory violations. As David
Uhlmann recently reported:

369.
Eric J. Conn and Kate M. McMahon, OSHA Criminal Cases on the Rise, OSHA DEF.
REPORT (Jan. 22, 2016) (noting efforts by the Justice Department to do more in this area), https://osha
defensereport.com/2016/01/22/osha-criminal-cases-on-the-rise [https://perma.cc/HY7Q-ZC3N] (noting
efforts by the Justice Department to do more in this area).
370.
For refusals to curtail Section 1001, see Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398 (1998), in
which the Court rejected an “‘exculpatory no’ defense”; and United States v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63, 6870 (1984), in which the Court held that the government need not prove that the defendant knew of federal
agency jurisdiction when making a false statement. For Section 371 cases, see supra note 365.
371.
Uhlmann, Redux, supra note 362, at 313.
372.
See Memorandum of Understanding Between the U.S. Departments of Labor and of Justice
on Criminal Prosecution of Worker Safety Laws (Dec. 17, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/enrd/file/800
526/download [https://perma.cc/U46E-GXSB].
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Prosecutors continue to focus on violations that involve harm, deceptive or
misleading conduct, or operating outside the regulatory system — and in most
cases look for a combination of one or more of those factors plus repetitiveness.
Relatively few cases involve isolated misconduct.373

Conduct with those characteristics could likely be captured via Title 18,
were prosecutors so inclined. Indeed, prosecutors would doubtless enjoy sticking
with these more familiar statutes, and threatening the higher penalties often
available with them.374 Agencies, for their part, would not need administrative
crimes to add teeth to their regulatory mandates. Even though Congress chose
not to authorize criminal prosecution of violations of rules promulgated by the
Consumer Finance Protection Board, that agency can freely refer egregious
conduct to a U.S. Attorney’s Office for prosecution as mail and wire fraud.375
This examination of the regulatory enforcement environment is concededly
cursory, and I make no general claim that every regulatory crime case that
prosecutors want to pursue can necessarily be captured via Title 18 charges. Still,
three points emerge. First, a muscular judicial effort along the lines suggested by
the Gorsuch critique, which requires Congress to do more to define
administrative crimes, would not necessarily result in Congress doing anything
of the kind—except perhaps with respect to misdemeanor offenses that lie at the
boundary of civil and criminal law.376 Standard Title 18 offenses would likely
capture the most of aggravated cases prosecutors deem worth pursuing as
felonies. Prosecutors can charge those standard offenses instead of, or in
conjunction with, administrative offenses. And because defendants will
generally plead guilty, cases often will not proceed beyond the district court. The
pressure on Congress to mend its ways would therefore be quite limited.

373.
Uhlmann, Prosecutorial Discretion and Environmental Crime Redux, supra note 362, at
368; see REPORT, FEWER CRIMINAL PROSECUTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES UNDER TRUMP, TRAC
(2019), https://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/crim/581 [https://perma.cc/GK6Q-D8R9] (noting only 302 new
environmental prosecutions in 2019, and showing significant and steady downward trend in such cases
from 1999); see David M. Uhlmann, New Environmental Crimes Project Data Shows That Pollution
Prosecutions Plummeted During the First Two Years of the Trump Administration 2 (Mich. L. Sch., Pub.
L. & Legal Theory Rsch. Paper No. 685, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3710109 [https://perma.cc
/2E2H-36K3] (reporting seventy percent and greater-than-fifty percent drops in Clean Water Act and
Clear Air Act prosecutions, respectively, under the Trump Administration as compared to the Obama
Administration).
374.
One open question is whether the returns to an agency for bringing cases—measured in
perceived deterrence, congressional funding, or some other metric—turn on the use of subject-matterspecific administrative criminal charges.
375.
Press Release, U.S. Att’y’s Office for S.D.N.Y., Manhattan U.S. Attorney Charges Debt
Settlement Company and Six Individuals for Multi-Million Dollar Scheme That Targeted Debt-Ridden
Consumers (May 7, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/manhattan-us-attorney-charges-debtsettlement-company-and-six-individuals-multi-million [https://perma.cc/MMW3-R8MX].
376.
See, e.g., United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 152, 164-69 (2d Cir. 2012) (reversing, in
light of First Amendment infirmity, a misdemeanor conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 333(a)(2) for promoting
an FDA-approved drug for off-label use); see John Malcolm, LEGAL MEMORANDUM, CRIMINAL LAW AND
THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE: THE PROBLEM WITH CRIMINAL REGULATIONS, HERITAGE FOUND. 5-6
(Aug. 6, 2014), https://www.heritage.org/crime-and-justice/report/criminal-law-and-the-administrativestate-the-problem-criminal-regulations [https://perma.cc/RY8X-FW7S] (singling out the underlying
charge in Caronia as an example of “regulatory overcriminalization.”).
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Second, any such shift to Title 18 would nullify (for better or worse) any
congressional effort to dial down penal consequences in particular regulatory
spaces. Those seeking more punitive responses to regulatory violations might
well be pleased,377 but political accountability would surely be lessened.
Finally, the self-dealing concerns that so troubled Justice Gorsuch in Gundy
are quite attenuated when the regulatory agency that defined an administrative
crime is not the DOJ.378 One might indeed worry about an agency’s promulgating
rules to aggrandize its authority, or reduce its enforcement costs, but no rule will
form the basis of a criminal prosecution unless a prosecutor decides that a
defendant’s conduct involves the kind of egregious illegality that would lead a
judge or jury to think it it’s really a “crime.” Prosecutors are trained on a diet of
violent crime, fraud, and narcotics cases and have likely internalized notions of
due process that counsel against hyper-technical cases against individuals. They
know that failure is likely unless they can tell a simple story of “fraud,”
“cheating,” or “illegitimate greed.” Stories of regulatory complexity are mostly
likely to come from the defense.
Here, as in so much of the criminal enforcement regime, we see a true
“separation of powers dynamic”—not an “external” one between constitutional
branches but an “internal” one, involving distinct departments and agencies, each
with its institutional structure and culture.379 Although quite different from the
external one that Justice Gorsuch valorizes, we ought not underestimate the
degree to which this dynamic promotes agency (and perhaps prosecutorial)
accountability.380 No claim is made here about the majesty of the federal
“criminal code.” There really is not one federal “criminal code,” and to the extent
there is such a “code” scattered throughout Title 18 and elsewhere, it is, in Julie
O’Sullivan’s excellent words, “a disgrace.”381 I do not claim that federal
prosecutors necessarily make appropriate judgements when charging matters that
would otherwise be targets of “merely” regulatory enforcement (which can be
quite punitive indeed). Rather, when prosecutors do pursue such cases—using
377.
See, e.g., Vanessa Dick, Dirty Money and Wildlife Trafficking: Using the Money
Laundering Control Act to Prosecute Illegal Wildlife Trade, 49 ENV’T L. REP. 10,334, 10,337-40 (2019)
(urging Congress to incorporate Lacey Act violations as predicates for RICO and the money laundering
statute, noting the “harsh fines and prison penalties,” as well as civil asset forfeiture authorized by those
Title 18 offenses); see also Michael O’Hear, Sentencing the Green-Collar Offender: Punishment,
Culpability, and Environmental Crime, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 133, 197-202 (2004) (noting low
sentences for environmental offenses).
378.
Even within DOJ, a regulatory unit might be quite removed from prosecutorial units.
379.
See Richman, supra note 28, at 754; see also Gillian Metzger, The Interdependent
Relationship Between Internal and External Separation of Powers, 59 EMORY L.J. 423, 425 (2009)
(calling for more attention to internal checks within the Executive Branch).
380.
See Richman, supra note 208, at 53 (discussing prosecutor’s ability to hold police to
account); Daniel Richman, Law Enforcement Organization Relationships, in OXFORD UNIVERSITY
HANDBOOK OF PROSECUTORS AND PROSECUTION (Ronald Wright, Russell Gold & Kay Levine eds.,
2021) (same).
381.
O’Sullivan, supra note 92, 643; see also id. at 648 n.21 (“Arriving at an accurate count of
the number of federal crimes is difficult for two reasons. First, the statutes are numerous and scattered
throughout the 50 Titles of the United States Code, federal regulations, and even rules of court. Second,
compilers must determine what counts as a crime and differentiate, where different acts are criminalized
within a single statutory section, whether that section ought to be counted as one crime or many.”).
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some mix of Title 18 offenses, specialized regulatory offenses created by
Congress, and administrative crimes defined by regulatory agencies—the
specific concerns a defendant might have about notice, overreach, and
overcriminalization will usually have little to do with the legislative genealogy
of the offenses charged.
Indeed, one might see administrative crimes as, to some extent, addressing
Rachel Barkow’s critique of federal criminal law’s capacity for executive
overreach, which draws considerable support from its comparison of the
structural and procedural protections of administrative law with those afforded
to criminal defendants.382 Administrative crimes do not fully address Barkow’s
critique, as prosecutors still retain untrammeled discretion. Nonetheless,
Congress’s delegation of substantial crime-definition authority to agencies—in
lieu of leaving prosecutors to effectively define crime within extraordinarily
broad criminal laws—creates some of the structural and procedural protections
from administrative law that Barkow covets. And it does so without the need for
deploying the formalist separation-of-powers doctrine that she seeks to bring to
criminal law. An agency may have its own self-dealing issues, which might lead
it to craft rules that lessen its proof burden in civil enforcement cases. But that is
an administrative law issue, not an administrative crime one.
Of course, the structural separation between rulemaking and prosecution is
not an unalloyed good. Were an agency to focus exclusively on its own
regulatory concerns and enforcement realities, it might not give sufficient
thought to the prospect that its rules will become a basis for a criminal
prosecution when violated “willfully.” To the extent that this tunnel vision
occurs, casual (over)criminalization is indeed a risk. A minor, but perhaps
salutary, proposal addressing this risk would require that agencies “list and make
generally available in full text all regulations that carry potential criminal
penalties, and perhaps that Congress then be required to ratify any such
regulation before it can provide the basis for a criminal prosecution.”383 In the
same vein, but less susceptible to congressional gridlock, was an Executive Order
issued by the Trump Administration (and since then revoked by President Biden)
that required, among other things, (a) that all future regulations explicitly indicate
whether violation of any provision therein can itself be a basis for criminal
liability, and (b) that future regulations “explicitly state a mens rea requirement
for each such provision or identify the provision as a strict liability offense
. . . .”384
382.
See Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989,
993 (2006) (“[U]nlike the administrative law context, where agencies must adhere to the structural and
process protections of the APA and their decisions are subject to judicial review, the government faces
almost no institutional checks when it proceeds in criminal matters.”).
383.
Paul Larkin Jr. & Michael Mukasey, LEGAL MEMORANDUM, THE PERILS OF
OVERCRIMINALIZATION, HERITAGE FOUND. 5 (Feb. 12, 2015), https://www.heritage.org/report/the-perils
-overcriminalization [https://perma.cc/Y6WC-A7GV].
384.
Protecting Americans From Overcriminalization Through Regulatory Reform, Exec. Order
No. 13,980, § 4(a)-(b), 86 Fed. Reg. 6817, 6817 (Jan. 18, 2021), revoked by Revocation of Certain
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Against the contributions that such measures might make to thoughtful
agency deliberation, one should weigh the possibility that interagency
consultation with prosecutors in the regulatory process would ensure that
prosecutorial equities and charging discretion shape, and even drive, agency
action. After all, the mere potential for criminal charges will regularly stiffen an
agency’s bargaining position, even in matters that are likely to remain on the civil
side.385 Coordination efforts thus might ironically incentivize more enforcer selfdealing. But the goal of facilitating congressional oversight is a worthy one.
C. Judging Delegations
Having considered a world without them, let us return the “problem” of
administrative crimes, and of delegated criminal lawmaking more generally.
How does one normatively sort through the many contexts in which federal
criminal law is largely defined by bodies other than the national legislature
(although it does always operate under the aegis of Congress)?
Originalism offers little leverage on the problem. One need not resolve the
current debate on the extent to which nondelegation concerns troubled the
Founders386 to see that the Gorsuch critique’s demand for heightened scrutiny of
criminal law delegations finds little support in understandings and practices of
the Founding. Legislators in the Early Republic were quite ready to anchor
federal criminal law provisions in “the law of nations” for piracy387 and the law
of states for the Assimilative Crimes Act.388 They also gave courts ample room
to fill out vague statutory prohibitions through common law development.389
The strong version of a separation-of-powers-based insistence on Congress
as the sole “author” of all federal criminal law counsels the condemnation of
every variety of delegation explored here. A weak version might embrace all
these delegations since Congress always sets the terms of punishment and, as the
Sharpnack Court suggested, ought to be excused from constantly revisiting
Presidential Actions and Technical Amendment, Exec. Order No. 14,029, § 1, 86 Fed. Reg. 27,025 (May
14, 2021).
385.
The Executive Order sought to reduce agency leverage in ordinary cases by requiring
agencies to issue guidance about how they plan “to administratively address regulatory offenses subject
to potential criminal liability rather than refer those offenses to the Department of Justice for criminal
enforcement.” Id. § 5(a), 86 Fed. Reg. at 6818. Yet I suspect that such plans, if issued, would not do more
than set conversation rules.
386.
Compare Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 11, and Christine Kexel Chabot, The Lost
History of Delegation at the Founding, 56 GA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022), https://ssrn.com/abstract=
3654564 [https://perma.cc/824C-QF7B], with Aaron Gordon, Nondelegation Misinformation: A Rebuttal
to “Delegation at the Founding” (Mar. 25, 2020) (manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=3561062 [https://perma.cc/9TBW-2KCW]; Aaron Gordon, Nondelegation, 12 NYU J.L. &
LIBERTY 718, 729, 778-79 (2019), and Ilan Wurman, Nondelegation at the Founding, 130 YALE L.J. 1288
(2021).
387.
See supra Section II.C.2.
388.
See supra Section II.B.2; see also Act of Feb. 28, 1803, ch. 10, 2 Stat. 205 (1803) (“An Act
to prevent the importation of certain persons into certain states, where by the laws thereof, their admission
is prohibited”) (targeting the foreign slave trade, before the Constitution allowed for a federal prohibition,
see U.S. CONST. Art. I, §. 9, cl. 1, by looking to state law prohibitions).
389.
See supra Section II.A.1.
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statutes that dynamically incorporate the definitional work of another
authority.390 Indeed, Congress’s regular reversion to statutes that delegate
considerable criminal lawmaking authority, to increase their penalties, recodify
them, or make them predicates for other criminal offenses indicates far more than
passive acquiescence.
But perhaps the Sharpnack license is peculiar to a regime designed to
promote federalism. Given his kind words for the ACA,391 Justice Gorsuch
himself may think so. But how far does respect for state sovereignty go? How,
for instance, does one score the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA)?392 Even as it provides for an EPA regime of permits for the
transportation of hazardous waste, it allows the EPA to approve state hazardous
waste programs that are equal or more stringent than federal standards. “When a
state program is authorized under RCRA, federal regulations are displaced or
supplanted by state regulations,” the Tenth Circuit has explained, but EPA
“retains the power under RCRA to pursue civil and criminal remedies for
violations of the state program.”393 Thus, if federal prosecutors bring a case in
such a state, authority to proceed criminally will have come from Congress, with
the source of law being state regulations, as approved by a federal agency that
will have persuaded the prosecutors to go forward. Does the extent of state
involvement make this regime better or worse under Justice Gorsuch’s analysis?
If federalism is a trump, what about international comity and cooperation?
While perhaps not yet transcendent constitutional values, as U.S. criminal
enforcement increasingly bumps up against and requires the assistance of foreign
sovereigns,394 why shouldn’t they gain that status?395 Of course, if these trumps
are acceptable, the Gorsuch critique loses considerable formal power and opens
itself up to justifications for administrative crimes that sound in pragmatism,
expediency, and expertise.
As Kahan noted decades ago, agency rulemaking offers considerable
advantage over what effectively has been a regime of judicial lawmaking
empowered by common law or just plain vague statutory terms.396 Moreover, the
risk of self-dealing highlighted by Justice Gorsuch in Gundy and recognized by
Kahan is alleviated or even eliminated when agencies other than DOJ devise their
own rules, according to proper rulemaking procedures, primarily for civil
enforcement. And note how one can turn around the concern of Hessick and
390.
See supra text accompanying notes 251-252.
391.
See supra text accompanying note 254.
392.
42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) (2018).
393.
United States v. Richter, 796 F.3d 1173, 1183 (10th Cir. 2015). A similar regime is found
in the Clean Water Act, which provides for federal prosecutions for violations of state water treatment
programs that have been approved by the EPA. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2) (2018); see United States v.
Iverson, 162 F.3d 1015, 1019 (9th Cir. 1998).
394.
See Koh, Foreign Affairs Prosecutions, supra note 275, at 346-52; see also Koh, The
Criminalization of Foreign Relations, supra note 275, at 740 (noting the extent of the criminalization of
foreign relations).
395.
See Anthony J. Colangelo, The Foreign Commerce Clause, 96 U. VA. L. REV. 949 (2010);
Scott Sullivan, The Future of the Foreign Commerce Clause, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 1955 (2015).
396.
Kahan, supra note 21, at 503-04.
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Hessick that agencies lack expertise when it comes to crime-definition.397 The
story of congressional authorship in the federal criminal sphere, for nearly a halfcentury, has largely been one of reliance on DOJ drafting—whenever the DOJ
could slip a “fix” into the omnibus bills that used to be a staple of criminal
lawmaking398 or when it provided material for a Congress looking to make a
“tough on crime” statement.399 Congress supposedly has the greatest “expertise”
on retribution, but its habit of using criminal lawmaking more to loudly condemn
than to actually apportion punishment diminishes any claim to actual expertise.
Weighed against the risks of self-dealing or sloppiness created by the “normal”
means of crime-definition, administrative rulemaking proves appealing: it treats
regulation as structuring primary behavior in a complex world, drawing lines
within spheres of socially productive activity between prohibited and allowed
conduct, rather than providing tools for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
Note that nothing here resolves the question of how to resolve the tension
between Chevron or Auer/Kisor and lenity.400 One need not exalt the rule of
lenity as a tool for ensuring strict legislative supremacy to hold criminal-offense
definition to a higher standard than we hold non-penal lawmaking.401 The sooner
we get past wholesale efforts to delegitimize administrative crimes as a whole,
the sooner we can get to this somewhat tougher question. Still, those addressing
it would do well to recognize the advantages of thoughtful ex ante agency law
development—which will invariably occur outside the context of a specific
criminal case, compared to the relatively freelance interpretations prosecutors
offer (and courts often accept) on favorable facts.402 Particularly when one
recognizes the rule of lenity’s spotty record as a restraint on liability
expansion,403 the relative process advantages of articulated and prospective
interpretations by expert agencies ought to loom large indeed.
In the end, perhaps the sorry record of congressional criminal lawmaking
in the past half-century—so dominated by a mix of broad statutes passed to
address some perceived need for a political statement and a regular supply of
DOJ “fixes”—is itself a “trump” of the Gorsuch critique. The accretion of
administrative crimes has given federal criminal law and practice greater clarity
397.
Hessick & Hessick, supra note 12, at 322-25.
398.
See supra note 209 (statutory overrides).
399.
See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified at scattered
titles of U.S.C.); see also Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, § 2(f)(1)(B),
123 Stat. 1617, 1618 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(9) (2018)), overriding United States v. Santos, 553
U.S. 507 (2008).
400.
See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
401.
See Whitman v. United States, 574 U.S. 1003, 353 (2014) (Scalia, J., statement respecting
the denial of certiorari) (“Undoubtedly Congress may make it a crime to violate a regulation, but it is quite
a different matter for Congress to give agencies — let alone for us to presume that Congress gave agencies
— power to resolve ambiguities in criminal legislation.” (first citing United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S.
506, 519 (1911); and then citing Carter v. Welles-Bowen Realty, Inc., 736 F.3d 722, 733 (6th Cir. 2013)
(Sutton, J., concurring))).
402.
See Sanford N. Greenberg, Who Says It’s a Crime?: Chevron Deference to Agency
Interpretations of Regulatory Statutes that Create Criminal Liability, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 42-60 (1996).
403.
See RICHMAN, STITH & STUNTZ, supra note 20, at 97 (addressing the “so-called rule of
lenity”).
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and specificity than it would otherwise have, and perhaps has even made it less
punitive, since specialized regulatory offenses often come with lower statutory
maximums than are allowed by general Title 18 offenses like “conspiracy to
defraud the United States.”404
If one looks not for community condemnation but for “liberty” in the form
of well-crafted legislation, rather than abstract separation-of-powers theories,
administrative crimes are even more attractive. Indeed, those whose chief
motivation for targeting administrative crimes is to advance a broader antiregulatory agenda might want to revisit their implicit assumption that the number
of felony cases brought in service of a regulatory scheme would be any different
in the absence of administrative crimes.405
Conclusion
As an aesthetic matter, administrative crimes and their proliferation may be
uniquely disquieting.406 Within federal criminal law, judicial delegations can
always be framed as “interpretation,” the ACA addresses just the quirk of federal
enclaves, and piracy is a special, historically honored transnational crime.
Administrative crimes, in contrast, explicitly demand that we confront the
seeming abdication of a foundational legislative duty and the empowerment of
bureaucracy. This Article’s goal is not to deny the power of formalist instincts,
but rather to challenge those who hold them to confront federal criminal law not
just as it is, but as it conceivably can be.
Since the Founding, Congress has delegated considerable crime-definition
authority to a range of entities—from courts to states to the “law of nations.” It
is hard to imagine the Supreme Court or lower courts changing that with even
the most muscular and repeated deployments of void-for-vagueness and lenity
doctrines. The issue is not whether Congress will delegate, but to whom, and
what institutional, structural, and procedural dynamics will thereby govern some
or all of the federal crime-definition project. We have seen the range of
delegations that Congress has actually deployed, and this Article explored the
distinct set of values promoted or diminished by each delegation, as well as the
institutional design of the delegatee. The contested nature of those values—
accountability, liberty, deliberation, federalism, international comity—and the
ways they interact not only challenge Justice Gorsuch’s critique of administrative
crimes, but also push us to think harder about judicial competence to police these
404.
See supra notes 364-369 and accompanying text.
405.
Some cases now charged as criminal misdemeanors might be pursued civilly, and to the
extent that civil procedures offer more opportunities to inflict costs on the government, defendants might
thereby benefit. For an argument that overreliance on criminal charges ought to be addressed by
strengthening civil enforcement regimes, see Daniel Richman, Corporate Headhunting, 8 HARV. L. &
POL’Y REV. 265, 274-75 (2014).
406.
See Kristin E. Hickman, Foreword, Nondelegation as Constitutional Symbolism, 89 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1079, 1137 (2021) (“[S]ome degree of formal adherence to separation of powers principles
carries with it a certain symbolism that hits many ordinary people at a very visceral level and contributes
to perceptions of the fairness and legitimacy of government.”).
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delegations.407 Given the outsized role that a handful of well-worn but expansive
statutes already play in a federal criminal law landscape shaped by interactions
between prosecutors and courts, we should welcome the discrete and limited
contributions that expert agencies make to a newer range of offenses, however
odd looking.

407.
I owe this final point to Daphne Renan. See Nikolas Bowie & Daphna Renan, The
Separation-of-Powers Counterrevolution, 131 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2022) (arguing against judicial
enforcement of separation-of-powers law); see also Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2244-45
(Kagan, J., concurring in the judgment with respect to severability and dissenting in part) (“Recall again
how this dispute got started. In the midst of the Great Recession, Congress and the President came together
to create an agency with an important mission. . . . And now consider how the dispute ends—with five
unelected judges rejecting the result of that democratic process.”).
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